Williams v. Lara
Decision Date | 28 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-0273,99-0273 |
Citation | 52 S.W.3d 171 |
Parties | (Tex. 2001) David Williams, in his capacity as Sheriff of Tarrant County, Texas, and Tarrant County, Texas, Petitioners v. Ruth Maree Lara and Michael Huff, Respondents |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Justice Hankinson delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a dispute over a religious-education program in a Tarrant County jail facility. Our inquiry focuses on the Chaplain's Education Unit (CEU), a separate unit within the Tarrant County Corrections Center (TCCC), where inmates can volunteer for instruction in a curriculum approved by the sheriff and director of chaplaincy at the jail as consistent with the sheriff's and chaplain's views of Christianity. Ruth Maree Lara and Lee Huff, former inmates at the TCCC, and Dr. Ronald Flowers, a Tarrant County resident, sued Tarrant County and its sheriff, David Williams 1 (collectively, "the County"), for operating the CEU in violation of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions, and for violating their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs asserted claims for damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney's fees.
This appeal presents two principal questions: first, whether any of the plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims; and second, whether the operation of the CEU is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The County contends that the plaintiffs do not have standing to obtain the relief they seek. Alternatively, it urges that the CEU's purpose is secular and that its operation is not unconstitutional. Flowers and Lara respond that they have standing as Tarrant County taxpayers, and Huff and Lara respond that they have standing as former TCCC inmates. Collectively, the plaintiffs argue that the CEU operates to advance the personal religious beliefs of the unit's administrators. They further maintain that involving county employees in the CEU's operation not only excessively entangles the government with religion, but also improperly suggests that the County favors the religious views taught in the CEU over the views of other religions or nonreligion.
In the trial court the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Concluding that the CEU program was constitutional, the court granted the defendants' summary-judgment motion, denied the plaintiffs' motions, and ordered that the plaintiffs take nothing. The court of appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. 986 S.W.2d 310. The court of appeals determined that Flowers lacked standing, but that Lara and Huff had standing as former inmates. Id. at 315. In considering the parties' Establishment Clause claims, the court concluded that fact issues precluded summary judgment for either side. It therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the operation of the CEU violates the Establishment Clauses of our state and federal constitutions. Id. at 319. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment favorable to the defendants in all other respects, including its disposition of the plaintiffs' Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and section 1983 claims. Id. at 320-23.
We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusions concerning standing. Because public funds are expended in running the CEU, we conclude that Flowers has standing as a taxpayer to enjoin its operation. We also conclude that while Lara and Huff have standing as former inmates to pursue monetary relief, they lack standing to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief; those claims are moot. We further disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the Establishment Clause dispute in this case presents a fact question. Instead, we conclude as a matter of law that based on the record in this case, the County's operation of the CEU is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Therefore, the trial court should determine whether injunctive relief, as sought by Flowers, is appropriate, and whether Lara is entitled to damages under section 1983. We also disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion concerning Huff's free-exercise complaint. We conclude that fact issues preclude summary judgment on Huff's free-exercise challenge, and thus whether his free- exercise rights were violated is again an issue for the trial court. Finally, because no party with standing to do so seeks monetary relief for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, we cannot address the merits of the parties' equal-protection complaint. For these reasons, we vacate in part and reverse in part the court of appeals' judgment, dismiss for want of jurisdiction the equal- protection claims, render judgment declaring the operation of the CEU unconstitutional, and remand the remaining claims to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Tarrant County Corrections Center is a county jail facility that houses inmates who are serving sentences, awaiting trial, or awaiting transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Chaplain's Education Unit is one of many jail pods, or cluster of jail cells within the TCCC, where inmates live. Tarrant County, at the behest of Warden James Skidmore and other county employees, created the original CEU in 1992. It was initially open only to male inmates, but a women's CEU was added the following year. Admission to the CEU is voluntary. To be admitted, an inmate must receive security clearance. He or she also must sign an "Application and Agreement," acknowledging that the CEU is "based on orthodox Christian biblical principles" and confirming a willingness to "cooperate fully with the program." Inmates are admitted into the CEU for 120 days and then released back into the jail's general population.
The CEU's purported goals are to promote rehabilitation and reduce violence, which, according to the Director of Chaplaincy, Hugh Atwell, 2 are best accomplished through the teaching of what Williams and Atwell labeled "orthodox Christianity." Atwell explained their views as "generally believing in Jesus Christ as deity, with the Bible being the scripture that is utilized in that belief system . . . and that the scripture is holy and it is accepted as an infallible truth," and that a person must be "born again" to attain salvation. Sheriff Williams and Chaplain Atwell testified that they would not allow instructors to discuss any other religious viewpoint, and the sheriff acknowledged that he would limit what could be taught in the CEU to that which comported with his own personal religious views. As part of the CEU program, inmates are taught in accordance with those views at least four hours a day. They spend the rest of their day completing assignments, studying the Bible, and reviewing other religious books or videotapes. Volunteer chaplains teach the inmates using donated materials. To maintain their positions, the volunteer chaplains must remain members in good standing of a local church.
Sheriff Williams had ultimate authority over and responsibility for the county jail, see Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 351.041, which in this case includes the CEU and its curriculum. Chaplain Atwell was second-in-command. Like the sheriff, he was a paid employee of Tarrant County. Chaplain Atwell interviewed and selected the CEU's volunteer instructors, who were subject to background checks, and met with them weekly. He also met weekly with Sheriff Williams to apprise him of the CEU's progress and to discuss periodically the CEU's curriculum. Directly under Chaplain Atwell was Volunteer Chaplain Don Anderson, the CEU Director. Anderson was responsible for the CEU's daily operation. He was not a county-paid employee but was required to work a minimum of thirty hours a week to retain his position. He too participated in interviewing instructors and determining the appropriate curriculum for the CEU.
Except for a Tuesday night service, which is open to the jail's general population but follows the same curriculum as does the CEU, living in the CEU is the only opportunity county jail inmates have for any type of group religious study. Inmates outside the CEU may meet with spiritual advisors, but the advisor's local religious body must grant him or her permission to represent the religion, and the meeting must occur across a glass window via telephone. Sheriff Williams and Chaplain Atwell expressed a willingness to allow representatives from other religions to take part in the Tuesday night service, but only if those representatives taught from the CEU curriculum.
Plaintiffs Ruth Maree Lara and Lee Huff are former TCCC inmates who did not participate in the CEU program. They, along with Dr. Ronald Flowers, a Tarrant County resident and taxpayer, sued Tarrant County and Sheriff Williams for operating the CEU in violation of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions, and for violating their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 3a, 6, 7. They seek damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney's fees.
In the trial court the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, each side urging that the CEU is either constitutional or unconstitutional as a matter of law. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment requesting only declaratory relief and acknowledging that assessing any other relief would require a factual inquiry. The court initially denied the motions on public-policy grounds. Later, a second judge who presided over the proceedings indicated her intent to reconsider the summary-judgment motions. The parties filed an agreement pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil...
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