Davis v. Parham
| Decision Date | 12 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-929.,04-929. |
| Citation | 208 S.W.3d 162 |
| Parties | James DAVIS, Administrator of the Estate of Monroe Luther Davis, Deceased, Appellant, v. Dr. Gordon R. PARHAM; Parham, Sills & Hays Clinic; Sparks Medical Foundation; Sparks Health System; Dr. Neil E. Crow, Jr., and Sparks Regional Medical Center, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Charles Karr, P.A., by: Charles Karr, Fort Smith, for appellant.
Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten and Kathryn Stocks, Fort Smith, for appellees Dr. Gordon Parham, Parham, Sills & Hays Clinic, Sparks Medical Foundation, Sparks Health System, and Sparks Regional Medical Center.
Ledbetter, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, L.L.P., by: J. Michael Cogbill and Rebecca D. Hattabaugh, Fort Smith, for appellee Dr. Neil E. Crow, Jr.
This case arises from an order from the Sebastian County Circuit Court dismissing a negligence claim filed by appellant, James Davis, the administrator of the estate of the decedent, Monroe Luther Davis. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by appellees, Dr. Gordon R. Parham, Parham, Sills & Hays Clinic ("Clinic"), Sparks Medical Foundation, Sparks Health System, Dr. Neil E. Crow, Jr., and Sparks Regional Medical Center ("Center"). We affirm the trial court's ruling.
The following facts are alleged in appellant's complaint. On January 26, 2001, the decedent, who was a patient of Dr. Parham at the Clinic, saw Dr. Parham and complained of a productive cough, nasal congestion, and fever. Dr. Parham ordered a chest x-ray, which he read as "clear," according to an attached progress note. Dr. Parham diagnosed the decedent with bronchitis. On January 29, 2001, Dr. Crow, a radiology specialist, read the chest x-ray, and reported that there was "no acute disease" in an attached x-ray report.
On February 24, 2003, the decedent was talking to his father on the telephone. According to his complaint, he experienced tremendous, sharp pain, and had tingling in both arms, diaphoresis, and decreased pulses in the right leg. His wife called 911, and he was transported to the emergency room at the Center. A CT scan showed the presence of a Type I aortic dissection, and he underwent emergency surgery. After surgery, he was transferred to the intensive care unit where he was on mechanical ventilation. The decedent died on February 25, 2003.
According to appellant's complaint, the chest x-ray taken on January 26, 2001, showed the aortic aneurysm, but neither Dr. Parham nor Dr. Crow mentioned it to the decedent. Neither doctor ordered additional testing after the x-ray was taken.
On February 25, 2004, appellant filed a complaint against appellees, alleging that each appellant violated the standard of care and was negligent for, among other things, the failure to read the chest x-ray correctly. On March 15, 2004, appellees Parham, the Clinic, the Foundation, and the Center filed a motion to dismiss. Dr. Crow filed an answer on March 18, 2004, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 26, 2004. On July 26, 2004, the trial court granted Dr. Crow's motion and dismissed the John Doe defendants. On August 2, 2004, the trial court granted the remaining appellees' motion to dismiss. Appellant now brings his appeal from this order.
From the trial court's order of dismissal, it is clear that the trial court considered appellees' motion to dismiss, appellant's response, and "all other things properly before it." As such, it is not treated as a dismissal, but instead as a summary judgment. Williams v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 362 Ark. 134, 207 S.W.3d 519 (2005). We have repeatedly held that summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appeal, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Summary judgment is not proper where the evidence, although in no material dispute as to actuality, reveals aspects from which inconsistent hypotheses might reasonably be drawn and reasonable minds might differ. Id.
For his sole point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss, and challenges the constitutionality of the statute of limitations under the Medical Malpractice Act ("Act"), codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-201 et seq. (1987 and Supp.2003). Specifically, appellant makes four allegations of error. First, appellant argues that the two-year statute of limitations is special legislation in violation of Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. Second, he contends that the application of the two-year statute of limitations violates the open-court provision found in Article 2, Section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution. Third, he maintains that the medical-malpractice statute of limitations denies equal protection to appellant and the decedent. Finally, he argues that the statute of limitations deprives appellant of due process.
The crux of this appeal is whether appellant's cause of action is barred by the medical-malpractice statute of limitations in a wrongful-death action. Under current Arkansas law, when a person's death is caused by the negligence of another, two causes of action arise. Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F.Supp.2d 764, 766 (E.D.Ark.2000) (citing Matthews v. Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 249, 432 S.W.2d 485, 487 (1968)). First, there is a cause of action for the estate under the survival statute, and, second, there is a cause of action for the statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful-death statute. Id. The Medical Malpractice Act states that it applies to "all causes of action for medical injury accruing after April 2, 1979, and, as to such causes of action, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of law." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-202 (1987). We have said that the Medical Malpractice Act applies to all causes of action for medical injury arising after April 2, 1979, including wrongful-death and survival actions arising from the death of a patient. Brewer v. Poole, 362 Ark. 1, 207 S.W.3d 458 (2005) (citing Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996)).
Under the Medical Malpractice Act, a plaintiff must file a medical-malpractice cause of action within two years from the date of the wrongful act complained of. The statute of limitations, found at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(a) and (b) (Supp. 2003), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.
(b) The date of the accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time. However, where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such two-year period, the action may be commenced within one (1) year from the date of discovery or the date the foreign object reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
The wrongful-death statute of limitations, found at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-62-102(c) (Supp.2003), provides that an action must be filed within three years from the decedent's date of death. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(c)(1) Every action authorized by this section shall be commenced within three (3) years after the death of the person alleged to have been wrongfully killed.
At the outset, we note that our case law is replete with the holding that the Medical Malpractice Act's two-year limitations period conflicts with the three-year limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act, and is therefore controlling where death ensues from medical injuries. See Looney v. Bolt, 330 Ark. 530, 955 S.W.2d 509 (1997) (); Scarlett v. Rose Care, Inc., 328 Ark. 672, 944 S.W.2d 545 (1997) (); Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997) (); Pastchol v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 326 Ark. 140, 929 S.W.2d 713 (1996) (); Hertlein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 283, 914 S.W.2d 303 (1996) (); see also Ruffins v. ER Arkansas, P.A., 313 Ark. 175, 853 S.W.2d 877 (1993) ().
Furthermore, we stated in Scarlett, supra:
We recognized in Ruffins that the Medical Malpractice Act was enacted long after the wrongful death statute was enacted, and that it expressly states that it applies to all causes of action for medical injury and that it supersedes any inconsistent provision of law. We have consistently applied this...
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