Noel v. State
| Decision Date | 21 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Nos. SC14–274,SC14–1952.,s. SC14–274 |
| Citation | 191 So.3d 370 |
| Parties | Jean Claude NOEL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Jean Claude Noel, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Consiglia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Melynda Layne Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
This case is before the Court for review of the en banc decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Noel v. State, 127 So.3d 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(en banc), which certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Nezi v. State, 119 So.3d 517 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Petitioner also seeks review of Noel on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with Nezi on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const.1
The question in this case concerns the constitutionality of the trial court's imposition of a sentence which provided that if the defendant made a certain restitution payment within sixty days, then his prison term would be reduced from ten years to eight years. As we fully explain below, we hold that the trial court's sentence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We therefore quash the Fourth District's decision in Noel and approve the Fifth District's decision in Nezi to the extent it found the sentence in that case to be unconstitutional.
Following a jury trial, Jean Claude Noel was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering and one count of first-degree grand theft. The charges stemmed “from an elaborate scheme to steal advance fees from victims who sought to obtain funding for their business projects.” Noel, 127 So.3d at 770
. The following exchange took place at Noel's sentencing:
Noel's privately-retained counsel requested a prison sentence of 3.8 years, while the prosecutor sought a minimum of fifteen years in prison. According to Noel's sentencing scoresheet, the lowest possible prison sentence was 3.81 years, while the maximum prison sentence for each offense was thirty years. §§ 812.014(2)
, 895.03(4), 895.04(1), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009).
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Noel to serve ten years in prison followed by ten years of probation:
(Emphasis added.) The trial court further ordered, as conditions of probation, that Noel owed six hundred fifty thousand dollars in restitution and provided for income deduction of fifteen percent. The trial court's written order provided that “if the Defendant pays $20,000 within 60 days of the Court's Order, the [ten-year] prison portion of his sentence shall be mitigated to eight (8) years state prison.” Noel's ten-year prison sentence was not mitigated because he failed to make the restitution payment of $20,000 within sixty days. The trial court denied Noel's counsel's request for an extension of the sixty-day-period.
On appeal,3 Noel claimed that his sentence violated his equal protection rights. Noel, 127 So.3d at 771
. Finding that the imposed sentence did not give rise to any constitutional violation, the Fourth District, sitting en banc, held that “a judge's use of an incentive to encourage the payment of restitution is not so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.” Id. at 772, 778. The district court reasoned:
[C]onsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when deciding what sentence to initially impose, a sentencing judge may consider the entire background of a defendant, including employment history, financial resources, and ability to make restitution. The Constitution does not preclude a judge from actively using the sentencing process to encourage payment of restitution to victims of crimes, nor does it prevent a judge from showing mercy by reducing the severity of a previously imposed legal sentence.
Id. at 770–71. The Fourth District found that the trial court imposed an appropriate sentence based not on Noel's ability to pay restitution, but on his prior record and the extent of the criminal scheme employed. Id. at 777.
The district court explained that Noel's sentence was authorized by section 921.185, Florida Statutes (2010)
, which provides, as to crimes involving property, that a trial court, “in its discretion, shall consider any degree of restitution a mitigation of the severity of an otherwise appropriate sentence,” and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), which permits trial courts to reduce a legal sentence within sixty days after its imposition. Id. at 775.
In discussing case law from the United States Supreme Court, the district court explained that Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)
, “reaffirm[ed] the broad discretion of a judge to consider a defendant's financial resources when imposing the original sentence.” Noel, 127 So.3d at 773. The district court expressed that Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398–99, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (), have “little application” because “[n]either case involved a court's attempt to encourage restitution after imposing a lawful sentence of incarceration.” Id. at 772–73.
The Fourth District accordingly affirmed Noel's convictions and sentences, certified conflict with Nezi, 119 So.3d 517
,4 and receded from DeLuise v. State, 72 So.3d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).5
Noel claims that his sentence—which provided that if he were to make a restitution payment of $20,000 within sixty days, then his prison term would be mitigated from ten years to eight years—violates his equal protection and due process rights secured under the United States Constitution. Noel asserts that section 921.185
, which affords discretion to the trial courts to consider restitution as mitigation, was unconstitutionally applied.
“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Crist v. Ervin, 56 So.3d 745, 747 (Fla.2010)
. In considering a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, this Court is “obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.” Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005) ). Because Noel did not raise the constitutionality of his sentence in the trial court, Noel must establish that the trial court committed fundamental error. See F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226,...
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