Davis v. Sec'y of State
| Decision Date | 16 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 354622,354622 |
| Citation | 963 N.W.2d 653,333 Mich.App. 588 |
| Parties | Robert DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Robert Davis in propria persona.
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Heather S. Meingast, Erik A. Grill, and Kendall Asbenson, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Secretary of State.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC (by Larry J. Saylor, Wendolyn Wrosch Richards, Detroit, Ashley N. Higginson, Lansing, and Erika L. Giroux, Detroit) for The Brennan Center for Justice, amicus curiae.
Before: Tukel, P.J., and Meter and Redford, JJ.
Redford, J. Plaintiff, Robert Davis, appeals by right the Court of Claims’ order granting defendant, Michigan's Secretary of State, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) and dismissing plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
In the November 2018 election, Michigan voters approved passage of Proposition No. 18-3 (Proposal 3), which, among other things, amended the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4, to provide all registered voters the right to vote by absentee ballot without giving a reason. In the case before us, plaintiff challenged the Secretary of State's unsolicited mailing of absent-voter ballot applications to registered Michigan voters by mail before the August 4, 2020 primary election and the November 3, 2020 general election, accompanied by a letter that encouraged absentee voting from home to stay safe in relation to the COVID-19 outbreak. The Secretary of State did not mail absent-voter ballot applications to voters in locales where the local election officers planned to send applications to all registered voters, and the Secretary did not send actual ballots.
Plaintiff sued the Secretary of State after receiving an unsolicited application that he could use for applying to his local clerk for an absentee ballot.1 Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Secretary of State lacked authority under state law and the Constitution to mail unsolicited absent-voter ballot applications to all registered voters and that the sending of unsolicited applications violated the constitutional requirement of the separation of powers under Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. He sought to enjoin the Secretary from mass mailing unsolicited absent-voter ballot applications to registered voters in Michigan. The Secretary of State answered plaintiff's complaint and moved for summary disposition.
In an opinion and order issued August 25, 2020, the Court of Claims concluded that the Secretary of State had authority to send the absent-voter ballot applications at issue, granted summary disposition for the Secretary under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), and dismissed the consolidated cases. This appeal followed.
We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition in an action seeking declaratory relief. League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Secretary of State , 331 Mich. App. 156, 167, 952 N.W.2d 491 (2020) (League of Women Voters I ), oral argument ordered on the application 505 Mich. 988, 938 N.W.2d 244 (2020). We also review de novo questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation, which present issues of law. Frank v. Linkner , 500 Mich. 133, 140, 894 N.W.2d 574 (2017) ; Makowski v. Governor , 495 Mich. 465, 470, 852 N.W.2d 61 (2014).
Concerning the interpretation of the state Constitution and statutes, this Court in League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Secretary of State , 333 Mich. App. 1, 52–58, 959 N.W.2d 1 (2020) (League of Women Voters II ) explained the rules for interpreting constitutional provisions as follows:
In interpreting constitutional provisions, this Court applies two rules of interpretation. Makowski , [495 Mich. at 473, 852 N.W.2d 61]. "First, the interpretation should be the sense most obvious to the common understanding; the one which reasonable minds, the great mass of people themselves, would give it." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Words should be given their common and most obvious meaning, and consideration of dictionary definitions used at the time of passage for undefined terms can be appropriate." In re Burnett Estate , 300 Mich. App. 489, 497-498, 834 N.W.2d 93 (2013). Every constitutional provision "must be interpreted in the light of the document as a whole, and no provision should be construed to nullify or impair another." Lapeer Co. Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Court , 469 Mich. 146, 156, 665 N.W.2d 452 (2003). Second, the interpretation should consider "the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished." Id.
In Sau-Tuk Indus., Inc. v. Allegan Co. , 316 Mich. App. 122, 136, 892 N.W.2d 33 (2016), this Court explained the rules for statutory interpretation:
When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, we presume the Legislature intended the meaning expressed in the statute. A statutory provision is ambiguous only if it conflicts irreconcilably with another provision or it is equally susceptible to more than one meaning.... When construing a statute, we must assign every word or phrase its plain and ordinary meaning unless the Legislature has provided specific definitions or has used technical terms that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]
Courts "may not pick and choose what parts of a statute to enforce" but, rather, "must give effect to every word of a statute if at all possible so as not to render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." Id. at 143, 892 N.W.2d 33. Courts "may not speculate regarding legislative intent beyond the words expressed in the statute." Id. at 145, 892 N.W.2d 33 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "This Court reads the provisions of statutes reasonably and in context, and reads subsections of cohesive statutory provisions together." Detroit Pub. Sch. v. Conn , 308 Mich. App. 234, 248, 863 N.W.2d 373 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When courts interpret statutes, they must first look to the specific statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature, and if the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 256 Mich. App. 541, 544; 666 N.W.2d 294 (2003).
Plaintiff argues that the Court of Claims committed legal error by ruling that the Secretary of State had authority to distribute unsolicited applications for absentee ballots to Michigan registered voters. He contends that MCL 168.759 does not expressly authorize the Secretary of State to mail out such applications and asserts that, read correctly, our Constitution and state law prohibit the Secretary from doing so. Therefore, he argues, the Court of Claims should not have granted the Secretary of State summary disposition. We disagree.
The Michigan Constitution provides, "All political power is inherent in the people." Const. 1963, art. 1, § 1.2 In 2018, the people of this state exercised this power when they, as registered voters, amended the Constitution by approving Proposal 3. As a result of the enactment of Proposal 3, all registered qualified voters have a right to vote absentee without giving a reason for desiring to do so.3 As a result of the passage of Proposal 3, Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4 now provides, in relevant part:
Likewise, our Constitution and laws define the role and duties of the Secretary of State. Const. 1963, art. 5, § 3 states, in relevant part: ...
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... ... disposition if "[t]he opposing party has failed to state ... a claim on which relief can be granted." Harbor ... Watch Condo Ass'n v Emmet Co ... evidenced by other statutory language or by reading the ... statute as a whole." Davis v Secretary of ... State, 333 Mich.App. 588; 963 N.W.2d 653 (2020), quoting ... Browder ... ...