Heidler v. State
| Decision Date | 02 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. S00P0808.,S00P0808. |
| Citation | 273 Ga. 54,537 S.E.2d 44 |
| Parties | HEIDLER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
537 S.E.2d 44
273 Ga. 54
v.
The STATE
No. S00P0808.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
October 2, 2000.
Reconsideration Denied October 26, 2000.
Richard A. Malone, District Attorney, William S. Askew, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allison B. Vrolijk, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
A jury convicted Jerry Scott Heidler of the following offenses: four counts of malice murder; kidnapping with bodily injury; two counts of kidnapping; aggravated sodomy; aggravated child molestation; child molestation; and, burglary. For the murders, the jury recommended four death sentences, finding as the statutory aggravating circumstances that each homicide was perpetrated during Heidler's commission of the other three and that all four deaths occurred during his commission of a burglary. OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2). The trial court denied Heidler's motion for new trial, and he appeals.1
Pre-Trial Issues
1. Heidler claims that his confession resulted from an illegal arrest, but he waived the right to assert that issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. Rushing v. State, 271 Ga. 102, 104(2), 515 S.E.2d 607 (1999); Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 288(2), 313 S.E.2d 95 (1984). The only objection made below related to the voluntariness of Heidler's statement, and that is the only question which this Court will now consider.
The trial court was authorized to find the following: Heidler was arrested at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the day the crimes were committed, and his interrogation began about 90 minutes later. The police read Heidler his rights and reviewed the waiver-of-rights form with him before he signed it. The interview lasted about two hours and culminated in a videotaped confession. Heidler was lucid, not [273 Ga. 55] intoxicated, and he appeared to understand his rights. He was twenty years old and had a tenth grade education. He was not handcuffed, and was provided with cigarettes and a soft drink. He was neither coerced, threatened, nor promised anything in exchange for his statement. He did not request a lawyer or ask that the questioning cease. When asked about the sequence of events and why they occurred, Heidler said several times that he was unsure because it was like "a dream." One of the interrogating officers volunteered to "get in the dream with him," and Heidler claims that this was coercive. However, a review of the record shows that the offer was simply an attempt on the part of the officer to prod Heidler's memory. Viewing the totality
2. Heidler claims a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) based upon the purported failure of the State to turn over his Department of Family & Children Services (DFCS) records that were in its possession. However, the trial transcript shows that the prosecution made the DFCS records that it possessed available to the defense before trial, and that Heidler, in turn, furnished many of the records to mental health experts to assist in their pre-trial evaluations of him and that he also introduced a significant number of those records into evidence at trial. See Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 836(17), 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999); Dennard v. State, 263 Ga. 453, 454(4), 435 S.E.2d 26 (1993) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is available to the accused at trial); Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 382, 385(8)(b), 405 S.E.2d 648 (1991) (no Brady violation when the alleged exculpatory evidence is presented to the jury at trial).
In addition, Heidler could, and did, obtain the records directly from DFCS by means of his own separate subpoena. See Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 648(2), 501 S.E.2d 219 (1998) (in order to prevail on Brady claim, defendant must show he could not obtain the exculpatory evidence on his own with any reasonable diligence). We find no violation by the State of Heidler's discovery rights.
Jury Selection
3. The death penalty qualification of prospective jurors during the guilt-innocence phase of a capital case is not unconstitutional. DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 790(11), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997). Heidler further contends that the trial court erroneously found to be qualified several prospective jurors who expressed a bias in favor of the death penalty, and compounded that error by striking for cause several [273 Ga. 56] others who were not prejudiced against the imposition of that sentence.
"The proper standard for determining the disqualification of a prospective juror based upon his views on capital punishment `"is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'"
Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 48, 485 S.E.2d 741 (1997), quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424(II), 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). We must base our review of the trial court's rulings in this regard upon a consideration of the voir dire as a whole. Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 588(9)(a), 458 S.E.2d 799 (1995). There is no requirement that a prospective juror's qualification or disqualification appear with unmistakable clarity, since the trial court often has to resolve equivocations or conflicts in the responses on voir dire. Ledford v. State, 264 Ga. 60, 64(6), 439 S.E.2d 917 (1994); Jefferson v. State, 256 Ga. 821, 823(2), 353 S.E.2d 468 (1987). For this reason, this Court must pay deference to the trial court's determination of a prospective juror's qualification, and affirm the ruling below absent some manifest abuse of discretion. Ledford, supra.
(a) Prospective Juror Howard. According to Heidler, Mr. Howard was not qualified because he would not consider voting for life with the possibility of parole. The voir dire transcript shows, however, that Mr. Howard initially stated that he would consider all three sentencing options and any mitigating evidence. He was adamant that the death penalty is not appropriate for all murderers. Later, he did say that he could not vote for life with the possibility of parole for someone convicted of murder "without hearing all the evidence" and that he had negative feelings about parole "in some cases." However, he then agreed that he could vote for life with parole "if it was prove[n] to me that it was ... worthy." Although he later seemed to equivocate somewhat, Mr. Howard complained that defense counsel had "confused me quite a bit" regarding the life with parole questions. The trial court itself then questioned Mr. Howard, and he replied that he never meant to say that he would not consider any sentencing option. Mr. Howard agreed that he would consider all of them, but that he would
( [273 Ga. 57] b) Prospective Juror Still. Ms. Still stated that she was able to consider all three possible sentences and that her mind was not made up about any sentence before hearing the evidence. Later, she expressed some leaning toward the death penalty for one convicted of murder. However, in response to a question about whether she could ever vote for life with the possibility of parole, she stated "I wouldn't say I would never [vote for such a sentence because] I don't ... know exactly what I would do in that situation [be]cause I've never been in that situation." She repeated that she would not automatically exclude life with parole, but that "the possibility would be strong" that she would vote for the death penalty. In response to a question by the trial court, however, she said she was not positive how she would vote because she did not know about the case. A prospective juror is not disqualified merely for expressing a leaning for or against the death penalty. "Instead, the relevant inquiry on appeal is whether the trial court's qualification of the juror is supported by the record as a whole. [Cit.]" Mize, supra at 652(6)(d), 501 S.E.2d 219. Viewing the record as a whole and giving deference to the trial court's decision, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that Ms. Still's views about the death penalty did not impair her ability to serve on the jury. See Mize, supra; Bishop, supra.
(c) Prospective Jurors Hawkins, Garrett and Silva. Pretermitting Ms. Hawkins', Mr. Garrett's and Ms. Silva's voir dire responses, they were not among the first 42 qualified prospective jurors and could have been selected only as alternate jurors. Any error as to the qualification of the 43rd or subsequent prospective juror is harmless, unless use of an alternate juror becomes necessary. Devier v. State, 253 Ga. 604, 607(3)(b), 323 S.E.2d 150 (1984). Since no alternate jurors were needed during the trial, the trial court's ruling that these three prospective jurors were qualified, if error, was not harmful. Compare Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202(7)(e), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999).
(d) Prospective Juror Malcom. Initially, Ms. Malcom expressed her belief that she could consider all three sentencing options and...
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