Neal v. Wilkes

• Decision Date: 20 July 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122498, Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 685 N.W.2d 648,470 Mich. 661
• Parties: Julie NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry WILKES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

685 N.W.2d 648

470 Mich. 661

Julie NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry WILKES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 122498, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 9, 2004.

Decided July 20, 2004.

Traci M. Kornak P.C. (by Traci M. Kornak), Grand Rapids, for the plaintiff.

Worsfold Macfarlane McDonald, P.L.L.C. (by Charles H. Worsfold and David M. Pierangeli), Grand Rapids, for the defendant.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether defendant is exempt from liability pursuant to the recreational land use act (RUA), MCL 324.73301(1), for injuries plaintiff sustained while riding an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on defendant's property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition, concluding that the RUA bars plaintiff's cause of action against defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that defendant is not exempt from liability for injuries that occurred to plaintiff while riding an ATV on the mowed portion of defendant's backyard because the RUA only pertains to injuries that occur on "large tracts of undeveloped land." Because there is nothing in the RUA that indicates that it pertains only to "large tracts of undeveloped land," we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff injured her back while riding as a passenger on defendant's ATV, which was being driven by defendant's brother on defendant's property in the village of Dimondale.¹ When defendant's brother drove over an uneven area of defendant's lawn, plaintiff was bounced on the ATV, causing her to suffer injuries to her lower back. Defendant's property is an eleven-acre lot that is zoned residential. Although portions of the lot are wooded, plaintiff was injured while riding on the mowed portion of defendant's backyard. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition on the basis that the RUA bars plaintiff's cause of action against defendant. However, on the basis of this Court's decision in Wymer v. Holmes, 429 Mich. 66, 79, 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987), that the RUA only applies to "large tracts of undeveloped land," the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for continued proceedings.² After this Court directed the parties to present oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1),³ and having heard such argument, we granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.⁴

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of MCL 324.73301(1). The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 487, 490, 672 N.W.2d 849 (2003). Likewise, a trial court's ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Schmalfeldt v. North Pointe Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 422, 426, 670 N.W.2d 651 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

The RUA, MCL 324.73301(1), provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a cause of action shall not arise for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee.

In Wymer, the plaintiff's decedent suffered injuries while swimming on the defendants' property. This Court held that the defendants could be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries because "the [RUA] was intended to apply to large tracts of undeveloped land suitable for outdoor recreational uses. Urban, suburban, and subdivided lands were not intended to be covered by the RUA." Wymer, supra at 79, 412 N.W.2d 213.

Defendant contends that our decision in Wymer should be overruled because it is inconsistent with the plain language of the RUA. We agree. "[O]ur primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). "The words of a statute provide `the most reliable evidence of its intent ....' "Id., quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). Although the Wymer Court noted that its task was to ascertain the legislative intent, it failed to recognize that the language of the statute is the best source for determining legislative intent. Instead, Wymer found it "reasonable to assume that the Michigan statute has the similar general purpose of similar acts in other jurisdictions...."⁵ Wymer, supra at 77, 412 N.W.2d 213. That purpose being to "open[ ] up and mak[e] available vast areas of vacant but private lands to the use of the general public" in order to "promot[e] tourism." Id. at 78, 412 N.W.2d 213, quoting Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 58 Mich.App. 486, 495-496, 228 N.W.2d 786 (1975). If that were the Legislature's purpose, it could have used the words "vacant or undeveloped land of another," rather than the words "the lands of another."⁶

Before Wymer, in Winiecki v. Wolf, 147 Mich.App. 742, 745, 383 N.W.2d 119 (1985), in which the plaintiff was injured while playing with "land skis" in defendants' backyard, the Court of Appeals concluded that the RUA precluded plaintiff's action against the defendants, stating:

[The RUA], as the trial court has already observed, is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff was a person on the lands of another, without paying a consideration, for the purpose of an outdoor recreational use. The statute offers nothing on its face excluding from its application the backyard of residential property. If the Legislature did not intend the statute to apply to parcels of land this size, it was within its power to insert words limiting the statute's application, e.g., to lands in their natural state. As we, however, are constrained to apply the statute as written, we cannot say that the trial court erred in relieving defendants of liability based on the recreational use statute.

This understanding of the RUA is truer to the language of the RUA than is the Wymer Court's interpretation of the RUA. There is absolutely no indication in the language of the RUA that the Legislature intended its application to be limited to vacant or undeveloped lands. As the Court of Appeals in the instant case stated, "[a]lthough nothing in the statutory language indicates that the statute is not applicable to the backyards of residential property such as defendant's, the statute has been construed to apply `to large tracts of undeveloped land suitable for outdoor recreational uses,' not to `[u]rban, suburban, and subdivided lands....'" op. at 649 (citations omitted).⁷ Because this construction is, as the Court of Appeals itself recognized, not supported by the statutory language, we are compelled to abandon this construction and overrule Wymer.⁸

The RUA makes no distinction between large tracts of land and small tracts of land, undeveloped land and developed land, vacant land and occupied land, land suitable for outdoor recreational uses and land not suitable for outdoor recreational uses, urban or suburban land and rural land, or subdivided land and unsubdivided land.⁹ To introduce such distinctions into the act is to engage in what is essentially legislative decision-making. The RUA simply states that an owner of land is not liable to a person who injures himself on the owner's land if that person has not paid for the use of the land and that person was using the land for a specified purpose,¹⁰ unless the injuries were caused by the owner's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. The statute contains no limitation on the type of land involved, but rather applies to specified activities that occur "on the land of another...." MCL 324.73301(1). That is, the act limits its application to specified activities, but it does not limit its application to any particular type of land. Therefore, an owner is not liable to a nonpaying outdoor recreational user of his land, unless the user's injuries are caused by the owner's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.¹¹

The dissent mischaracterizes our opinion by stating that our "interpretation eliminates the liability of a landowner, tenant, or lessee when a person who does not pay consideration and who participates in any outdoor recreational activity is injured...." Post at 655 (emphasis in original). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the RUA does not apply to any outdoor recreational activity. Rather, it only applies to "fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use...." MCL 324.73301(1). Under the statutory construction doctrine known as ejusdem generis, where a general term follows a series of specific terms, the general term is interpreted "to include only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated." Huggett v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 464 Mich. 711, 718-719, 629 N.W.2d 915 (2001). Therefore, the language "other outdoor recreational use" must be interpreted to include only those outdoor recreational uses "of the same kind, class, character, or nature," id., as "fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, [and] snowmobiling...." MCL 324.73301(1).¹² While the dissent apparently believes that jump-roping and playing hopscotch, pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey, shuffleboard, and horseshoes are of the "same kind, class, character, or nature" as "fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, and snowmobiling...." post at...