Davis v. Dudley

• Decision Date: 19 September 1879
• Citation: 70 Me. 236
• Parties: JOSIAH H. DAVIS v. FRANCIS C. DUDLEY, and another. PARKER D. SHAW v. FRANCIS C. DUDLEY, appellant. FRANCIS C. DUDLEY v. PARKER D. SHAW, and others.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

70 Me. 236

JOSIAH H. DAVIS v. FRANCIS C. DUDLEY, and another.

PARKER D. SHAW v. FRANCIS C. DUDLEY, appellant.

FRANCIS C. DUDLEY v. PARKER D. SHAW, and others.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

September 19, 1879

ON REPORT.

The three actions were reported for the law court to determine the title between the parties.

The first two actions are trespass quare clausum.

Davis and Shaw both claim title under deed from Francis C. Dudley to Parker D. Shaw, dated November 27, 1868, Shaw having subsequently conveyed a portion of the premises to Davis.

Francis C. Dudley was born April 17, 1848, and therefore was a minor at the date of his deed to Shaw.

April 22, 1878, nine years after attaining his majority, Dudley taking his brother with him as a witness, made an entry upon the premises described in that deed, for the purpose of asserting his claim and title to the land, and forbade Shaw and Davis from doing any more work upon it. For making this entry the Dudleys are sued in the above actions of trespass.

After the testimony was all in the cases were continued on report with an agreement that the law court should " determine the title between the parties. If the actions of trespass are maintainable, the damages to be fixed at the sum named. If the writ of entry is maintainable, it is to stand for trial on the question of betterments."

L. R King, for Shaw and Davis.

Powers & Powers, for Dudleys.

The entry was proper to disaffirm the deed. Boody v McKenney, 23 Me. 517. Some positive act was necessary for the purpose. Boody v. McKenney, supra, 1 Pars Contr. 272. Met. Contr. 60, and cases. Urban v. Ginnes, 2 Grant (Pa.)

Chadbourne v. Rackliff, 30 Me. 354. Holmes v. Blogg & Taunt, 39, 16 E. L. & E., Am. note, 558.

DANFORTH J.

The last named of these three cases, that of Dudley v. Shaw, is a real action. It is conceded that the title to the land described in the writ was originally in the plaintiff. The tenants claim under a deed from him. The execution of the deed is not denied, but the case finds that when it was given the grantor was a minor. The deed is dated November 27, 1868, and the plaintiff became of age April 17, following. On the 22d day of April, 1878, the plaintiff entered upon the land claiming to own it. After the sale and before this entry the tenants had built buildings thereon and made valuable improvements, the plaintiff living near by and making no claim to the land or objection to the improvements. The only question involved in the case is whether under these circumstances the deed is valid and binding upon the plaintiff.

Whatever differences of opinion may formerly have existed as to whether a minor's deed is void or only voidable, it must now be considered as well settled law that an instrument like this, where it does not appear upon its face to be prejudicial and which may be beneficial to the minor, is voidable at his election. Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 106.

As the deed is voidable at the election of the minor, it follows that until that election is in some way made manifest there is neither a ratification nor an avoidance. Without the one or the other the deed must still remain in force but as a defeasible instrument. This manifestation must be shown by some positive and clear act, intended for that purpose. What that act shall be, or what is sufficient for that purpose must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case. It therefore follows that mere delay within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, uncoupled with any acts expressive of an intent to confirm, would not be sufficient for that purpose; and this may now be considered as well settled law; though some decisions may be found holding that unless the deed is repudiated within a reasonable time, ratification will result. 3 Wash. R. Prop. (3d ed.) 226. Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 523-4. Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539. Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Peters 75-6.

While mere acquiescence for any length of time within the statute of limitations, is no proof of intention to ratify, when coupled with acts or even omissions when duty requires action, it may become not only pertinent, but satisfactory proof of such intention.

In Boody v. McKenney, Shepley, C. J., says: " The reason is, that by his silent acquiescence he occasions no injury to other persons, and secures no benefits or new rights to himself. There is nothing to urge him as a duty towards others to act speedily."

In Tucker v. Moreland, Story, J., says: " Mere acquiescence uncoupled with any acts demonstrative of any intent to confirm it would be insufficient for that purpose."

From these propositions the inference is inevitable that when delay is coupled with acts, indicating intention to confirm, or which do cause injury to others, or secure benefits to himself, or under such circumstances as impose a duty to act speedily, it becomes proof of confirmation more or less potent according to the accompanying acts and circumstances.

This is analagous to the doctrine applied to infant purchasers. If he retains the land after becoming of age receiving a benefit from it, he confirms the contract without further act. Hubbard v. Cummings, 1 Me. 11. Dana v. Coombs, 6 Id. 89. Without a further citation of authorities it seems to be established as a general rule that when an infant enters into a contract and after becoming of age receives a benefit from it or by virtue of it does an act which is an injury to the other party he thereby ratifies it.

In this case the land was sold late in the fall. The grantor became of age in the spring following. The inference is that nearly or quite all the improvements were made at a time when the duties and responsibilities of an adult rested upon the plantiff. The case further shows that his residence was such that he must have known the improvements the tenants were making, the purpose for which they were made, and that they were made relying upon the title derived from the deed now in question. Under such circumstances if the plaintiff intended to avoid his deed, common honesty required him to make known that intention in season to prevent so great an injury and would forbid his making profit by an omission to do so. This certainly is a case where there is something " to urge...