Davis v. State
Decision Date | 08 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 68142,68142 |
Citation | 651 S.W.2d 787 |
Parties | Elpato DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal is taken from a conviction for aggravated robbery. The jury assessed punishment at 40 years.
On October 16, 1979, appellant and two other men, James Riggins and Vince Benton, entered the lobby of the Ramada Inn in Longview. Glenda Hudson, the motel desk clerk, testified Benton pulled a revolver " Hudson further related appellant said, " 'Yeah, let's have it all now.' " As Yvonne Woods, the motel night auditor, put her hand on the one-dollar bills and said "take it," Benton shot her. After forcing the two women to lie on the floor, appellant and the two other men left. It was later determined at least $250.00 had been taken from the cash register.
Appellant contends the trial court "erred in overruling the many motions for a mistrial in this cause." Although this is a multifarious ground of error, we will review the same since we "can identify and understand such point of objection." Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P.
Appellant complains the court commented on the weight of the evidence in its remarks to the veniremen prior to jury selection. He maintains the court told the veniremen this cause would have to be retried if the jury did not follow the court's instructions.
The record does not contain a transcription either of the trial court's remarks or of the voir dire examination. However the record does reflect the following:
Art. 38.05, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
"In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or comment upon the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall simply decide whether or not it is admissible; nor shall he, at any stage of the proceeding previous to the return of the verdict, make any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case." (Emphasis added.)
To constitute reversible violation of Art. 38.05, supra, the comment of the judge must be such that it is reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice the defendant's rights. Marks v. State, 617 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Barber v. State, 628 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.App.1981).
In Graham v. State, 624 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.App.--Ft. Worth 1981) reversal resulted because of the trial judge's comments before voir dire of the jury, "I think that the evidence will show that he [defendant] went to her [victim's] house looking for her daughter and the State's evidence will probably show that Sara Whitehead [victim] was killed somewhere during that time ..." The Court found that these remarks were calculated to, and probably did, convey to the jury the court's opinion of the case on a pivotal issue. The question of whether the defendant had been to the victim's home on the day in question was hotly disputed and the judge's comment gave credence to the State's version of the disputed facts.
In Hernandez v. State, 507 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), a comment by the trial judge during argument of defense counsel bears a similarity to the one complained of in the instant case. In Hernandez, the following occurred during argument of defense counsel at the guilt stage of the trial:
An objection was made and the court instructed the jury that it was strictly up to them to determine guilt or innocence of the defendant. While noting that the court's comment carried the implication that the defendant's conviction was a foregone conclusion in the eyes of the trial court, this Court held that the court's instruction was sufficient to cure the error.
The instruction made prior to voir dire in the instant case was far more subtle than the court's comment in Graham which was directed to a pivotal factual issue in the trial. While the court's comment about appeal could only imply that the defendant would be convicted in Hernandez, the court's mention of another trial does not carry such a narrow implication. A retrial of the cause could just as easily stem from a mistrial caused by the jury's failure to follow the court's instruction. The instruction in question is not a proper one to be given in the trial of a criminal case. Nonetheless, under the circumstances, we conclude that it was not reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice the defendant. No reversible error is shown.
Appellant also complains "the State couched their witnesses to answer to the effect 'they' robbed us, that is, involving the Defendant when he was not involved according to his, and other, testimony." He argues, "the most truthful thing was, and should have been that Vince Benton shot the lady and robbed the place, and that the Defendant and James Riggins were present."
Witness Hudson testified appellant told her, " 'Yeah, let's have it [the money] all now.' " Furthermore, Vince Benton testified appellant told Woods and Hudson "to get on the floor" and that later appellant personally divided up the money and took $40.00 for himself. The evidence sufficiently demonstrates appellant was a party to the offense. No error is shown.
Appellant next maintains "hearsay testimony was allowed to involve the Defendant." Complaint is made of the State, on redirect examination of Barbara Ann Jackson, improperly using a portion of Jackson's written statement to the police. The statement itself was never admitted into evidence and does not appear in the appellate record.
Jackson was a friend of appellant, Riggins and Benton. She testified that all three men came to her apartment on the evening of the 16th, after they had been to the Ramada Inn.
Under cross-examination by appellant's attorney, Jackson testified as follows:
On redirect examination the following exchange occurred between Jackson and the prosecutor:
Art. 38.24, V.A.C.C.P. provides that:
Appellant's counsel first made reference to Jackson's statement. In response, the...
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