Davis v. State

• Docket Number: S23A0166
• Decision Date: 31 May 2023
• Parties: DAVIS v. THE STATE
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

1

DAVIS v. THE STATE

No. S23A0166

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 31, 2023

LAGRUA, JUSTICE

Appellant Garrett Davis was convicted of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Eugene Stinchcomb.^[1] On appeal, Davis contends that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions, (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on confession corroboration, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. These claims fail, and we affirm.

Background.

The evidence presented at Davis's trial showed that, on May 9, 2012, law enforcement officers responded to a 911 call reporting a shooting at an apartment complex located at 635 Jett Street. Upon arrival, officers discovered a man bleeding from his left leg, who refused to provide his name or any information about the shooting. A 9mm shell casing was recovered near the injured man, and he was transported to Grady Hospital. Police officers spoke to several bystanders including a man who had applied a tourniquet to the injured man's leg, but each person refused to provide any information about the shooting. The injured man died the next day, and he was eventually identified as Eugene Stinchcomb. The medical examiner determined that Stinchcomb's cause of death was probable sepsis due to a gunshot wound to the left leg.

Two days after the shooting, Rory Session called 911 and stated he was "turning in his nephew" because Davis had "confessed" to "a shooting, a murder" on "Jett Street" of "Eugene Stony," who "died in Grady [Hospital] the other day." Session stated he was going to pick up Davis and then drive to a relative's house and police should meet them there.

When Session and Davis arrived at the relative's house officers were waiting. Davis and Session were separated, and a police officer conducted a pat-down of Davis and recovered a 9mm magazine, containing a single bullet, from Davis's pocket. A 9mm handgun was also recovered from underneath the front passenger seat where Davis had been sitting. When the gun was pulled out of the car, Session stated, "[T]hat's not mine." Session told a detective that he called 911 and "told them that [Davis] had confessed to . . . a murder, to a shooting . . . over the phone today[.]"

Ballistics testing revealed that the 9mm shell casing recovered near Stinchomb's body was fired from the 9mm handgun recovered from Session's car. Crime scene technicians were unable to find any fingerprints on the shell casing, handgun, or bullet.

Several of the bystanders, who initially refused to speak to police on the day of shooting, testified at trial. Rollo Gregory testified that he saw Davis walk to Jeremy Douglas's apartment, speak with Douglas for a minute, and then stand around in the parking lot. According to Gregory, Stinchcomb arrived at the apartment complex during this time frame and asked Gregory, "Who has the good dope?" Gregory responded that he did not know, and Stinchcomb would "have to check and see." Stinchcomb then went to speak to Douglas at his apartment. After Stinchcomb left Douglas's apartment, Stinchcomb encountered Davis, and they began arguing. Stinchcomb said: "I don't screw with you . . . I don't want nothing you got . . . Just leave me alone." Stinchcomb then asked, "Man, you going to shoot me?" Gregory then witnessed Davis shoot Stinchcomb, put the gun into his pants, and say, "[H]e won't talk back to nobody else like that." Gregory went over to Stinchcomb, took off his shirt, and used it to tie a tourniquet around Stinchcomb's leg.

Sir James Woods testified that on the day of the shooting, he was standing in the doorway of a friend's apartment when he heard Davis and Stinchcomb arguing, and he witnessed Davis shoot Stinchcomb. And Melvin Croom testified that on the day of the shooting, he was sitting outside of his apartment, heard Davis and Stinchcomb arguing, heard a gunshot, and then saw Davis walk away from Stinchcomb.

1. Davis contends the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient. We disagree.

Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction if, "'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Jackson v. State, 315 Ga. 543, 549 (1) (883 S.E.2d 815) (2023) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979)). "This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony but rather defers to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence." Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878 S.E.2d 502) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the evidence showed that Davis shot and killed Stinchcomb in front of multiple eyewitnesses, admitted to his uncle that he shot Stinchcomb, and was in possession of the murder weapon two days after the shooting. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Davis's convictions, and this claim is without merit.

2. Davis contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to investigate alibi evidence and by failing to request a jury instruction on confession corroboration. We conclude these claims fail.

To prevail on these claims, Davis must demonstrate both that his trial counsel's performance was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State, 313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 S.E.2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984)). To establish deficient performance, Davis must show that trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 S.E.2d 400) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Davis must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. See Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). "And, this burden is a heavy one." Id. at 6263 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). "If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong." Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 S.E.2d 346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). "This Court accepts a trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply legal principles to the facts de novo." Bonner v. State, 314 Ga. 472, 474 (1) (877 S.E.2d 588) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Davis contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate evidence of alibi. But, in his appellate brief, Davis also "concedes that this enumeration of error is without merit based on trial counsel's testimony at the motion[-]for[-]new[-]trial hearing and applicable case law," and we agree.

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Davis's trial counsel testified that he was informed of a potential alibi, i.e., that Davis was babysitting a child at a nearby apartment complex. Trial counsel went to the apartment complex to locate the parent(s) and child for whom Davis was babysitting, but trial counsel was unable to locate them after speaking with residents and a property manager. After obtaining additional details from Davis, trial counsel went back to the apartment complex, but was still unsuccessful in locating any potential alibi witnesses.

It is hardly unreasonable, or outside the scope of prevailing professional norms, to diligently investigate an alibi and simply fail to discover any such evidence of alibi. See Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 244 (3) (b) (850 S.E.2d 152) (2020) (the appellant failed to show that trial counsel performed deficiently when the evidence showed that trial counsel attempted to locate alibi witnesses but they could not be found). Accordingly, Davis has failed to show that his trial counsel performed deficiently, and this enumeration of error fails.

(b) Davis contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to request a jury instruction on confession corroboration. See OCGA § 24-8-823 ("A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction."). But see Thomas v State, 308 Ga. 26, 30 (838 S.E.2d 801) (2020) ("Incriminating statements, unlike confessions, do not require corroborating evidence."). Assuming, without deciding, that Davis's statement to Session was a confession, see English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2) (796 S.E.2d 258) (2017) (distinguishing admissions, where "only one or more facts entering into the criminal act are admitted," and confessions, where "the entire...