Davis v. Thayer
Decision Date | 23 December 1980 |
Citation | 170 Cal.Rptr. 328,113 Cal.App.3d 892 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jo Anne DAVIS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles E. THAYER, Jr., and Eileen D. Willette, individually, and dba Camarillo Gold & Silver Exchange, Camarillo Gold & Silver Exchange, a partnership, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 57769. |
King & Skeels and C. Russell King, Santa Paula, for plaintiff and respondent.
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This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside an entry of default and a judgment predicated thereon.
On September 28, 1978, plaintiff and respondent, Jo Anne Davis, filed a complaint for restitution and damages against Charles E. Thayer and his mother Eileen D. Willette, defendants and appellants, doing business as Camarillo Gold & Silver Exchange, a partnership. The complaint, which concerned the sale of a partial interest in a contract for the purchase of gold, alleged that defendant Thayer had made numerous false representations to plaintiff, without any intention of performance. In addition to recission and recovery of the $20,000 she had invested in the contract, plaintiff alleged that she was entitled to punitive damages in the sum of $50,000 because defendants had acted with oppression, fraud, and malice.
Defendant Thayer was served with summons and complaint on September 28, 1978, while present at the Ventura County Municipal Court for arraignment on felony charges, one of which related to the claim of plaintiff in this action. Defendant Willette was served with summons and complaint on October 2, 1978, at her home in Santa Maria, California.
On November 2, 1978, each defendant was served by mail with a copy of a request for entry of default. One envelope was addressed to Willette at her home in Santa Maria where she had been served with the summons and complaint. The other was addressed to Thayer, in care of Willette, at the same address. Neither of the defendants entered an appearance and on November 3, 1978, defaults were entered as to each defendant.
On November 29, 1978, after hearing, the trial court granted judgment on the third cause of action (grounded on fraud and deceit) for $20,000 actual and $50,000 punitive damages.
On May 4, 1979, the defendants filed a notice of motion to set aside their defaults and the default judgment rendered against them. The motion was considered and orally denied by the court on June 18, 1979.
On July 3, 1979, a formal order signed by the trial judge stated that the motion "is, denied, on the sole ground that defendants' motion, filed May 4, 1979, exceeded by one day the six month limit authorized under CCP § 473."
The motion to set aside the default did not allege any grounds but recited that it would be based upon the declarations of defendants Thayer and Willette, "the attached points and authorities, and such other evidence, both oral and documentary, to be presented at the time of said hearing." No oral evidence was actually presented at the hearing.
The declaration of defendant Thayer submitted in support of the motion recited that the defendant Willette was his mother
Thayer took no steps to preserve his rights until "March or April 1979" when he spoke to attorney Robert L. McCord, Jr.
Thayer further stated:
A proposed answer was filed with the motion. It recited that the appearing parties were "Defendants, CHARLES E. THAYER and EILEEN D. WILLETTE, individually and doing business as CAMARILLO GOLD & SILVER," and that defendants admit "they were doing business as Camarillo Gold & Silver."
Defendants also admitted that defendant Thayer executed the loan agreement attached to the complaint as Exhibit A and that they owed "the approximate sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) " They denied any fraud or false representations and alleged that plaintiff has been paid "the approximate sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) as and for interest," and that said sum should be set off against any amounts determined to be due.
The answer also included an affirmative defense:
Thayer's declaration was dated May 3, 1979, at Ventura, California. The answer was dated May 4, 1979, at Ventura, California, and verified by attorney McCord who stated that the parties were absent from the county.
On May 17, 1979, defendant Willette executed a declaration which stated:
She attached to her affidavit, as an exhibit, a fictitious name statement filed with the Ventura County Clerk, September 3, 1974, showing that C. E. Thayer was conducting the business of "Camarillo Gold & Silver Exchange" as a sole proprietorship.
Willette's declaration further stated:
the actions. I was then under a doctor's care for a recent heart attack and was taking valium very heavily. I was also caring for my 86 year old mother who was recovering from a corneal transplant, and my husband who was dying of cancer. He died March 31, 1979.
In addition to the documents mentioned above, defendants presented an original and a supplemental memorandum of points and authorities. None of the documents recites the "grounds" for the motion to set aside the default. However, the points and authorities state that the relief is being sought under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of the trial court denying the motion states...
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...dealing with six month statutes of limitations for the purpose of urging they do not apply to the present case. Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 170 Cal.Rptr. 328, held that for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, "six months" meant 182 days because in common usage, s......
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