English v. State

Decision Date23 January 2017
Docket NumberS16A1754
Citation300 Ga. 471,796 S.E.2d 258
Parties ENGLISH v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Tyler R. Conklin, for Appellant.

Timothy G. Vaughn, Dist. Atty., Christopher C. Gordon, Asst. Dist. Atty., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael A. Oldham, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following a jury trial, James English appeals his convictions for the malice murder of Ricky Payne and first degree arson.1 English contends that the trial court committed plain error by not providing a jury charge regarding the corroboration of confessions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that, on the night of April 25, 2009, emergency personnel discovered Payne's burned corpse on a couch in a home that had been set on fire, as well as blotches of Payne's blood throughout the house and on the front porch. The State Fire Marshal determined that the fire was not accidental, and a GBI medical examiner concluded that Payne died as a result of blunt force trauma to the head

rather than smoke inhalation or burns. Clothing samples from Payne tested positive for an ignitable fluid, and both a lighter and lighter fluid were recovered from the house.

Billy Humphrey owned the house that burned, and, in the hours prior to the fire, he drank with Payne and Lori Kirkpatrick before leaving to attend a party at Thomas O'Neal's house. Shortly after dark, Kirkpatrick also left Humphrey's home to attend the same party, and she encountered English in Humphrey's yard. Kirkpatrick left after telling English about O'Neal's party, and only English and Payne remained in Humphrey's home.

At about 10:00 p.m., English arrived at O'Neal's house with his brother, Eric, and told O'Neal, James Howell, and Michael Carrigg, "I'm here if anybody's looking for me. Tell them I've been here all the time." Howell testified that English told him he had "just killed a man," that the man had argued and wrestled with him, and then he "had hit him up side the head with a bat and laid him on the couch and set him on fire." English subsequently told Carrigg similar information, and English proved his claim by showing Howell and Carrigg the crime scene, where the fire department was busy extinguishing the fire.

On May 6, 2009, Howell and Carrigg called an investigative hotline and informed the GBI about what English told them on the night of the fire. The pair met with a GBI agent, relayed the information, and then agreed to wear audio and video recording devices for investigative purposes. Howell and Carrigg then met with English. On tape, English stated to Howell and Carrigg that investigators had no DNA evidence and no eyewitnesses, that English had withheld telling GBI officers in a prior interview that Howell and Carrigg were at O'Neal's house on the night of the fire and murder, that English wanted O'Neal to tell police English had been at his house at a certain time, and that his uncle offered to buy him a bus ticket to Minnesota. English also asked Howell and Carrigg to create an alibi that they saw English at O'Neal's house at the time of the house fire. Additionally, at the conclusion of the video, Howell and Carrigg confirmed to each other, after English had left, that English admitted to the murder during the course of their meeting. Howell and Carrigg nonetheless expressed concern about whether GBI investigators would be able to hear the same because he "was kind of whispering when he said it."2

GBI investigators reviewed the audio and visual recording and arrested English for murder. English then gave a formal statement to the police. After waiving his Miranda rights, English told police that he argued with Payne in Humphrey's home, that the argument turned violent, and that he struck Payne in the head with an object multiple times. After Payne fell on the sofa, English left the home, cleaned himself up, and returned to make sure Payne was okay, and noted that Payne had been bleeding from his head. English claimed that he then went to O'Neal's house. English did not admit to law enforcement officials that he killed Payne or started the fire. Later, on May 11, 2009, officers interviewed English in the jailhouse and received essentially the same information.

This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find English guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his sole enumeration of error, English contends that the trial court plainly erred by not instructing the jury regarding the necessity of corroborating evidence for confessions under former OCGA § 24–3–53. This statute states:

All admissions shall be scanned with care, and confessions of guilt shall be received with great caution. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.3

English's trial counsel neither requested a charge based on this statute, nor objected to the lack of that charge or any alternative charges. Nonetheless, "under OCGA § 17–8–58 (b), appellate review for plain error is required whenever an appealing party properly asserts an error in jury instructions," as English has done in this case. State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011). There are four prongs in the test for plain error, each of which must be satisfied:

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

(Punctuation omitted.) Stanbury v. State , 299 Ga. 125, 129 (2), 786 S.E.2d 672...

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21 cases
  • Ash v. State
    • United States
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    • 2 Noviembre 2021
    ..., 310 Ga. 310, 322 (3) (b), 849 S.E.2d 382 (2020) (same); Clarke , 308 Ga. at 637 (5), 842 S.E.2d 863 (same); English v. State , 300 Ga. 471, 473-475 (2), 796 S.E.2d 258 (2017) (same); Rashid v. State , 292 Ga. 414, 422 (7), 737 S.E.2d 692 (2013) (same).24 Additionally, the Court of Appeals......
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    ...satisfy the third prong of the plain error test: that any error affected the outcome of the court proceedings.In English v. State , 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2), 796 S.E.2d 258 (2017), as here, we considered whether failing to give an unrequested charge on corroboration of a confession amounted to ......
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