Davis v. State Dept. of Public Health and Welfare
| Decision Date | 05 January 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 7335,7335 |
| Citation | 274 S.W.2d 615 |
| Parties | Coma DAVIS, Respondent, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Paul McGhee, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
J. Bernie Lewis, Ava, for respondent.
The respondent, Coma Davis, was removed from the old age assistance rolls in March 1953. He appealed to the Director of Public Health and Welfare, and a hearing was held before a referee on May 20, 1953. Based on the record made at that hearing, the Director came to the conclusion, 'We are not convinced the claimant owed his daughter a valid debt, and it is found claimant transferred property to his daughter for the purpose of rendering himself eligible to continue to receive old age assistance benefits.' It was therefore ruled that claimant was ineligible and the decision of the local welfare office in removing him from the rolls was affirmed. Such determination was by the respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Douglas County, which reversed the finding of the Director and remanded the case for redetermination, upon a finding of such court that a hearing and determination of applicant's eligibility and rights under the laws of Missouri pertaining to old age assistance was not granted to the applicant; and that the decision of the Director of Public Health and Welfare was arbitrary and unreasonable. From such decision that Department has appealed.
The case must be determined under the provisions of section 208.010, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., then in force. Such statute provides, among other things, that benefits shall not be payable to any person who has made an assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself eligible for benefits.
In reviewing an old age assistance award the court determines only whether or not a fair hearing has been granted the aplicant and whether or not the decision of the Director of Public Health and Welfare was arbitrary and unreasonable. Section 208.100(5), RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
As to the first assignment, i. e., that the court erred in finding that applicant had not been accorded a fair hearing, we agree with the appellant. The record shows that the respondent was granted a hearing before the referee, was represented by counsel, was permitted to call and examine witnesses and to cross-examine appellant's witness. Neither abuse nor restriction is shown, and it appears that he was allowed full latitude in presenting his facts. We cannot find anything suggestive of unfairness in this.
The other question is whether or not the decision of the Director of Public Health and Welfare was arbitrary and unreasonable. In determining whether the Director's finding was arbitrary and unreasonable we are restricted to the question solely of whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the finding. If there was substantial evidence the decision of the Director must be affirmed. If there was no substantial evidence the proceedings must be remanded for redetermination. We do not try the case de novo nor consider the credibility of witnesses nor the weight of the evidence. If the record contains substantial evidence we may not disturb the finding, even though, had we had the inquiry in the first instance, our decision would have been contrary to that reached by the Director. In our examination we should search the record for evidence most favorable to the finding of the Director. Chapman v. State Social Security Commission, 235 Mo.App. 698, 147 S.W.2d 157; Hooks v. State Social Security Commission, Mo.App., 165 S.W.2d 267; Brattin v. State Social Security Commission, Mo.App., 194 S.W.2d 536; Howlett v. State Social Security Commission, 347 Mo. 784, 149 S.W.2d 806; Linton v. State Dept. of Public Health, Mo.App., 252 S.W.2d 841. But the evidence must be the facts adduced and not the conclusions of the witnesses. Nichols v. State Social Security Commission, 349 Mo. 1148, 164 S.W.2d 278.
Since the question of whether or not the finding was arbitrary depends upon whether substantial evidence is in the record, the meaning of such expression is important.
The last definition we find when used in reference to cases of this kind is that in Collins v. Division of Welfare, Mo., 270 S.W.2d 817, loc. cit. 820, wherein it is said, "Substantial evidence' is evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i. e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it establishes them; it is evidence from which the trier or triers of the fact reasonably could find the issues in harmony therewith; it is evidence of a character sufficiently substantial to warrant the trier of facts in finding from it the facts, to establish which the evidence was introduced.' Other definitions are, "evidence from which the triers of the fact reasonably could find the issue in harmony therewith" 1; "evidence which, if true, would have probative force upon the issues" 2; 'whether the jury reasonably could find the issue thereon.' 3
In State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47, loc. cit. 51-52, it is said, 'In this state the scintilla doctrine does not prevail. (Citing Scrivner v. American Car & Foundry Co., 330 Mo. 408, 424, 50 S.W.2d 1001, 1006.) And what is substantial evidence? Berkemeier v. Reller, 317 Mo. 614, 642, 296 S.W. 739, 752, says it is 'evidence which, if true, would have probative force upon the issues.' But it is more than that; even a scintilla of evidence must tend to prove the issue. * * *
At loc. cit. 52, of 96 S.W.2d quoting from James v. Kansas City Gas Co., 325 Mo. 1054, 1069, 30 S.W.2d 118, 123, "Whether the evidence in a given case is sufficient to support the finding of the jury, when taken and considered in the fashion in which it must be on demurrer, depends on whether it is sufficient to establish with reasonable certainty in the minds of persons of ordinary and average intelligence the existence of the facts on which the finding is necessarily based."
Again at loc. cit. 52 of 96 S.W.2d quoting from Hardin v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 334 Mo. 1169, 1180, 70 S.W.2d 1075, 1079, 1080, "If reasonable minds could fairly and honestly have two views of the matter from all the evidence, then plaintiff's testimony was substantial evidence of his theory of the facts, * * *."
The court concludes its investigation with the statement, loc. cit. 52 of 96 S.W.2d, 'Now since the test of substantial evidence is whether a jury reasonably could find the issue thereon, * * *.'
We conclude from the foregoing that our question, reduced to simple language, is whether the Director could with reasonable certainty find or infer from the evidence that respondent had transferred his property for the purpose of making himself eligible. It is not a question of whether the transfers were made, for such is admitted. The proposition is whether the evidence reasonably justifies the conclusion that the transfer was made with the prohibited purpose or intent.
Respondent Davis was put on the old age assistance rolls commencing January 1, 1948. He was taken off on March 31, 1949. The case was reopened August 6, 1949, and he was taken off again in September 1949. The case was again reopened on March 12, 1951, and he drew assistance until March 1953, at which time he was again removed, on the basis of fact that he had, at some time not shown but presumably about the first of 1953, sold his equity in a home and, in the opinion of the county welfare office (and later of the Director as found) had made transfers of a part of the proceeds of such sale in order to render himself eligible.
During the principal portion of the period here covered he had as members of his household a son, Paul, who was in high school, and a daughter, Cinita, who at some time during the period commenced work as a teacher and who finally, in October of 1952, married and left the home.
Testimony of Davis in substance is that he was (had been) the owner of a small dwelling, subject to an...
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...statements in Jones, supra. We are of the considered opinion that claimant was accorded a fair hearing. Davis v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, Mo.App., 274 S.W.2d 615, 616(2); McCoy v. State Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, Mo.App., 271 S.W.2d 788, 790; Bollinger v. State Dept. o......
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