Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 1913
• Citation: 156 S.W. 1171
• Parties: DAVIS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

156 S.W. 1171

DAVIS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 30, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Jones County; Jno. B. Thomas, Judge.

Leonard Davis was convicted of forgery, and appeals. Affirmed.

J. C. Randel, of Anson, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Jones county under an indictment charging him with forgery, and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for the term of two years.

The first contention is that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment. The motion to quash the indictment states the following reasons: (1) That the indictment does not charge that the instrument forged would have created, diminished, discharged, or defeated any pecuniary obligation; (2) because the indictment does not allege that "S. F. Hackney and son," was a firm; (3) because the indictment does not allege and show that W. H. Travis, the purported maker, or the said S. F. Hackney & Son, or either, could have been injured; (4) because said indictment does not contain allegations as to what was meant by the words "no Dollars" following the word "Fiftheen"; (5) because the indictment does not contain allegations as to what is meant by "For Goods"; (6) because the indictment does not contain innuendo averments to the effect that "The First Bank of Swenson" was a corporation, association, or banking concern, nor where located.

The indictment under which appellant was convicted reads as follows:

"And the grand jurors aforesaid upon their oaths in said court do further present that Leonard Davis, on or about the 10th day of August, A. D. 1912, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the county of Jones and state of Texas, without lawful authority and with intent to injure and defraud, did willfully and fraudulently make a false instrument in writing, purporting to be the act of another, to wit, the act of W. H. Travis, the said W. H. Travis being a fictitious person, which said false instrument is to the tenor following:

"`Swenson, Texas, 8/10 1912. No. _____

"`The First Bank of Swenson (unincorporated)

                  "`Pay to the order of S. F. Hackney
                and son          $15.00
                Fiftheen         no/           Dollars
                For          Goods
                                            "`W. H. Travis.'
                

"By the figures `8/10' in the line at the top of said check after the words `Swenson Texas,' was intended and meant to be and stand for `August tenth.' By the word `Fiftheen' after the dollar mark and figures was intended and meant to be the word `Fifteen.' Against the peace and dignity of the state."

As to the first ground upon which this motion to quash is based, we think the instrument on its face imports a pecuniary obligation, and therefore it was not necessary to allege that the instrument, if genuine, would have created, increased, diminished, or discharged or defeated any pecuniary obligation. See Horton v. State, 32 Tex. 79; Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Dooley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 549, 2 S. W. 884. It is drawn in the form that virtually all checks on banks are now given.

It was not necessary to allege that "S. F. Hackney and son" was a firm. It has been so decided in a number of cases by this court.

As to the third ground, to wit, that the indictment was bad because it did not allege that Hackney & Son, or Travis, or either, could have been injured, it is not tenable. It is not necessary to allege the name of the person to be defrauded. Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Westbrook v. State, 23 Tex. App. 401, 5 S. W. 248; English v. State, 30 Tex. App. 470, 18 S. W. 94.

As to the fourth ground, that it should have, by explanatory averments, alleged what was meant by "no/" just before the word "Dollars" in the check, we think the entire commercial world knows that it meant "no cents," and the check as written was an ordinary commercial instrument, and called for fifteen dollars—no more and no less. The words "For Goods" after the amount simply evidences that the check had been given for goods purchased. Forcy v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 206, 131 S. W. 585, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327.

As to the remaining ground in the motion, it was not necessary to...