Davis v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 05–12–01715–CV.,05–12–01715–CV.
• Citation: 443 S.W.3d 260
• Parties: Alexander R. DAVIS and Rebecca Davis, Appellants v. TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

443 S.W.3d 260

Alexander R. DAVIS and Rebecca Davis, Appellants

v.TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 05–12–01715–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

July 28, 2014.

Rehearing Overruled Sept. 29, 2014.

Alan L. Busch, Christopher M. Albert, Dallas, for Appellants.

Matthew Baumgartner, Mary Barrow Nichols, Shannon Simmons Pounds, Nina M. Hsu, P.M. Schenkkan, David P. Boyce, Austin, for Appellee.

Before Justices FITZGERALD, FILLMORE, and EVANS.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice FILLMORE.

Appellants Alexander R. Davis and Rebecca Davis appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Texas Mutual Insurance Company. In a single issue, appellants assert Ronald Davis was in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained an injury that resulted in his death and, therefore, appellee is liable for workers' compensation benefits and the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural Background

Appellants, children of Ronald Davis, filed a beneficiary claim for workers' compensation death benefits with the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (DWC). Appellee, insurer of Ronald Davis's employer, contested the claim. A benefit review conference was conducted by a DWC benefit review officer, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. A contested case hearing was held before the DWC to determine whether Ronald Davis was in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained an injury on July 19, 2009 that resulted in his death on August 14, 2009. The hearing officer determined Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained the July 19, 2009 injury. Appellants appealed the hearing officer's decision to the DWC's appeals panel. The appeals panel rendered its final decision, affirming the contested case hearing officer's decision. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 410.204(c) (West Supp.2013) (if appeals panel does not issue a decision in accordance with section 410.204, decision of the hearing officer becomes final and is the final decision of appeals panel).

The DWC's decision and order provides in pertinent part:

[Ronald Davis] clearly went to New York City on a business trip and under the general rule would be subject to continuous coverage until the business trip ended. [Appellee] pointed out that [Ronald Davis] chose to travel to New York City on Saturday, rather than Sunday or Monday, for the Monday meeting, suggesting perhaps the trip was made for personal as well as business reasons, which would bring in the dual purpose doctrine. However, this was speculation, and there was some evidence [Ronald Davis] went early to get a better air fare.

[Appellee] also argued [Ronald Davis] made a distinct departure from the course and scope of employment on a personal errand when he sustained the injuries that resulted in his death. An employee on an overnight business trip needs to eat and sleep. Injuries sustained in the employee's hotel or while traveling to or from (or in) a nearby restaurant are generally compensable. On the other hand, injuries otherwise sustained on a business trip generally are not. This is a question of fact. Here there was no evidence indicating why [Ronald Davis] was crossing a street near Central Park at 10:30 [a.m.] on Sunday, 8–10 blocks from his hotel, when he sustained the injuries resulting in his death.

[Appellants] had the burden of proof to show that at the time of the injury [Ronald Davis] was engaged in an activity that furthered the Employer's business. As noted above, when the employee is on a business trip out of town, staying in a hotel and eating are activities that further the Employer's business. [Ronald Davis] was not in the hotel or at a restaurant when the bicycle hit him. Maybe he was on his way to a restaurant. Maybe he was taking a walk for exercise or to visit Central Park. There was simply no evidence showing the purpose of the walk.

* * *

[Appellants] failed to prove [Ronald Davis] was injured in the course and scope of his employment.

The DWC's decision and order contains the finding of fact that at the time of injury, Ronald Davis was not engaged in an activity that furthered the business of his employer and the conclusion of law that Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained the injury on July 19, 2009.

Appellants sought judicial review of the appeals panel's final decision.See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 410.301 (West 2006) (party who has exhausted its administrative remedies and is aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel regarding compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits may seek judicial review of the appeals panel's decision); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 437 (Tex.2012) (party may challenge decision of appeals panel by judicial review). Section 410.302(b) of the labor code limits judicial review to “issues decided by the appeals panel and on which judicial review is sought.” Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 410.302(b) (West 2006); In re Metro. Transit Auth., 334 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding [mand. denied] ). Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting there is no genuine issue of material fact that Ronald Davis was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the July 19, 2009 injury that resulted in his death. Appellee filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting there is no genuine issue of material fact that at the time of the July 19, 2009 injury, Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment, and there is no evidence that at the time of the July 19, 2009, Ronald David was in the course and scope of his employment.

An associate judge granted appellants' motion for summary judgment, finding “that Ronald Davis's injuries did occur in the course and scope of his employment and that [appellants] are entitled to recover workers' compensation death benefits” from appellee. The associate judge further ordered that judgment should be rendered overruling the DWC's decision and order, and ordering that appellants should recover benefits, including death and burial benefits, as a result of the July 19, 2009 accident that resulted in Ronald Davis's death. The associate judge denied appellee's traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

Appellee appealed the associate judge's order to the trial court. The trial court reversed the associate judge's order and granted appellee's traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment and “sustained and affirmed” the DWC's “holding that Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained an injury on July 19, 2009 that resulted in his death on August 14, 2009 and that [appellee] is not liable for benefits.” The trial court denied appellants' motion for summary judgment. Appellants filed this appeal of the trial court's order granting appellee's traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment and denying appellants' motion for summary judgment.

Factual Background

The evidence relied upon by the parties in their motions for summary judgment was largely uncontested. Appellants and appellee filed a joint stipulation of facts in the district court. The parties jointly stipulated:

1. On July 19, 2009, Ronald Davis was the employee of Tejas Securities Group, Inc.

2. On July 19, 2009, Tejas Securities Group, Inc. was insured under a workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Texas Mutual Insurance Company.

3. On July 19, 2009, Ronald Davis sustained an injury that resulted in his death on August 14, 2009.

4. Ronald Davis was scheduled to attend a business meeting on Monday, July 20, 2009, in New York City with the CEO of Tejas Securities Group, Inc. and with five persons from Och–Ziff, a private equity firm.

5. Ronald Davis flew from Texas to New York City on Saturday, January 18, 2009. Upon his arrival, he checked into the Quintess Collection hotel.

6. Ronald Davis's employer paid for his airfare and hotel expenses for his trip to New York City that commenced on Saturday, July 18, 2009.

7. It was not unusual for Ronald Davis to spend the weekend before a meeting scheduled early in the week in the city of the scheduled meeting.

8. Neither party knows the specific reasons why Ronald Davis chose to travel to New York City two days before his scheduled business meeting.

9. Tejas Securities Group, Inc. is unaware of Ronald Davis's itinerary or activities in New York City on Saturday, July 18, or Sunday, July 19, 2009.

10. On Sunday, July 19, 2009, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Ronald Davis was walking approximately 10 blocks from his hotel when he was struck by a bicycle and knocked down, sustaining injuries that resulted in his death on August 14, 2009.

11. The location of the accident was 60th Street and West Drive, New York City.

12. Ronald Davis was not in his hotel at the time he sustained injuries on July 19, 2009.

13. Ronald Davis was not in a restaurant at the time he sustained injuries on July 19, 2009.

14. Other than walking near 60th Street and West Drive, neither party knows what activity Ronald Davis was engaged in when the accident occurred on July 19, 2009.

15. Neither party knows the purpose of the walk that Ronald Davis was engaged in at the time the accident occurred on July 19, 2009.

16. Neither party knows the location from which Ronald Davis was walking at the time of the injury that resulted in his death.

17. Neither party knows Ronald Davis's intended destination at the time of the injury that resulted in his death.

The parties also stipulated to facts contained in the New York City Police Department report on the accident which included the narrative that Ronald Davis “was crossing the street when a bike hit him causing head injury

.” Appellee's summary judgment evidence included the bicycle rider's description of the accident in which he st...