Davis v. Wicomico Cnty. Bureau

• Decision Date: 25 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 46, Sept. Term, 2015.,46, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Parties: Justin DAVIS v. WICOMICO COUNTY BUREAU.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

447 Md. 302

135 A.3d 419

Justin DAVIS

v.WICOMICO COUNTY BUREAU.

No. 46, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 25, 2016.

Michael A. Davis (Havertown, PA), on brief, for Petitioner.

Joseph B. Spillman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA^* , GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

BATTAGLIA

, J.

Justin Davis, Petitioner, twice sought to secure a paternity test years after he had executed an Affidavit of Parentage, in which he attested, shortly following the birth of twin boys in 2009, that he was their father. The Wicomico County Bureau of Support Enforcement (“Bureau”), Respondent, in 2011, had filed a Complaint for Child Support against Mr. Davis, in which it alleged that Mr. Davis was responsible for support, because he had attested that he was the father of the twins; Mr. Davis, in turn, requested a paternity test and denied parentage of the children, alleging that his signature on the affidavit had been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. Judge David B. Mitchell, then retired but specially sitting in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, ordered Mr. Davis to pay child support; he also denied the request for a paternity test, because Mr. Davis had executed the affidavits of parentage and there was “nothing in this record and before this Court today that would even broach the subject of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.” Mr. Davis did not note an appeal.

Two years later, Mr. Davis, however, filed a “Complaint for Blood Test, to Challenge Finding of Paternity (By Affidavit of Parentage), and to Set Aside Child Support Order” in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Judge Donald C. Davis denied the request for a paternity test, concluding that “[Mr. Davis] has no absolute right to blood or genetic testing under FL § 5–1038

; even if he did, he has waived his right by failing to appeal the trial judge's decision in 2011; and there is no other meritorious basis asserted to grant [Mr. Davis] his requested relief.”

Mr. Davis then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported opinion, affirmed.¹ 222 Md.App. 230, 112 A.3d 1024 (2015)

. Our brethren concluded that Mr. Davis's claims were barred by res judicata, but also reached the merits. Judge Patrick L. Woodward, writing on behalf of the Court, in interpreting the statutes in issue, held that “the plain language and the legislative history of FL §§ 5–1028 and 5–1038 support the trial court's determination” that Mr. Davis “is not entitled to a blood or genetic test.” Id. at 246, 112 A.3d at 1033

.

We granted certiorari, 444 Md. 638, 120 A.3d 766 (2015)

, to consider the following questions:

1. Is blood or genetic testing mandated when demanded by a putative father who, from the beginning of the legal process, presents evidence of fraudulent affidavits of parentage?

2. Does extrinsic evidence of fraud exist where the state's attorney actively participates in the deception and fraud without disclosing it to the putative father or to the trial court during two trials? ^[2]

With respect to the seminal issue of res judicata as to whether the 2011 child support order from which Mr. Davis did not appeal precludes him from relitigating the same claims in 2013, we have defined res judicata as:

[A] judgment between the same parties and their privies is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and is conclusive not only as to all matters that have been decided in the original suit, but as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit....

Prince George's County v. Brent, 414 Md. 334, 342, 995 A.2d 672, 677 (2010)

, quoting MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 488–89 (1977). The requirements of the doctrine of res judicata are:

(1) that the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier dispute; (2) that the claim presented in the current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3) that there was a final judgment on the merits.

Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass'n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 392, 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000)

. Res judicata “avoids the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves the judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions.” Cochran v. Griffith Energy Services, Inc., 426 Md. 134, 140, 43 A.3d 999, 1002 (2012), quoting Anne Arundel County.

Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 106–07, 887 A.2d 1029, 1037 (2005).

Mr. Davis does not dispute that the parties in the 2011 and 2013 cases are the same, nor that the claims were identical in both. Rather, he argues that res judicata should not bar his 2013 Complaint, because the equitable, remedial nature of paternity actions requires continuous vigilance by the judiciary, so that there cannot be a final judgment against which res judicata is measured.

A final judgment is “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court ... from which an appeal ... may be taken”, according to Section 12–101(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article

. We have stated that, “[a] ruling of the circuit court, to constitute a final judgment, must, among other things, be an ‘unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.’ ” Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251, 262, 983 A.2d 138, 145 (2009), quoting Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546, 801 A.2d 1013, 1016 (2002).

In the present case, Judge Mitchell's order requiring Mr. Davis to pay child support and denying his request for a paternity test was a final judgment. Mr. Davis, of course, argues that because the Court continues to have jurisdiction over child support and parentage, that the order could not be final. Although we have specifically not opined about this subject, Judge Alan Wilner, then writing on behalf of the Court of Special Appeals, recognized that, “[a]n order establishing child support, or determining any other matter over which a continuing jurisdiction exists, if possessing all other required attributes of finality, is a judgment (see Md. Rule 1–202 ( [o ] ))....” Haught v. Grieashamer, 64 Md.App. 605, 611, 497 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985)

. Maryland Rule 1–202(o ) defines judgment as “any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules.” Therefore, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that res judicata would have barred the 2013 action.

The dissent, however, raises an argument never raised below before Judge Davis in 2013, nor before the Court of Special Appeals, that res judicata would not have barred the 2013 action, because Judge Mitchell in 2011 allegedly never addressed Mr. Davis's claim for genetic testing. In the 2011 action, however, there were two issues queued up for decision by Judge Mitchell: one brought on behalf of the twins as to whether Mr. Davis should be ordered to pay child support and the other raised by Mr. Davis, as to whether Mr. Davis should have been afforded a genetic test because of alleged fraud in Section 5–1028(d)(2)(i)

governing whether an affidavit of parentage was subject to attack. With respect to Mr. Davis's claim, he repeatedly argued that he had been the victim of fraud and requested genetic testing:

[BUREAU]: But it's my understanding Mr. Davis would like to present argument to the Court today to challenge the validity of those Affidavits under the Paternity Statute.

* * *

[MR. DAVIS]: This is the whole reason we are here. The only thing I'm asking for is a paternity test to prove that I actually have an obligation to these children legally.

[THE COURT]: All right.

[MR. DAVIS]: That's the only thing I'm asking for. I'm not asking for anything else. I'm just asking for a paternity test to actually prove paternity. That's the only thing I want, Judge.

* * *

[MR. DAVIS]: I'm not sure—I'm not sure on the actual timing. The only thing that I think is relevant here is the fact that I'm just asking for a paternity test. That's it. I'm not trying to get out of any—I just want a paternity test so you guys can see if I'm actually the father.

* * *

[MR. DAVIS]: She could have deceived me when we were together. I'm not—I wasn't with her 24/7. The only thing I'm asking for once again, I reiterate is—is a paternity test.

* * *

[MR DAVIS]: I just want a paternity test to prove in front of the Judge and the eyes of the law to make it legal that I am the father—if you prove to me legally that I'm the father, you can bring me back in here and I will pay all the child support you want .... That's—I just want a paternity test. I'm not asking to get out of something. I want—can you just prove to me that they're my children?

* * *

[MR. DAVIS]: So in this case, I'm just asking for a paternity test. That's it. I'm asking for a paternity test to actually prove paternity.

Judge Mitchell specifically responded to Mr. Davis's repeated requests for a paternity test when he denied the existence of fraud at the time Mr. Davis executed the affidavit:

Thank you .... The statute authorizing the creation of these affidavits is found in Family Law Article Section 5–1028

. In essence, for a period of 60 days after

you sign the affidavit, you have the right to rescind it. You can rescind it in writing, or you can rescind it in a judicial proceeding provided that proceeding occurs within 60 days of the birth of the child or the execution of the affidavit. Beyond that 60–day period of time, the statute provides that you may rescind the Affidavit of Paternity and its contents only upon a showing of fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact.

The issue in this case is not the fatherhood of the child. The issue in this case is whether there is the presence of fraud, mistake, or duress that would justify the rescission of an Affidavit signed by you and acknowledged to be signed by

...