Davis v. State
Decision Date | 01 July 1991 |
Docket Number | Nos. S91A0685,s. S91A0685 |
Parties | DAVIS v. The STATE. OWENS v. The STATE. DAVIS v. The STATE. to S91A0687. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Marcus R. Morris, Cynthia N. Johnson, Waycaster, Corn, Murray & Morris, Dalton, for Farris M. Davis.
Rickie L. Brown, Minor, Bell & Neal, P.C., Dalton, for Owens.
McCamy, Phillips, Tuggle, Rolins & Fordham, Stephen A. Williams, Dalton, for F. Michael Davis, Jr.
Jack O. Partain III, Dist. Atty., Dalton, Kermit N. McManus, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dalton, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, C.A. Benjamin Woolf, State Law Dept., Atlanta, for U.S.
Farris M. Davis, Sr., shot and killed Bradford Thomas with a rifle. He was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, malice murder, and felony murder. Benny Owens was convicted by the jury of aggravated assault, felony murder, and conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. F. Michael Davis, Jr., was convicted by the jury of aggravated assault and felony murder. 1
There was evidence indicating as follows. Owens was involved in a drug sale that two men were conducting with Thomas. Owens and the two Davises were concerned that the sale was fraudulent, and that Thomas had been involved in a prior deceptive drug sale involving them. Owens drove to the scene of the crime and struck Thomas in the face with a shotgun when the latter tried to get out of a car. Thereafter, Thomas' body was found in the middle of a residential road, fatally shot from behind. After the homicide, Owens tried to conceal the car in which Thomas had been riding. Owens removed a part from the shotgun, which later was found in his house. The murder weapon was found in Davis, Sr.'s house.
S91A0685. Farris M. Davis, Sr.
1. (a) Davis contends that the search of his house was without probable cause and that the seizure of the murder weapon should have been suppressed. He bases this upon the fact that a detective informed the magistrate that the rifle was buried behind the house, yet the search warrant and the search included the house.
(b) In Gumina v. State, 166 Ga.App. 592, 595(2), 305 S.E.2d 37 (1983), it was stated:
Barton v. State, 161 Ga.App. 591(1), 592, 288 S.E.2d 914 [1982].
There was no error.
2. (a) Davis argues that the trial court erred in preventing him from cross-examining the investigating officer about the statement of the Davises' after the state introduced evidence concerning the giving of the statement.
(b) OCGA § 24-3-38 () and OCGA § 24-9-64 () are both inapplicable, because the substance of the statement was never introduced in evidence.
3. (a) Davis urges as error the trial court's denial of his motion for severance. He relies upon Reeves v. State, 237 Ga. 1, 3, 226 S.E.2d 567 (1976), which cites Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), for the proposition that:
the admission of a co-defendant's confession that implicated another defendant at a joint trial constitutes prejudicial error even though the trial court gave clear, concise, and understandable instructions that the confession could only be used against the co-defendant and must be disregarded with respect to the defendant.
He argues that the Bruton problem as to co-defendant Owens' involvement could have been solved had the court allowed the statement to be paraphrased; that after the state tendered part of the statement, he then could bring out the whole of it, even if much of it was self-serving or exculpatory; that this denied him cross-examination; and that severance should have been granted and all exculpatory statements admitted.
(b) Boyd v. State, 244 Ga. 130, 131(1), 259 S.E.2d 71 (1979). Davis has not shown the requisite prejudice to require a reversal based on the trial court's denial of his motion to sever. Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593(3), 351 S.E.2d 625 (1987).
4. (a) Davis enumerates as error the trial court's disallowing the evidence to be reopened to admit a photograph of the deceased's body, in response to the jury's expressed confusion over conflicting evidence of the entrance and exit wounds.
(b) Johnson v. State, 254 Ga. 591, 598(8), 331 S.E.2d 578 (1985). There was no abuse of discretion.
S91A0687. F. Michael Davis, Jr.
5. The enumerations of error in this case are identical to those in the case of Davis, Sr. Our rulings, too, are the same.
S91A0686. Benny Owens
6. (a) Owens contends that the search of his residence was invalid because probable cause did not exist for the issuance of the search warrant. He argues that the six-page affidavit supporting the search warrant did not mention his name until the last sentence; that this sentence was not corroborated or related to the remainder of the affidavit; that the reliability of the informant was not shown; that there was no reference to evidence of the contraband at Owens' residence (which was different from his residence at the time of Thomas' death); and that the affidavit was made two months after the homicide.
(b) The magistrate was informed that the information on the affidavit came from three persons who were involved in the murder, two of whom were eyewitnesses who corroborated the third.
In State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 182, 311 S.E.2d 823 (1984), we quoted from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), as follows:
Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2332. (Ellipses and brackets in text.)
Neither the warrant nor the search was invalid.
7. Owens urges as error the denial of his motion for severance, based upon an alleged Bruton violation by allowing the testimony that the Davises had given a statement, then not allowing him to confront the Davises, who did not testify. Because the statements were not introduced in evidence, there was no error.
8. (a) Owens contends that a new trial was required by the state's withholding from him exculpatory evidence of a $1,000 payment made by police officers to two state's witnesses who gave testimony crucial to the state's case. He argues that this alleged Brady violation was material because one of the witnesses (Blackwell) was the only one to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to Owens' guilt of the felony-murder charge.
(b) In Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 30(4c), 326 S.E.2d 194 (1985), we stated:
Brady itself does not require the pre-trial...
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