Davis v. Pierce

• Decision Date: 20 January 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.15-1068-RGA
• Parties: CAMERON DAVIS, Petitioner, v. DAVID PIERCE, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

CAMERON DAVIS, Petitioner, v. DAVID PIERCE, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.

Civil Action No.15-1068-RGA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

January 20, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cameron A. Davis. Pro se Petitioner.

Karen V. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

January 20, 2017

Wilmington, Delaware

ANDREWS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Presently pending before the Court is Petitioner Cameron A. Davis' Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (D.I. 1) The State filed an Answer in opposition. (D.I. 7) For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2010, a series of three armed robberies took place in the Bear, Delaware area. The police identified Robert Williams of 709 Sandburg Place as a person of interest. At approximately midnight on July 23, 2010, police arrived at 709 Sandburg Place, secured the apartment, and did not permit anyone, including [Petitioner], to leave or enter the residence until a warrant was obtained. Police obtained a warrant the next day and executed it at approximately 11:05 a.m. [Petitioner] was then transported to police headquarters and interviewed from approximately 3:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. [Petitioner] ultimately admitted to participating in the three robberies. The videotape of [Petitioner's] confession was shown to the jury at trial.

[Petitioner] later testified that he confessed to participation in the three robberies because he wanted the questioning to cease. He testified, "I felt as though, once again, it would have went on forever. The questioning would have never stopped until he would have got what he wanted."

Davis v. State, 38 A.3d 278, 279 (Del. 2012).

Petitioner was indicted on five counts of first degree robbery, second degree assault, three counts of second degree conspiracy, six counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony ("PFDCF"), and three counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited ("PFBPP"). (D.I 7 at 3; D.I. 9-17 at 11-21) A Delaware Superior Court jury found him guilty of three counts of first degree robbery, three counts of PFDCF, three counts of PFBPP, and two counts of second degree conspiracy. The Superior Court granted Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal for one count of first degree robbery and one count of PFDCF. The Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to a total of thirty-four years of incarceration at Level V, suspended after eighteen years of minimum mandatory time for decreasing levels of supervision.Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. See Davis, 38 A.3d at 281.

In May 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"). (D.I. 9-18 at Entry No. 61) The Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner, and counsel filed an amended Rule 61 motion. After conducting an evidentiary hearing and permitting counsel to provide further evidence, the Superior Court issued a letter order denying the Rule 61 motion. See State v. Davis, 2015 WL 3539794, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 2015). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. See Davis v. State, 127 A.3d 1171 (Table), 2015 WL 6954840, at *1 (Del. Nov. 9, 2015).

II. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking onecomplete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, in a procedural manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their merits. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989).

A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).

Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the claims. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actualprejudice, a petitioner must show "that [the errors at trial] worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.

Alternatively, a federal court may excuse a procedural default if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). A petitioner demonstrates a miscarriage of justice by showing a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). In order to establish actual innocence, the petitioner must present new reliable evidence - not presented at trial - that demonstrates "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-38 (2006); see Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522-24 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner timely filed the § 2254 Petition presently pending before the Court, which asserts the following two grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was unlawfully seized, detained, and arrested; and (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a timely motion to suppress evidence and also by failing to contact or call as a trial witness a victim who told a Department of Justice social worker that Petitioner was not the person who robbed her.

A. Claim One: Barred by Stone v. Powell

Pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), a federal habeas court cannot review a Fourth Amendment claim if the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the state courts. Id.; see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 293 (1992). A petitioner is considered to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims if the state has an available mechanism for suppressing evidence seized in or tainted by an illegal search or seizure, irrespective of whether the petitioner actually availed himself of that mechanism. See U.S. ex rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1978); Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 1980). Conversely, a petitioner has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, and therefore, avoids the Stone bar, if the state system contains a structural defect that prevented the state court from fully and fairly hearing that Fourth Amendment argument. See Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 82 (3d Cir. 2002). Significantly, "an erroneous or summary resolution by a state court of a Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the [Stone] bar." Id.

In this case, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 41 (D.I. 9-17 at 29 to 32), which the Superior Court denied as untimely. (D.I. 9-17 at 35)

Petitioner challenged that denial in his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, presenting the same Fourth Amendment argument raised in Claim One of the instant Petition. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's argument that the untimeliness of his motion to suppress should have been excused, and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

In his Rule 61 motion, Petitioner argued that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness who had stated that Petitioner did not rob her and for failing to file a timely motion to suppress....