Howlett v. Social Security Com'n

• Decision Date: 22 March 1941
• Docket Number: 37518
• Parties: Ben F. Howlett v. State Social Security Commission, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

149 S.W.2d 806

347 Mo. 784

Ben F. Howlett v. State Social Security Commission, Appellant

No. 37518

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 22, 1941

Appeal from Butler Circuit Court; Hon. Robert I. Cope Judge.

Reversed.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, Aubrey R. Hammett Jr., John T. Harding, Elmore G. Crowe and Charles W Hess, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

(1) The finding of the Commission on the issue of eligibility was binding on the circuit court, if supported by substantial evidence, and the judgment of the circuit court was erroneous in making a finding on this issue and remanding the case with directions. 1939 Amend., Sec. 16, Social Security Act, Laws 1939, p. 736; Redmon v. State Social Security Comm., 143 S.W.2d 168; Clay v. State Social Security Comm., 143 S.W.2d 165; DeMay v. Liberty Foundry, 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 40 S.W.2d 601; Beck v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 48 S.W.2d 213. (a) In determining whether the record discloses substantial evidence to support the finding of the Commission, the reviewing court must look only to the evidence which is most favorable to support such finding. Bise v. Tarlton, 333 Mo. 395, 35 S.W.2d 993. (b) Applying the test laid down by the aforementioned cases the substantial evidence in this case supports the finding of the Commission. Soper v. Wheeler, 239 Mass. 327, 132 N.E. 46. (c) The circuit court's judgment determining eligibility and its remanding with directions is an unconstitutional invasion of the administrative field by a judicial body. Schneberger v. State Board of Social Welfare, 291 N.W. 861; Borreson v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 14 N.E.2d 488. (2) The legislative intent in enacting the amendments of 1939 to the Social Security Act is, that the Commission should consider support received from relatives in determining eligibility. Moore v. State Social Security Comm., 233 Mo.App. 536, 122 S.W.2d 393. (a) The decisions of the appellate courts concerning the 1939 amendments to the Missouri Social Security Act hold that there is no room for construction because the legislative intent is clearly expressed. Price v. State Social Security Comm., 232 Mo.App. 721, 121 S.W.2d 298; Hughes v. State Social Security Comm., 128 S.W.2d 671; Moore v. State Social Security Comm., 233 Mo.App. 536, 122 S.W.2d 393; Laws 1939, page 739; Sec. 11, 1937 Act, Laws 1937, p. 473; Johns v. State Social Security Comm., 143 S.W.2d 161; Buettner v. State Social Security Comm., 144 S.W.2d 865; Keller v. State Social Security Comm., 137 S.W.2d 989; State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 448 Mo. 622, 92 S.W.2d 640; Little River Drain. Dist. v. Jones, 136 S.W.2d 440; Columbia Weighing Machine Co. v. Rockwell, 38 S.W.2d 508; Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 330 Mo.App. 596, 50 S.W.2d 130. (b) The legislative record of their procedings in connection with this enactment clearly indicates the legislative intention in the enactment of the 1939 amendments. (3) Foreign cases construing similar statutes have interpreted the eligibility requirements according to the appellant's contention. Wood v. Wagner, 293 N.W. 188; Schneberger v. State Board of Social Welfare, 291 N.W. 859; Soper v. Wheeler, 132 N.E. 46, 239 Mass. 327; State ex rel. Eckroth v. Borge, 283 N.W. 521, 69 N.D. 1; Waits Estate, 7 A.2d 329, 336 Pa. 151.

David W. Hill for respondent.

OPINION

Hays, J.

Respondent Ben F. Howlett made application for old age assistance under the State Social Security Act of 1937. [Laws of 1937, p. 467 et seq.; as amended: Laws of 1939, p. 738.] His application was denied and, after a hearing before the State Commission, the denial was affirmed. Howlett then appealed to the circuit court, which reversed and remanded the case to the commission "for redetermination in accordance with this decision." From this judgment the commission appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals. An opinion was there filed affirming the judgment of the circuit court; but the Judge who wrote same concluded it was in conflict with the decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Buettner v. Social Security Commission, 144 S.W.2d 864. At his request and pursuant to the direction of Section 6, Article VI of the Amendment of 1884 to the Constitution of Missouri the case was certified and transferred to this court for determination. By that constitutional provision it is our duty to rehear and determine the cause in the same manner "as in case of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary appellate process." It is not an open question in this court as to whether such conflict does in fact exist. [Epstein v. Pa. Railroad, 250 Mo. 1, 156 S.W. 699, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 394.]

Undisputed evidence shows that Howlett at the time of his application for assistance was 78 years old, not gainfully employed and physically incapable of making a living. He did not own nor possess real or personal property or any interest therein and had owned none for a number of years. He had made no assignment for the purpose of becoming eligible for a pension and he was and had been for many years a citizen and resident of Butler County in this State. He has never been an inmate of a public institution.

Howlett was living in a hotel room, the rental of which -- fifteen dollars per month -- was paid by an adult son who also supplied his father with board at a restaurant which cost approximately twenty dollars a month. The son also supplied the applicant with clothing and laundry. The total cost of the father's living expenses thus furnished by the son averaged forty-four dollars per month. At the time of the hearing the son was making one hundred dollars per month, out of which, in addition to his own living expenses and those of his father, he made occasional irregular contributions to an adult daughter. Sometime before the hearing Mr. Howlett had had a surgical operation performed and the expenses of this had not been paid. While the son testified that at times his father did not eat as much as he should because he was afraid the expense would too greatly tax the son's income, there is no substantial evidence tending to show that the elder Howlett's living conditions were not "compatible with decency and health."

The appellant contends that the circuit court, in remanding the cause for "redetermination in accordance with this decision," exceeded the power given it by the statute governing appeals from the Social Security Commission. Appeals are strictly creatures of the statute and this is particularly true of appeals to the courts from the determination of administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. The State Social Security Commission is an executive governmental agency (State ex rel. v. Hackman, 314 Mo. 33, 282 S.W. 1007); and, like the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Public Service Commission and the State Highway Commission, exercises quasi-judicial powers (State ex rel. v. Brown, 323 Mo. 382, 19 S.W.2d 484; Hughes v. State Board of Health, 345 Mo. 995, 137 S.W.2d 523; State ex inf. v. Murphy et al. (en banc), 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527.) The power and jurisdiction of a court upon such appeal is limited to that granted by the terms of the statute which creates the right. [Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909; State ex rel. Missouri Gravel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (Mo. App.), 113 S.W.2d 1034.] The present appeal was taken after the enactment of the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act and is governed by Sec. 16 of said act, as so amended. [Laws of 1939, p. 736.] This section provides that if upon appeal to the circuit court that tribunal shall find that the applicant was not granted a fair hearing by the commission, or that the determination of the commission was "arbitrary and unreasonable," it shall "remand the proceedings for redetermination of the issues by the State Commission." Under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Sec. 3732, R. S. Mo. 1939) the court, upon appeal from a decision of the Compensation Commission, is authorized to "modify, reverse, remand for rehearing or set aside the award." Yet it is held that it may not remand with directions to enter a particular finding or particular form of award. [Russell v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 332 Mo. 645, 60 S.W.2d 44, 87 A. L. R. 953; Schulz v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 56 S.W.2d 126.] But it is also held that where the circuit court has reversed and remanded with directions, this is to be treated as a simple remand and that in such instance the decision of the court upon any question of law involved in the case is binding upon and must be followed by the commission as the law of the case. [Brocco v. May Department Stores, 227 Mo.App. 395, 55 S.W.2d 322.] While the words "for redetermination in accordance with this decision," used by the circuit court in its judgment, may be surplusage, they do not affect the validity of such judgment and in point of fact the Social Security Commission is bound to follow such ruling as is made by the court of last resort upon questions of law, such ruling being considered the law of the case.

What is meant by the statutory language referring to an arbitrary and unreasonable determination by the commission? Any decision of the commission is like a general judgment of a court of law in this: that it involves the solution of two subsidiary questions -- a question of fact and one of law. The answers to these questions form the major and minor premises from which the ultimate finding of the commission for or against the applicant must be derived as a conclusion. The commission must, from the evidence adduced before it first determine what the facts of ...