Dooley v. State
| Decision Date | 22 June 1886 |
| Parties | DOOLEY <I>v.</I> STATE.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
This was a conviction for forgery, the details of which are sufficiently set out in the opinion of the court. A term of two years in the penitentiary was the penalty assessed by the jury. The record brings up no statement of the facts.
Brenneman & Bergstrom, for appellant, insisting that the facts alleged in the indictment were insufficient as an assignment of forgery.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Burts, for the State.
There is but one question deserving attention in this case, and that is: Is the instrument alleged to have been forged by the defendant such a one as comes within our statute of forgery? The instrument is a telegram, dated at San Antonio, Texas, addressed to Mrs. L. E. Edwards, at Austin, Texas, purporting to be signed by J. W. McKnight, and is in the following words: It is insisted by the counsel for defendant that this instrument, if it had been genuine, would not have created, increased, diminished, discharged, or defeated any pecuniary obligation, and is not, therefore, the subject of forgery. Our statute defines the term "pecuniary obligation," used in the definition of "forgery." It "means every instrument having money for its object, and every obligation for the breach of which a civil action for damages may be lawfully brought." Pen. Code, art. 437. It is very clear to our minds that money was the object of the instrument in question. It was, in legal effect, an order by McKnight upon Mrs. Edwards, in favor of Wilcox, for $75 in money. Its object was to have Mrs. Edwards send to Wilcox that amount of money. Wilcox may have advanced that amount of money upon this order; and, if so, McKnight, had the order been genuine, would certainly have been liable to Wilcox upon said order; and likewise Mrs. Edwards would have become liable thereon had she accepted it. Also, if the order had been genuine, but the facts therein stated false, and Mrs. Edwards had sent the money as requested, very clearly McKnight would have been liable to her upon the order for the money so sent, and for the fraud practiced in obtaining it. We are clearly of the opinion that the instrument comes within the meaning of the statute, and is such a one that, if it were true, would create...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chowning v. State
...is an ordinary draft such as is commonly used in commercial transactions and required no explanatory averments. See Dooley v. State, 21 Tex.App. 549, 2 S.W. 884; Miller v. State, 50 Tex.Cr.R. 536, 100 S.W. His next contention is that the instrument is not such as, on its face, created a pec......
-
Townser v. State
...therein cited; Horton v. State, 32 Tex. 80; Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Dooley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 549, 2 S. W. 884; articles 454 and 807, C. C. The instrument clearly, on its face, was neither vague nor uncertain, and especially when taken in c......
-
Dreeben v. State
...been perfected, and these steps are not taken.' Com. v. Costello, 120 Mass. 358. See, also, Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Dooley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 550 ; Lassiter v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 540 ; State v. Gullette, 121 Mo. 456, ; and notes cited in 8 Am. St. Rep. 467. And in Cyc. vol......
-
Davis v. State
...obligation. See Horton v. State, 32 Tex. 79; Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Dooley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 549, 2 S. W. 884. It is drawn in the form that virtually all checks on banks are now It was not necessary to allege that "S. F. Hackney and son" ......