Davis v. First Healthcare Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. A98A0966.,A98A0966.
• Citation: 234 Ga. App. 744,507 S.E.2d 563
• Parties: DAVIS et al. v. FIRST HEALTHCARE CORPORATION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

507 S.E.2d 563

234 Ga. App. 744

DAVIS et al. v. FIRST HEALTHCARE CORPORATION.

No. A98A0966.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 16, 1998.

Calhoun, Sapp & Calhoun, John R. Calhoun, Kenneth A. Calhoun, Savannah, for appellants.

Brennan & Wasden, Joseph P. Brennan, Savannah, for appellee.

RUFFIN, Judge.

Raymond Davis, Sr., individually, and Raymond Davis, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Elsie T. Davis, sued First Healthcare Corporation d/b/a Savannah Convalescent Center ("Savannah Convalescent Center"), a nursing home, for wrongful death and negligence as a result of Elsie Davis falling out of bed while under its care. Savannah Convalescent Center moved for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence of ordinary negligence to support the claims against it. The trial court granted summary judgment to Savannah Convalescent Center, and the Davises appeal. We reverse.

In their complaint, the Davises allege that on or about January 13, 1994, Elsie T. Davis was found on the floor of her room by another resident at the nursing home. They assert that "Ms. Davis had apparently fallen out of her bed due to not being properly restrained by the staff at Defendant's nursing home as required by Dr. Schwartz." The nursing home's failure to properly restrain Ms. Davis is the only specific allegation of negligence in the complaint.

Savannah Convalescent Center moved to dismiss the complaint based on plaintiffs' failure to attach an OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the nursing home's alleged failure "to carry out the instructions of the decedent's physician ... does not involve the exercise of professional judgment, but presents a cause of action of simple negligence." Savannah Convalescent Center subsequently moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion because it found "there was no specific order to restrain Mrs. Davis while in bed on January 13, 1994 when she fell out of bed." The Davises have appealed from the trial court's order granting summary judgment on their claims of simple negligence.

"`To prevail at [a motion for] summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case.' (Emphasis omitted.) Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). Our review is de novo. Bandy v. Mills, 216 Ga.App. 407, 454 S.E.2d 610 (1995)." Walker v. Virtual Packaging, 229 Ga.App. 124, 493 S.E.2d 551 (1997).

Viewed in this light, the record shows Elsie Davis entered Savannah Convalescent Center around November 24, 1993, to recuperate from a fall which fractured her hip. She also suffered from Alzheimer's-type dementia. Dr. Phillip Schwartz, the medical director for the nursing home, testified in his deposition that at the time of her admission, Ms. Davis had an ongoing problem with her balance and "had apparently fallen before, even before her fractured hip."

At the time of her admission to the nursing home, another physician, Dr. Clary, ordered the nurses to restrain Ms. Davis with a "Posey vest PRN." On November 30, 1993, Dr. Schwartz changed this order after examining Ms. Davis because he believed Dr. Clary's restraint order was too nebulous and lacked specificity. Dr. Schwartz testified that "[h]istorically, vest restraints ... have caused more deaths than good in nursing homes.... [P]eople get hung up on those vest restraints and get strangled." Dr. Schwartz's written order required the nurses to "D/C [discontinue] vest restraint" and to "Try the least restrictive restraint first and evaluate patient."

On December 8, 1993, Dr. Schwartz issued the following written order: "Safety Device ordered: velcro grip restraint while OOB [out of bed] to prevent injury." Dr. Schwartz testified this order was in effect on January 13, 1994, the day Ms. Davis was found on the floor beside her bed. According to Dr. Schwartz, however, there was no specific order for Ms. Davis to be restrained while in bed on that date. Dr. Schwartz also testified that the nursing home staff did not violate any of his orders by failing to restrain Ms. Davis while she was in her bed on January 13, 1994.

Raymond Davis, Jr. testified that he visited the nursing home after his mother's injury and asked a woman sitting at the nurse's station about his mother. The woman told Davis that his mother was found on the floor by her bed that morning. Davis advised the woman that "it's in Dr. Schwartz's orders somewhere that she should be restrained," and asked how his mother could "have been gotten out of the bed if she had been restrained." According to Davis, this woman replied, "well, I don't know" and looked through his mother's chart. After looking through the chart she told him, "oh, here it is, here it is, where Dr. Schwartz left the order that she should be restrained when in the wheelchair with a strap or in the bed." Davis acknowledged that he did not know the date of this alleged order.

The Davises attached a document titled "Medication Record" as Exhibit "A" to their brief in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion. This document was not certified, and there is no sworn testimony in the record about the origin or creation of this document. It is undisputed, however, that this document was produced by Savannah Convalescent Center in response to a request for production of documents from the Davises.

The medication record lists the patient's name as "Davis, Elsie," the physician as "Schwartz, Phillip," and the facility as "Savannah Convalescent Center." This pre-printed form includes separate boxes for various orders, days of the week, and the hour. One box states "Charting from 2/01/94 thru 2/28/94." Another box states "Order Date: 12/8/93 safety device ordered: velcro grip restraint while OOB in W/C & vest restraint while in bed at night time to prevent pt. injury." The trial court held that although this document could create a triable issue of fact, it was unauthenticated and therefore could not be considered when evaluating the motion for summary judgment.

1. We must first determine whether the medication record can properly be considered when evaluating Savannah Convalescent Center's summary judgment motion. "A proper foundation must be laid for the introduction of documentary evidence." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill Aircraft &c. Corp. v. Cintas Corp., 169 Ga.App. 747, 748(1), 315 S.E.2d 263 (1984) (physical precedent only). "As a general rule, a writing will not be admitted into evidence unless the offering party tenders proof of the authenticity or genuineness of the writing. [Cit.] There is no presumption of authenticity, and the burden of proof rests upon the proffering party to establish a prima facie case of genuineness. [Cits.] Our rules of evidence provide a wide variety of means by which a party may authenticate a writing." Martin v. State, 135 Ga.App. 4, 6-7(3), 217 S.E.2d 312 (1975). The use of circumstantial evidence is one of these methods. See Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 657(4), 256 S.E.2d 341 (1979) ("The genuineness of the writing ... may be proved by circumstantial evidence."). See also McCormick on Evidence, Vol. 2, § 222, p. 44 (4th ed.1992) ("it is clear that authentication by circumstantial evidence is uniformly recognized as permissible").

The Davises assert the medication record is properly authenticated because it was produced for them in response to a request for production of documents by Savannah Convalescent Center.¹ This is an issue of first impression in Georgia. Federal courts faced with this issue typically find production of a document by a...