Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 02 December 2021
• Docket Number: SC19-716
• Citation: 332 So.3d 970
• Parties: Alvin DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

332 So.3d 970

Alvin DAVIS, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC19-716

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 2, 2021

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent

CANADY, C.J.

In this case, we consider whether a trial court's consideration of failure to take responsibility during a sentencing proceeding necessarily violates a defendant's due process rights. We have for review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Davis v. State , 268 So. 3d 958, 968-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), in which the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance:

WHEN, IF EVER, MUST AN APPELLATE COURT REVERSE A SENTENCE BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF "REMORSE," "FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY," OR THE LIKE?

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts as set forth by the First District are as follows:

A jury convicted Davis of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. According to trial testimony, a teenager was driving a car with Davis as a passenger. Officers stopped the car and found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a gun. The teenage driver testified that he did not know a gun was in the car until right before the traffic stop, when Davis pulled out the gun, wrapped it in an orange shirt, and stuffed it under the seat.

The teen's testimony was essential, and the defense suggested it was also untrue.... The jury convicted.

Davis moved for a new trial. After a hearing, the court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to sentencing. The presentence investigation report noted Davis's "extensive criminal history," which included "numerous violent offenses." It also concluded that Davis "appears to have a history of gang related activity" and "apparently continues to be a threat to the safety of the community." The PSI [(presentence investigation)] report recommended the maximum sentence.[N.1]

[N.1] A PSI's purpose is to provide information to help the court impose an appropriate sentence. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.712(a)....

At the sentencing hearing, Davis declared he was innocent. He insisted that the gun was not his, that the jury convicted him without sufficient evidence, and that his counsel performed inadequately. After Davis spoke, the court pronounced sentence. In doing so, the court recounted Davis's significant criminal history and told Davis "you still fail to take any responsibility for your actions." The court concluded that, "considering your history here, your failure to take any responsibility, the nature of the crime, the fact that it involves a firearm, the Court will sentence you to 15 years ..., which is the statutory maximum."

Davis , 268 So. 3d at 961-62.

Davis appealed, and the First District heard his appeal en banc. Receding from its own precedent, the First District concluded that "lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the statutory range." Id. at 961.

In reaching this conclusion, the First District explained that "[t]he commonsense approach of considering a defendant's remorse—or willingness to take responsibility—fits with the Legislature's command that each sentence be not only commensurate with the severity of the offense but also fashioned in light of ‘the circumstances surrounding’ it." Id. at 963 (quoting § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017) ). The district court noted the United States Supreme Court's recognition that " ‘possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics’ is ‘[h]ighly relevant—if not essential’ to a judge's selection of an appropriate sentence," id. (quoting Williams v. New York , 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) ), and that Florida courts have considered a variety of factors when sentencing a defendant, including financial resources, employment status, family obligations, and overall reputation in the community, id. at 964 (citing Noel v. State , 191 So. 3d 370, 379 (Fla. 2016) ; Imbert v. State , 154 So. 3d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ). The First District further explained that "[a] defendant's remorse or willingness to accept responsibility comprises part of the whole picture," and "speak[s] to a defendant's character and to the defendant's potential for rehabilitation," which is important because a sentencing judge is obligated to consider a convicted defendant's potential for rehabilitation, or lack thereof, in fashioning a sentence. Id. (citing Simmons v. State , 419 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fla. 1982) ).

The First District addressed several counterarguments to its change in precedent. First, it discussed the "view that judges may rely on remorse to reduce a sentence but may not rely on a lack of remorse to increase a sentence." Id. at 965. While the First District acknowledged that this approach was taken by this Court in the capital case Pope v. State , 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983), it distinguished the instant case, because noncapital sentencing does not consider aggravating factors to justify a higher sentence as is required in capital sentencing. Davis , 268 So. 3d at 965. In this case, the First District noted, the trial court was authorized to impose the maximum sentence based only on the fact of the conviction and without further findings, which are necessary to impose an aggravated sentence of death in a capital case. Id.

The First District explained that "if [it] held that Davis's refusal to take responsibility could not increase his sentence but could justify not lowering his sentence, [it] would have to figure out which of those happened." Id. at 966. But this could prove difficult since it is unclear whether a particular sentence reflects "an aggravated sentence or an unmitigated sentence." Id. The court noted that none of the minority opinions written in this case "doubts the legality of considering remorse or acceptance of responsibility to reduce (or not reduce) a sentence." Id.¹ The court took issue with this position, explaining,

This further supports our conclusion that these considerations are, in fact, valid sentencing considerations. It should go without saying that no up-versus-down distinction would be an issue with truly impermissible sentencing factors. With religion, for example, we would never say a judge could lighten a sentence for defendants who disavowed Catholicism, so long as the judge did not enhance sentences for those who embraced Catholicism. We would instead say—quite emphatically—that a defendant's religious faith must not play any part in the sentence. In other words, we would say improper sentencing factors should not be factors in sentencings—up or down.

Id. (citation omitted). To put it another way, the court concluded that if acceptance of responsibility is a permissible sentencing consideration to reduce a sentence, then it is simply a proper sentencing consideration, regardless of its purpose.

Finally, turning to this Court's decision in Holton v. State , 573 So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990), another capital case, the First District rejected the argument that Holton ’s prohibition against using pleas of not guilty against defendants is comparable to the voluntary allocution in this case. Davis , 268 So. 3d at 967. The First District reasoned that "when a defendant forgoes permissible benefits of pleading guilty (such as a lenient sentence), it does not necessarily follow that his not-guilty plea was unconstitutionally ‘used against him.’ " Id. at 966-67. The court continued, "To the extent Davis had to choose between maintaining his innocence at sentencing or seeking a more favorable sentence, he was in no different situation than defendants facing plea offers every single day." Id. at 967. The First District then distinguished cases of true judicial vindictiveness, which would clearly be violative of due process rights. Id. at 967-68. But, the court reasoned, withholding leniency, as the trial court here did, is not equivalent to punishing a defendant. Id.

Concluding that there was no constitutional violation, the First District held "that a trial judge does not violate a defendant's due process rights by merely considering the defendant's lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility." Id. at 961. The First District thus affirmed Davis's conviction and sentence but certified the aforementioned question to be one of great public importance. Id. at 968-69.

We accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question, but because the district court did not pass upon the entirety of the question as framed, we first rephrase it based on the specific circumstances presented by this case:

DOES A TRIAL COURT, WHEN IMPOSING A SENTENCE ON A DEFENDANT WHO HAS VOLUNTARILY CHOSEN TO ALLOCUTE AND MAINTAIN HIS INNOCENCE AT THE SENTENCING HEARING, VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY CONSIDERING THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE

TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTIONS?²

II. ANALYSIS

Davis contends that consideration by a trial court at sentencing of a defendant's failure to take responsibility for his or her actions violates due process "because it infringes on the defendant's right to testify and not incriminate himself." Initial Br. of Pet. at 13. We disagree. In support of his position, Davis relies on this Court's opinion in Holton , a capital case, in which this Court stated that "[a] trial court violates due process by using a protestation of innocence against a defendant." 573 So. 2d at 292. He relies on another capital case, Pope , which states that "lack of remorse should have no place in the consideration of aggravating factors." 441 So. 2d at 1078. But his reliance on these capital cases is misplaced.

In Pope , "[t]he trial court, in finding the murder especially...