Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co., 93-3144
| Decision Date | 23 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3144,93-3144 |
| Citation | 652 So.2d 907 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D735 Richard DAVIS, Property Appraiser of Bay County, and Larry Fuchs, Executive Director of the Department of Revenue Appellants, v. ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Alvin L. Peters of McCauley & Peters, Panama City, for appellant Davis.
Ralph Jaeger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant Fuchs.
Fred H. Kent, Jr., of Kent, Hayden, Facciolo & McMorrow, Jacksonville, for appellee.
In this appeal, appellants Davis and Fuchs challenge the trial court's judgment reversing Davis's denial of an agricultural use classification for certain property owned by appellee and situated in Bay County. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.
In the proceedings below, appellee St. Joe Paper Company challenged the decision of Richard Davis, the property appraiser, and the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, to deny St. Joe an agricultural use classification for approximately 230 acres of land fronting on the Gulf of Mexico in Bay County, Florida. One suit was filed for the tax year 1991, and another suit filed for the tax year 1992. The two suits were consolidated for trial. In a pre-trial order, the parties stipulated that if the property was determined not to be used for bona fide agricultural purposes, an assessed value of $4,766,840.00 was a reasonable fair market value.
In reviewing the property appraiser's determination, the applicable standard of review has been stated as follows:
Gianolio v. Markham, 564 So.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (quoting Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla.1977)); see also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Markham, 632 So.2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
However, although it is presumed that the determinations of property appraisers are correct, the presumption is rebuttable. If the taxpayer can demonstrate that the property appraiser abused his discretion or failed to follow the required statutory procedures, his determination will not be entitled to the presumption of correctness. 51 Fla.Jur.2d Taxation Sec. 18:86 (1984).
Gianolio v. Markham, 564 So.2d at 1134; see also Blake v. Xerox Corp., 447 So.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Fla.1984) ().
Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that "only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural." " 'Bona fide agricultural purposes' means good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." The statute then sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in the determination of agricultural use, including "whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, 1 and the "catch-all," "[s]uch other factors as may from time to time become applicable." 2 Zoning regulations must be considered under Section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. It is reasonable to conclude that zoning regulations may also be considered under the "catch-all" provision.
[Physical] use [of the land] is still the guidepost in classifying land, although other specifically enumerated factors relative to use may also be considered. Agricultural use is now and has always been the test.
Gianolio v. Markham, 564 So.2d at 1134, citing Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d at 370.
In the proceedings below, appellee failed to show that the property appraiser did not consider the appropriate statutory factors or that no reasonable hypothesis supported the appraiser's determination that the subject property was not primarily used for bona fide agricultural purposes. Although the highest permissible use for the subject property under the existing zoning classification was for silviculture activities, the property was not actually used for that purpose. Nor is the record susceptible of the interpretation that the property appraiser failed to consider factors which it should have considered, such as zoning regulations. 3
REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
I concur with the majority's decision, because the result appears to be required by Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368 (Fla.1977), and, because St. Joe's land remains in its natural, unimproved state, there is ample evidence upon which the tax assessor properly found that the land was not being used for an agriculture purpose. Consequently, I agree that St. Joe has not demonstrated by proof that every reasonable hypothesis has been excluded which would support the tax assessor's refusal to classify the parcel as agricultural.
The troubling aspect of this case to me is the appraiser's valuation of the property. The statutory test for classifying lands for assessment purposes as agricultural or nonagricultural is not the same as that for valuation purposes. The former requires a showing that the realty was "actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose," section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), while the latter involves a consideration of the eight factors listed under section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1991). The appraiser here apparently did not take into consideration the fact that St. Joe could not develop the land for the use he designated--commercial and/or residential mixed use--because, under Bay County's comprehensive plan, it had been classified as agriculture or silviculture. 4 Therefore, were it not for the parties' stipulation agreeing to a reasonable assessed value of $4,766,840 if the property were determined not to be used for a bona fide agricultural purpose, I would be inclined to reverse the valuation placed upon the property. I consider that in arriving at his appraisal the tax assessor misconstrued the provisions of section 193.011(2), requiring him to consider, among other factors, "[t]he highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future and the present use of the property, taking into consideration any applicable judicial limitation or local or state land use regulation."
That portion of subsection (2), referring to "any applicable ... local or state land use regulation," was added to the statute by chapter 74-234, section 20, Laws of Florida. As it was not in the 1973 version of the statute, the court in Tuck did not have the opportunity to consider the effect of this amended language in reaching its decision. Moreover, because St. Joe's property had been zoned silviculture under the county's comprehensive plan, and the plan was required to be consistent with the provisions of Florida's Growth Management Act, which was not enacted until 1985, 5 the supreme court, at the time it decided Tuck, similarly was not asked to decide what effect, if any, the provisions of the act might have on a tax appraiser's determination of the highest and best use to which the property could be expected to be placed in the immediate future.
Nevertheless, the Tuck opinion did make the following pertinent observations which remain relevant today to the question of a proper valuation of real property:
The uses under the statute must be immediate, not speculative,...
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