Davis v. State, 20000335.
Decision Date | 01 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 20000335.,20000335. |
Citation | 2001 ND 85,625 N.W.2d 855 |
Parties | Gregory James DAVIS, Petitioner and Appellant v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Gregory James Davis (submitted on brief), pro se, Bismarck, petitioner and appellant.
Wade L. Webb (submitted on brief), Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, for respondent and appellee.
[¶ 1] Gregory James Davis appeals from an order for judgment denying his application for post-conviction relief. A judgment of dismissal was entered on December 8, 2000, and we affirm the judgment of dismissal.1
[¶ 2] On June 2, 1994, Davis plead guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition under a plea agreement. The trial court sentenced Davis on June 2, 1994, to the State Penitentiary for a period of ten years, commencing June 2, 1994, with four years suspended for a period of four years after the period of incarceration. During the suspended period, Davis was to be on supervised probation subject to several conditions ultimately set forth in an Appendix attached to the criminal judgment. One of the conditions required Davis to successfully complete a sex offender treatment program. At the sentencing, the trial court told Davis:
[¶ 3] Davis did not complete the sex offender treatment program while in prison. On October 14, 1999, in anticipation of his scheduled release on October 25, 1999, the State petitioned the trial court to revoke Davis' probation, alleging he had not complied with the sex offender treatment program. At the revocation hearing on November 8, 1999, Davis admitted he was in noncompliance with the sex offender treatment program. Following the hearing, the trial court concluded Davis failed to successfully complete the program, revoked his probation and sentenced him to twenty years in the State Penitentiary, with six years credit. Thereafter, Davis wrote a letter to the trial court, requesting it reduce his sentence. On February 23, 2000, the court entered an Order denying Davis' request under Rule 35(b), N.D.R.Crim.P.
[¶ 4] On October 27, 2000, Davis filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing his original sentence was unlawfully revoked. The trial court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order for Judgment on November 24, 2000, summarily denying Davis' post-conviction relief application. Davis filed his Notice of Appeal on November 29, 2000, and a Judgment of Dismissal was entered December 8, 2000.
[¶ 5] Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(1), a trial court may summarily deny an application for post-conviction relief if there is no genuine issue of material fact and as a matter of law the moving party is entitled to judgment. Clark v. State, 1999 ND 78, ¶ 5, 593 N.W.2d 329. Our review of a summary denial of an application for post-conviction relief is akin to our review of a denial of summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 8, 608 N.W.2d 292. The "party opposing the motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding, and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of material fact." Syvertson v. State, 2000 ND 185, ¶ 13, 620 N.W.2d 362 (citation omitted). [¶ 6] Davis contends he did not willfully violate a condition of his probation because he interprets "condition" of probation to be completed while on probation and not while in prison. We disagree.
[¶ 7] The trial court has broad discretion to impose prior conditions of probation upon a defendant while in prison under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07, which provides a list of conditions the court may impose. State v. Bender, 1998 ND 72, ¶ 9, 576 N.W.2d 210. Although N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07 does not specifically list sex offender treatment as a condition of probation, the list of conditions is nonexclusive. Id. The imposition of conditions of probation is purely a matter of judicial discretion, and the trial court is authorized to tailor certain conditions to meet the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id. Moreover, we have concluded a trial court may require a defendant to successfully complete a sex offender treatment program while in prison as a prior condition of probation. State v. Shepherd, 554 N.W.2d 821, 822-23 (N.D.1996).
[¶ 8] The Criminal Judgment and Commitment required Davis to "[a]ttend, participate in, cooperate with and successfully complete ... the sex offender treatment program at the North Dakota State Penitentiary." At the initial sentencing hearing, the trial court told Davis: "[i]f you don't complete the rehabilitation programs and you're subject to release, that will be a violation of probation." Davis admitted he did not complete the program, and both the Criminal Judgment and the trial court's statements make it clear he was required to complete the program as a prior condition to probation. The Criminal Judgment is unambiguous. The trial court properly concluded Davis willfully violated his probation.
[¶ 9] Davis next contends that when the trial court revoked his sentence and resentenced him to a harsher sentence than his original sentence, it violated his double jeopardy and due process rights. Davis argues the trial court could not sentence him to anything more than the suspended period of his previously imposed sentence.
[¶ 10] The guarantee against double jeopardy protects a "criminal defendant's `legitimate expectations' of finality in his or her sentence." State v. Lindgren, 483 N.W.2d 777, 779 (N.D.1992). It ensures that the criminal defendant will not be subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 782, 784 (N.D.1988).
[¶ 11] Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6), a trial court is authorized to resentence a defendant who violates a condition of probation to any sentence that was initially available:
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