Davis v. Pou

• Decision Date: 16 January 1896
• Citation: 108 Ala. 443,19 So. 362
• Parties: DAVIS v. POU ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

19 So. 362

108 Ala. 443

DAVIS v. POU ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 16, 1896

Appeal from chancery court, Autauga county; S. K. McSpadden Chancellor.

Bill by William Pou and others against Julia E. Davis to enjoin the execution of a judgment. From a decree for plaintiffs defendant appeals. Reversed.

Sayre &amp Pearson, for appellant.

James E. Webb, for appellees.

COLEMAN J.

The facts stated in the bill show that Benjamin Davis and his wife, Julia E. Davis, appellant, executed a valid mortgage in the year 1887, conveying certain lands, as a security for a debt, to the New England Mortgage Security Company, the law day of which was fixed at some time prior to June, 1892; that the mortgage was regularly foreclosed in June, 1892, and the mortgagee became the purchaser. It further shows that appellant, Julie E. Davis, rented the lands to William Pou for the year 1892. It also avers that after the foreclosure of the mortgage, in the year 1892, the purchaser at the mortgage sale notified the tenant, Pou. of the mortgage, the foreclosure, and its purchase, and claim for accruing rent. It further shows that, without surrendering possession to his landlord, Pou attorned to the purchaser, and agreed to pay it rent, and paid it. The bill further avers that in January, 1893, Julia E. Davis instituted a suit before a justice of the peace for an unlawful detainer of the land, and damages for the detention thereof and recovered judgment for the possession and rent as damages for the detention, for the years 1893 and 1894, to the date of trial. The bill also avers and shows that Julia E. Davis, the plaintiff in the unlawful detainer suit, and respondent in this cause, was and is wholly and totally insolvent. The facts here stated, and which by the demurrer are admitted to be true show that William Pou, in law, became the tenant of the New England Mortgage Security Company, and became legally indebted to it for rent; that Julia E. Davis has recovered a judgment against him as damages for an unlawful detention of the lands held by him after the foreclosure, and attornment to the purchaser. The averments of the bill show that by the foreclosure sale all right, title, and interest, as well as right of possession in and to the land, and the right to the rents or to damages of the landlord, Davis, who was the mortgagor, for an unlawful detention, were terminated by the sale and foreclosure of the mortgage, and that all these interests were vested in the purchaser. The bill avers that these facts were properly pleaded in the unlawful detainer suit and on appeal in the circuit court and were properly presented in the record on the appeal to the court of final resort. On this point the pleadings of the bill are principally conclusions, but, as there are no objections to the bill on this account, we shall consider the averment as well pleaded and true. How far the proof, when offered, may sustain the bill as to these questions, cannot now be considered, as the case is here on demurrer, and the averments must be considered as true.

The condition of William Pou, the tenant, as shown by the bill, is that a judgment has been rendered against him in favor of an insolvent plaintiff under facts and circumstances which clearly show that there was no liability to the plaintiff for damages, and that plaintiff had sustained no injury, and that these facts were all properly pleaded and presented in defense of the unlawful detainer suit. This consequence resulted from the character of the action instituted against him by Julia E. Davis,-that of unlawful detainer before a justice of the peace,-and the rules of law which prevail in that action. Section 3389 of the Code declares that "the estate or merits of the title cannot be inquired into on the trial of any complaint exhibited under this chapter." The chapter is that which confers jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try actions for "forcible entry and unlawful detainer"; and section 3391 of the same chapter prescribes that double rent as damages maybe recovered in the action of unlawful detainer before a justice of the peace. Part 3, tit. 3, c. 7. Code 1886. Construing the foregoing section (3389), we have held that, where a tenant is sued by his landlord, from whom he acquires possession for an unlawful detainer, the tenant cannot defend against either the possession, or claim for damages for detention, on the ground that the title of his landlord has terminated or been extinguished; nor is the tenant permitted to show as a defense that he acquired ownership and title and the right of possession from his landlord during the rental term or that the right of the landlord, on any account, expired subsequent to the date of the contract of lease or renting. Pou v. Davis (Ala.) 18 So. 8, and cases cited. This case is reported as Pugh v. Davis, instead of Pou v. Davis. It is the same case. Neither the statement of facts of the case nor the opinion show that damages were recovered for the unlawful detention, but the record is full, and contains all the pleas and the evidence, and shows a recovery of damages as averred in the bill. The decisions under this chapter go to the full extent of holding that when a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit shows prior possession, a letting, and possession of the tenant under the letting, and that the term of the lease has ended, and lawful demand and refusal, the case is conclusively made out, and there is no defense. See the report of this same case, Pou v. Davis, supra, and authorities cited. Having a perfect legal defense against the plaintiff's right to the possession of the land, as well as damages for use and occupation during the detention, which could be made in an action of ejectment, but a defense which, by reason of the statute, cannot be made to the action of unlawful detainer before a justice of the peace, the tenant, William Pou, filed the present bill, in which are set up all the facts, and prayed the court for an injunction to enjoin the issue of the writ of possession, and also the issue of execution upon the judgment. The court granted the injunction, and at a hearing overruled the demurrer to the bill for want of equity, and refused to dissolve the injunction. From this ruling the respondent appeals to this court, and the question is whether the complainant is entitled to the relief granted. The writer entertains the opinion that the bill has equity, and that complainant is entitled to relief, and under any phase of the case, so far as it seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment recovered for damages for the unlawful detention of the lands; and this upon the broad equity that he is without adequate remedy in a court of law. Had the landlord, Davis, sued in ejectment, and claimed damages for use and occupation, it is manifest that the defendant could have shown the expiration of his landlord's title, either as resulting from his own act or by operation of law, and hence defeated the action entirely. It is well settled that such a defense does not involve the denial of the landlord's title. English v. Key, 39 Ala. 113; Farris v. Houston, 74 Ala. 162; Otis v. McMillan, 70 Ala. 46; Strauss v. Harrison, 79 Ala. 324; Nicrosi v. Phillipi, 91 Ala. 299, 8 So. 561; Tayl. Landl. & Ten. §§ 707, 708; Herm. Estop. §§ 867, 868; Bigelow, Estop. (5th Ed.) p. 517.

It is equally clear that if the landlord had sued in a separate action for the recovery of damages, for use and occupation as for damages merely for an unlawful detention, not suing for possession of the lands, the defendant could have made his defense good. A bailee may exonerate himself from liability to his bailor by showing a delivery of the property to the true owner. So a debtor is...