Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 16 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-94-00123-CV,03-94-00123-CV |
| Citation | 904 S.W.2d 946 |
| Parties | James W. DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas; the Cities of Houston, Ranger and Gonzales, Texas; and the Transit Authorities of Houston, Texas and Dallas, Texas, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Tom C. Ingram, Jr., Dallas, for appellant.
Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., David Randell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Collections Div., Austin, for appellees.
Before POWERS, ABOUSSIE and JONES, JJ.
In an action for sales taxes collected but not remitted to the State of Texas, appellant James W. Davis appeals the trial-court judgment rendered in favor of the State of Texas; the Cities of Houston, Ranger, and Gonzales; and the Transit Authorities of Houston and Dallas. We will reverse the trial court's judgment, remanding the cause to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
The facts of this case were orally stipulated at trial and supported by a single piece of stipulated documentary evidence. In short, by December 31, 1984, Jim Davis Auctioneers, Inc. ("JDA") had collected $190,737.12 in sales taxes; of this amount, state sales taxes totaled $134,350.43, city sales taxes totaled $28,914.43, and transit authority sales taxes totaled $27,472.26. Davis was president and director of JDA throughout the time period at issue; he controlled both the management and financial affairs of JDA. Davis, or those answerable to him, commingled the tax receipts into JDA's operating account and paid out the funds to entities other than appellees. To date, no sales taxes JDA collected have been remitted to appellees.
The Comptroller certified the delinquent amounts to the Attorney General for collection. Based on the certification, appellees filed suit on July 12, 1989. 1 The issues to be determined at trial were Davis's alleged conversion of the sales tax receipts and his liability under section 111.016 of the Tax Code. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellees on December 8, 1993. Davis appeals the trial court's judgment.
At the outset, we address appellees' jurisdictional cross point of error by which they contend this Court erred in denying their motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction because Davis did not timely perfect his appeal. To perfect his appeal, Davis did not file security for costs within thirty days of the signing of the trial court's judgment. Instead, he timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial court and thereafter filed a cost bond within ninety days after the judgment was signed. See Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1) (). Appellees argue that Davis's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to extend the deadline to perfect an appeal because findings of fact and conclusions of law are (1) unwarranted unless a trial has taken place and (2) inappropriate in an agreed case. We will address each argument in turn.
Appellees remind us that parties may request findings of fact and conclusions of law only in cases tried without a jury. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 296. Appellees place much emphasis on the word "tried": they argue that a proceeding based on stipulated evidence, like that in the instant case, cannot be characterized as a "trial" within the meaning of Rule 296, and assert that any request for findings of fact and conclusions of law stemming from such a proceeding therefore does not extend deadlines for perfecting an appeal. We disagree. The "trial" envisioned by Rule 296 is an evidentiary hearing to the court or a bench trial on the merits. Zimmerman v. Robinson, 862 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1993, no writ).
In the instant cause, the factual evidence was orally stipulated in proceedings before the trial court. One exhibit was introduced and offered into evidence. The trial court subsequently rendered judgment. We conclude that the instant case was "tried ... without a jury" as required by Rule 296; a bench trial on the merits took place regardless of whether the court received only stipulated evidence.
Because the proceedings constituted a nonjury trial, we generally would conclude that the timely filing of a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extended the deadline to perfect an appeal to ninety days after the judgment was signed. See Tex.R.App.P. 41(a)(1). However, appellees argue that we should treat the instant cause as an "Agreed Case" under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 263 2 and hold that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is inappropriate and cannot extend the appellate timeline.
To qualify as an agreed case, an agreed statement of facts upon which judgment shall be rendered must be filed with the court clerk. Tex.R.Civ.P. 263. 3 The parties in this cause did not strictly comply with Rule 263. However, appellees maintain that "[i]f the parties stipulate all the facts of an action, ... the stipulation may be treated as a submission upon an agreed statement [pursuant to Rule 263]." Lambda Constr. Co. v. Chamberlin Waterproofing & Roofing Sys., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex.App.--Austin 1990, writ denied); see also Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 715 (1945) (treating case submitted on stipulation so complete that "it shows what the controversy between the parties is, and the facts out of which the controversy arose, and leaves nothing for the court but to declare Davis has not challenged appellees' assertion that the instant cause be treated as an agreed case. Although the parties never agreed that the case would be tried pursuant to Rule 263 as an agreed case, neither did they imply that there were other facts as to which they would offer proof if they so desired. The issues at trial were limited to the application of the law to the stipulated facts. In considering all the facts, circumstances, and actions of the parties, we conclude that while not in literal compliance with Rule 263, the instant case may be treated as an agreed case for the purposes of determining the appropriateness of the request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Cobb, 190 S.W.2d at 715; Lambda Constr., 784 S.W.2d at 125.
the law arising from the facts" as agreed case).
Ordinarily,
[t]he courts are without power, in the absence of a provision in the agreed statement providing otherwise, to draw any inference, or find any facts, not embraced in the agreement, unless, as a matter of law, such other inferences are necessarily compelled; and the judgment of the court must only declare the law which necessarily arises from the facts agreed upon.
Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491, 492 (1923) (emphasis added); see also Cousins v. Cousins, 42 S.W.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1931, writ ref'd) (on rehearing) (confining trial court to facts contained in agreed statement and allowing no additional findings). Accordingly, findings of fact and conclusions of law need not be filed following a judgment rendered on stipulated facts. Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Hidalgo County Appraisal Dist., 783 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989), aff'd, 804 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.1991); see also Perry v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 380 S.W.2d 868, 875 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("As a general rule, findings of fact do not have any place in the trial of an agreed case.") (emphasis added); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Riggins, 291 S.W. 276, 278 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1927, writ ref'd) (); cf. Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Central Educ. Agency, 488 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding trial court correctly refused to make findings of fact in administrative law case because only questions of law were presented); Southwest Stone Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 173 S.W.2d 325, 328 () ( trial court properly refused to make findings of facts in case disposed of by sustaining special exceptions to pleadings because pleadings stated all facts upon which trial court ruled). If findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed in agreed cases, they will be disregarded on appeal. Cf. Cobb, 190 S.W.2d at 715 (); Ocean Accident, 291 S.W. at 278 ().
In the context of summary judgment, the Texas Supreme Court recently held that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law will not extend the appellate timetable "[b]ecause findings of fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment proceeding." Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.1994) (emphasis added). Our reading of Texas case law indicates that, as in the context of summary judgment, findings of fact generally have no place in cases based entirely on undisputed stipulated facts. See Perry, 380 S.W.2d at 875.
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