In re Marriage of Bonds

Decision Date21 August 2000
Docket NumberNo. S079760.,S079760.
Citation99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252,5 P.3d 815,24 Cal.4th 1
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF Susann Margreth BONDS and Barry Lamar Bonds. Susann Margreth Bonds, Appellant, v. Barry Lamar Bonds, Respondent.

Fancher & Wickland, Paige Leslie Wickland, Paula Conser Fancher, San Francisco, Anne E. Thorkelson; Law Offices of Lawrence H. Stotter and Lawrence H. Stotter, San Francisco, for Appellant.

Chern & Brenneman and Gertrude D. Chern, Santa Maria, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant.

De Goff and Sherman, Richard Sherman, Berkeley, Victoria J. De Goff; Robert J. Nachshin; Scott N. Weston, Los Angeles; and Stephen J. Montalvo, for Respondent.

Haight, Brown & Bonesteel, Roy G. Weatherup and Jennifer K. Saunders, Santa Monica, for Certain Underwriters at

Lloyds of London as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

In this case we consider whether appellant Susann (known as Sun) Margreth Bonds voluntarily entered into a premarital agreement with respondent Barry Lamar Bonds. We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in determining that because Sun, unlike Barry, was not represented by independent counsel when she entered into the agreement, the voluntariness of the agreement must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Instead, we determine that the circumstance that one of the parties was not represented by independent counsel is only one of several factors that must be considered in determining whether a premarital agreement was entered into voluntarily. Further, as we shall explain, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the determination of the trial court that the agreement in the present case was entered into voluntarily.

I

Sun and Barry met in Montreal in the summer of 1987 and maintained a relationship during ensuing months through telephone contacts. In October 1987, at Barry's invitation, Sun visited him for 10 days at his home in Phoenix, Arizona. In November 1987, Sun moved to Phoenix to take up residence with Barry and, one week later, the two became engaged to be married. In January 1988, they decided to marry before the commencement of professional baseball's spring training. On February 5, 1988, in Phoenix, the parties entered into a written premarital agreement in which each party waived any interest in the earnings and acquisitions of the other party during marriage.1 That same day, they flew to Las Vegas, and were married the following day.

Each of the parties then was 23 years of age. Barry, who had attended college for three years and who had begun his career in professional baseball in 1985, had a contract to play for the Pittsburgh Pirates. His annual salary at the time of the marriage ceremony was approximately $106,000. Sun had emigrated to Canada from Sweden in 1985, had worked as a waitress and bartender, and had undertaken some training as a cosmetologist, having expressed an interest in embarking upon a career as a makeup artist for celebrity clients. Although her native language was Swedish, she had used both French and English in her employment, education, and personal relationships when she lived in Canada. She was unemployed at the time she entered into the premarital agreement.

Barry petitioned for legal separation on May 27, 1994, in California, the parties then being California residents. Sun requested custody of the parties' two children, then three and four years of age. In addition, she sought child and spousal support, attorney fees, and a determination of property rights. The petition was amended to request dissolution, and the court bifurcated the trial proceedings, first adjudicating the issue of the validity of the premarital agreement and then reaching the remaining issues involving application of the agreement to the property held by the parties and the determination of spousal and child support. Child support was awarded in the amount of $10,000 per month per child. Spousal support was awarded in the amount of $10,000 per month, to terminate December 30, 1998. Only the first issue—the validity of the premarital agreement—is before this court.

Barry testified that he was aware of teammates and other persons who had undergone bitter marital dissolution proceedings involving the division of property, and recalled that from the beginning of his relationship with Sun he told her that he believed his earnings and acquisitions during marriage should be his own. He informed her he would not marry without a premarital agreement, and she had no objection. He also recalled that from the beginning of the relationship, Sun agreed that their earnings and acquisitions should be separate, saying "what's mine is mine, what's yours is yours." Indeed, she informed him that this was the practice with respect to marital property in Sweden. She stated that she planned to pursue a career and wished to be financially independent. Sun knew that Barry did not anticipate that she would shoulder her living expenses while she was not employed. She was not, in fact, employed during the marriage. Barry testified that he and Sun had no difficulty communicating.

Although Barry testified that he had previous experience working with lawyers in the course of baseball contract negotiations and the purchase of real property, his testimony at trial did not demonstrate an understanding of the legal fine points of the agreement.

Sun's testimony at trial differed from Barry's in material respects. She testified that her English language skills in 1987 and 1988 were limited. Out of pride, she did not disclose to Barry that she often did not understand him. She testified that she and Barry never discussed money or property during the relationship that preceded their marriage. She agreed that she had expressed interest in a career as a cosmetologist and had said she wished to be financially independent. She had very few assets when she took up residence with Barry, and he paid for all their needs. Their wedding arrangements were very informal, with no written invitations or caterer, and only Barry's parents and a couple of friends, including Barry's godfather Willie Mays, were invited to attend. No marriage license or venue had been arranged in advance of their arrival in Las Vegas.

Several persons testified as to the circumstances surrounding the signing of the premarital agreement.

Sun testified that on the evening before the premarital agreement was signed, Barry first informed her that they needed to go the following day to the offices of his lawyers, Leonard Brown and his associate Sabinus Megwa. She was uncertain, however, whether Barry made any reference to a premarital agreement. She testified that only at the parking lot of the law office where the agreement was to be entered into did she learn, from Barry's financial adviser, Mel Wilcox, that Barry would not marry her unless she signed a premarital agreement. She was not upset. She was surprised, however, because Barry never had said that signing the agreement was a precondition to marriage. She did not question Barry or anyone else on this point. She was under the impression that Barry wished to retain separate ownership of property he owned before the marriage, and that this was the sole object of the premarital agreement. She was unaware the agreement would affect her future and was not concerned about the matter, because she was nervous and excited about getting married and trusted Barry. Wilcox's statement had little effect on her, because she had no question but that she and Barry were to be married the following day.

Sun recalled having to hurry to arrive at the lawyers' office in time both to accomplish their business there and make the scheduled departure of the airplane to Las Vegas so that she and Barry could marry the next day. Sun recalled that once they arrived at the lawyers' office on February 5, 1988, she, her friend Margareta Forsberg, Barry, and Barry's financial adviser Mel Wilcox were present in a conference room. She did not recall asking questions or her friend asking questions, nor did she recall that any changes were made to the agreement. She declared that her English language skills were limited at the time and she did not understand the agreement, but she did not ask questions of anyone other than Margareta Forsberg or ask for more time, because she did not want to miss her flight and she was focussed on the forthcoming marriage ceremony. She did not believe that Barry understood the agreement either. Forsberg was unable to assist her. Sun did not recall the lawyers telling her that she should retain her own lawyer, that they were representing Barry and not her, that the applicable community property law provided that a spouse has an interest in the earnings and in acquisitions of the other spouse during marriage, or that she would be waiving this right if she signed the agreement. The lawyers may have mentioned the possibility of her being represented by her own lawyer, but she did not believe she needed one. She did not inform anyone at the meeting that she was concerned about the agreement; the meeting and discussion were not cut short, and no one forced her to sign the agreement.

Forsberg, a native of Sweden and 51 years of age at the time the agreement was signed, confirmed that she was present when Attorneys Brown and Megwa explained the agreement, that Wilcox also was present, that no changes to the agreement were made at Sun's or Forsberg's request, and that she had been unable to answer Sun's questions or explain to Sun the terminology used in the agreement. She confirmed that Sun's English was limited, that the lawyers had explained the agreement, and that Sun never stated that she was considering not signing the agreement, that she did not understand it, or that she was not signing of her own free will. Sun never said that Barry threatened her or forced her to sign, that she wanted to consult independent counsel...

To continue reading

Request your trial
187 cases
  • Bates v. Bates
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 3 février 2021
    ...coercion, and overreaching "may be read with their generally accepted meaning being applicable"); cf. In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal.4th 1, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815, 823 (2000) (relying on Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "voluntarily" because California's Uniform Premari......
  • In re Marriage of Kieturakis
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 29 mars 2006
    ...Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 630, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.) Our Supreme Court indicated in In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 27, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815, that the presumption of undue influence applies to marital settlement agreements. At issue in that case was......
  • Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 10 août 2011
    ...are the property of both partners in equal shares. ( Packard v. Arellanes (1861) 17 Cal. 525, 537;In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 12, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815.) The putative spouse doctrine extends this partnership concept to innocent parties of an invalid marriage. Thus,......
  • People v. Davis
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 26 février 2015
    ...289, 181 P.3d 105 ; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591 ; In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 31, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815.) Everything that can be presumed will be presumed in favor of the trial court's decision (People v. Giordano (2007)......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • Insuring the knot: the Massachusetts approach to postnuptial agreements.
    • United States
    • Suffolk University Law Review Vol. 45 No. 2, March 2012
    • 22 mars 2012
    ...Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 795 (Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing different states' philosophies for reviewing prenuptial agreements), rev'd in part, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000). Wisconsin, for instance, reviews prenuptial agreements for "substantive unfairness." See Greenwald v. Greenwald, 454 N.W.2d 34, ......
  • § 4.03 Modern Enforceability: Generally Accepted Equitable Limits
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 4 Marital Agreements
    • Invalid date
    ...Lee v. Lee, 35 Ark. App. 192, 816 S.W.2d 625 (1991) (contract signed one hour before the marriage). California: In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal.4th 1, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 252, 5 P.3d 815 (2000) (wife signed the contract the day before the wedding but she knew of plans for the contract a week be......
  • Exploring Identity
    • United States
    • ABA General Library Family Law Quarterly No. 55-1, April 2020
    • 1 avril 2020
    ...religious education provision); In re Marriage of Nuechterlein, 587 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 830 (Cal. 2000). The data set on which this Article is based excludes disputes that center on the enforceability of these clauses. 245. Abbo v. Briski......
  • "BECAUSE IT IS WRONG": AN ESSAY ON THE IMMORALITY AND ILLEGALITY OF THE ONLINE SERVICE CONTRACTS OF GOOGLE AND FACEBOOK.
    • United States
    • Journal of Law, Technology and the Internet No. 12, January 2021
    • 1 janvier 2021
    ...to the public policy underlying the no-fault provisions for dissolution of marriage." (566) The court, quoting In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000), noted that "... freedom of contract with respect to marital arrangements is tempered with statutory requirements and case law expre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT