Davis v. Montcalm Ctr. for Behavioral Health

Decision Date26 August 2021
Docket Number354049
PartiesMAUREEN DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTCALM CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, MONTCALM COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, doing business as MONTCALM CARE NETWORK, and MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

UNPUBLISHED

Montcalm Circuit Court LC No. 2019-025942-CZ

Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Beckering and Boonstra, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In this dispute over retirement benefits, plaintiff, Maureen Davis appeals as of right the trial court's order dismissing her case against defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(4) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff raises several claims on appeal. Because we agree with her contention that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 1991, plaintiff started working for Montcalm County Community Mental Health Authority, which at the time was known as Montcalm Center for Behavioral Health (MCBH). In September 2005, plaintiff terminated her employment with MCBH. Sometime afterward, Montcalm County Community Mental Health Authority started conducting business as Montcalm Care Network (MCN).

In February 2018, MCN informed plaintiff she was entitled to a pension for the years she worked at MCBH. She completed the necessary form, and effective March 2018, plaintiff began receiving a benefit in the amount of $2, 312.03 per month. She questioned the accuracy of the amount and was told that it was accurate. However, less than a year later, MCN informed plaintiff that her benefit had been miscalculated and she was only entitled to $914.32 per month. MCN also advised her that it intended to recoup the alleged overpayments.

In March 2019, MCN adopted MERS's Defined Benefit Plan under which MERS would administer MCN's pension plan starting in May 2019.

In April 2019, plaintiff notified MCN of her disagreement with the decision to reduce her benefit, and she asked for information including the plan document, amendments to the plan, and any procedures for appealing the decision relating to the reduction of her benefits. In response, MCN sent plaintiff a letter informing her that if she wished to appeal its decision to diminish her monthly benefits, she could find the applicable appeals procedure in its 2015 Restatement of the MCBH Pension Plan. MCN provided plaintiff with a copy of the plan and a copy of the Summary Plan Description. Plaintiff's counsel responded by letter indicating that he did not believe the pension plan documents provided any appeal procedure that applied to the dispute at issue, but in the event he was mistaken, his letter was intended to serve as an appeal.

In July 2019, MERS informed plaintiff that MCN had engaged it as its Plan Administrator, effective May 1, 2019, and it enclosed a copy of MERS's Plan Document, which was to become effective on June 25, 2019, and which contained an appeals procedure in § 72. Section 72 provided for an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.271 et seq. Plaintiff's counsel responded by letter, explaining why the APA was not applicable to the situation.

In October 2019, plaintiff filed her complaint in the trial court against the above-named defendants seeking a declaratory judgment and damages associated with MCN's attempt to reduce her pension. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, MERS filed a motion to dismiss under MCR 2.116(C)(4), contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter because plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies; the trial court agreed and granted MERS's motion. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over this matter because the MERS's appeal procedure pursuant to the APA does not apply in this case. We agree.

"This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4)." McKenzie v Dep't of Corrections, 332 Mich.App. 289, 296; 957 N.W.2d 341 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) "tests the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). When reviewing such a motion, "this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review de novo as a question of law whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. Additionally, we review questions of statutory construction de novo, "with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "When interpreting statutory language, we begin with the plain language of the statute." Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 499 Mich. 29, 34; 878 N.W.2d 799 (2016).

"Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to act and authority to hear and determine a case." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). "Michigan's circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and derive their power from the Michigan Constitution." Id. MCL 600.605 provides that "[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state." Accordingly, a circuit court is presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil case unless "Michigan's Constitution or a statute expressly prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction." McKenzie, 332 Mich.App. at 297.

In this case, MERS explained in its motion to dismiss that the MERS Retirement Board had full authority to establish "the provisions of the plan" pursuant to MCL 38.1536(2)(a) of the Municipal Employees Retirement Act of 1984, MCL 38.1501 et seq., and under MCL 38.1536(2)(a), the Board adopted the MERS Plan Document, which provided an administrative appeal process that conformed to the APA and required plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. A brief review of MERS's evolutional history and the APA is helpful to an analysis of this argument.

Before August 15, 1996, MERS was part of Michigan's executive branch, and it operated within the Department of Management and Budget. MCL 38.1536(1). However, after August 14, 1996, MERS became a public corporation that did not operate within Michigan's executive branch. MCL 38.1536(1). The Retirement Board, which was created to administer the MERS Act, had the following powers and duties after August 14, 1996:

The retirement board shall determine and establish all of the provisions of the retirement system affecting benefit eligibility, benefit programs, contribution amounts, and the election of municipalities, judicial circuit courts, judicial district courts, and judicial probate courts to be governed by the provisions of the retirement system. The retirement board shall establish all retirement system provisions. As of 12:01 a.m. on August 15, 1996, the retirement system provisions must not differ materially from the defined benefit provisions that are in effect under this act at 11:59 p.m. August 14, 1996. This subdivision does not limit the retirement board's authority after August 15, 1996 to establish additional programs, including, but not limited to, defined benefit, defined contribution, ancillary benefits, health and welfare benefits, and other postemployment benefit programs. The retirement board may adopt the provisions of the reciprocal retirement act, 1961 PA 88, MCL 38.1101 to 38.1106, on behalf of the employees of the retirement board. [MCL 38.1536(2)(a) (emphasis added).]

"The APA provides the procedure for state agencies hearing contested cases." Bisco's, Inc v Mich. Liquor Control Comm, 395 Mich. 706, 719; 238 N.W.2d 166 (1976). Importantly, it "confers a right to appeal, after exhaustion of all administrative remedies, upon a person aggrieved by a final decision or order in a contested case." J & P Market, Inc v Liquor Control Comm, 199 Mich.App. 646, 649; 502 N.W.2d 374 (1993) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). MCL 24.301 specifically provides that

[w]hen a person has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an agency, and is aggrieved by a final decision or order in a contested case, whether such decision or order is affirmative or negative in form, the decision or order is subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law.

A "contested case" is a proceeding "in which a determination of the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a named party is required by law to be made by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing." MCL 24.203(3). If an evidentiary hearing is not required by statute, the proceeding is not a contested case covered by the APA's appeals procedure. J & P Market Inc, 199 Mich.App. at 650. Additionally, an "agency" is "a state department, bureau, division, section, board, commission, trustee, authority or officer, created by the constitution, statute, or agency action." MCL 24.203(2). This means that an agency must be a state unit or position created by the constitution, a statute, or agency action. League Gen Ins Co v Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass 'n, 435 Mich. 338, 343; 458 N.W.2d 632 (1990). If those two requirements are met, the agency is subject...

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