Dawson v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1994
• Citation: 637 A.2d 57
• Parties: David F. DAWSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 57

637 A.2d 57

David F. DAWSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Jan. 25, 1994.

Decided: Feb. 23, 1994.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.

Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr. (argued), Loren C. Meyers, Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Ferris W. Wharton and Charles E. Butler, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc).

HOLLAND, Justice:

The defendant-appellant, David F. Dawson ("Dawson"), was convicted on four counts of Murder in the First Degree, six counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Robbery in the First Degree, Burglary in the Second Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Prohibited Person. After a penalty hearing was held on June 27 and 28, 1988, pursuant to the then existing Delaware death penalty statute, Dawson was sentenced to death. Dawson's convictions and death sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1078 (1990).

Dawson's death sentence (but not his convictions) was vacated by the United States Supreme Court. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). Another penalty hearing was ordered regarding the appropriate sentences for Dawson's convictions of Murder in the First Degree. Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 608 A.2d 1201 (1992). Dawson's convictions and other sentences are final judgments and are not at issue in this appeal.

A new penalty hearing, pursuant to the 1991 amendments to Delaware's death penalty statute, was conducted in March 1993. 11 Del.C. § 4209. The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death. A Superior Court judge, who had the ultimate decisionmaking authority under the amended Delaware statute, sentenced Dawson to death by lethal injection for his convictions of Murder in the First Degree. An automatic appeal was docketed with this Court. 11 Del.C. § 4209(g). Dawson's attorney also filed a timely notice of appeal. Those appeals have been consolidated. ¹

Dawson's Contentions

Dawson has raised five issues in this appeal regarding his second penalty hearing. First, Dawson submits that the application of a more severe death penalty sentencing law, which was enacted after the commission of the murder for which he was convicted, denied him due process of law. Second, Dawson argues that the striking of certain jurors for cause, on the basis that those jurors had reservations about the imposition of the death penalty, was erroneous and was not constitutionally mandated. Third, Dawson contends that the disclosure to the jury, by a witness for the State, that a death sentence had been previously imposed violated his due process rights. Fourth, Dawson contends that the jury instruction concerning the State's burden of proof with respect to nonstatutory aggravating evidence was legally inadequate. Finally, Dawson argues that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, were constitutionally deficient and materially misleading. According to Dawson, those instructions could have led the jury to believe that he was required to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Court has carefully considered each of Dawson's contentions. We have concluded that none of Dawson's allegations of reversible error has merit. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court, sentencing Dawson to death by lethal injection, are affirmed.

Facts

The issues on appeal relate exclusively to the proceedings during Dawson's penalty hearing. Therefore, the underlying facts with regard to Dawson's First Degree Murder conviction will be stated only briefly. An extensive recitation of those facts has been set forth in a previously reported opinion. See Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1078, 1082-84 (1990). See also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992); Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 608 A.2d 1201 (1992).

In the early morning hours of December 1, 1986, Dawson and three other prisoners escaped from the Delaware Correctional Center. Later that day, Madeline Kisner ("Kisner") was found murdered in her nearby home. Kisner had been bound, struck in the head, and stabbed to death. Dawson was apprehended by police the next morning. Based upon the circumstantial and physical evidence presented by the State, Dawson was convicted, inter alia, of burglary, robbery, and Kisner's murder. Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d at 1081. Those judgments of conviction have been affirmed. Id. at 1082.

Following Dawson's appeals to this Court and the United States Supreme Court, a new penalty hearing was scheduled to determine whether Dawson should be sentenced to death for his convictions of Murder in the First Degree. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Superior Court instructed the jury that the fact Dawson had been convicted of killing Kisner (1) during the commission of a burglary and/or robbery and (2) while an escapee from a penal institution, established the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances, as a matter of law. 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(1)a, j. See also Red Dog v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 298, 307 (1992); Pennell v. State, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 1368, 1375 (1992). During the penalty hearing, the State presented evidence of a third statutory aggravating circumstance, i.e., that the murder had been committed for pecuniary gain. 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(1)o.

The State also presented evidence during the penalty hearing of what it alleged to be non-statutory aggravating circumstances. First, the State argued that the fact Kisner was bound, gagged, and defenseless when she was murdered constituted an aggravating circumstance. Second, the State presented evidence of Dawson's multiple convictions for various crimes, which had resulted in a lifetime of almost continuous incarceration, beginning with Dawson's confinement as a juvenile at the age of thirteen. Compare Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d at 1101. The State argued that Dawson's extensive criminal record was characteristic of his lawless nature and his non-amenability to rehabilitation while incarcerated. Compare id.

During the penalty hearing, the defense presented evidence of what it contended were mitigating circumstances. First, the defense focused upon the dysfunctional nature of Dawson's childhood. Testimony was presented that as a result of his illegitimate birth, Dawson was only gradually accepted by his mother's family. He apparently had no relationship or contact with his natural father. Dawson's stepfather was an alcoholic, who was eventually imprisoned as a sex offender.

Second, according to the defense, Dawson's mother took little interest in him. Dawson's mother did not appear at the sentencing hearing. As a youth, Dawson resided with various family members. Dawson did poorly in school and was truant. Dawson learned to read and write during his periods of incarceration.

Third, in response to the State's evidence of Dawson's criminal history, the defense argued that although Dawson's criminal record was extensive, it had been non-violent until the Kisner murder. The defense also presented evidence that, subsequent to the Kisner murder, Dawson's prison conduct had improved significantly. Since his reincarceration, Dawson worked in various capacities at the Delaware Correctional Center, e.g., laundry, painting, and kitchen duty.

Finally, the defense presented testimony that, despite his tenuous relationship with his immediate family during his childhood, Dawson had developed close relationships with his aunt and sister. Those relatives testified that Dawson had offered to donate a kidney to a seriously ill cousin. ²

Ex Post Facto Application

Delaware's Present Death Penalty Statute

The General Assembly amended the Delaware death penalty statute in the Fall of 1991. The new law was applicable "to all defendants tried or sentenced after its effective date." 68 Del.Laws ch. 189, § 6. A number of other capital defendants have previously raised several challenges regarding the 1991 amendments to the Delaware death penalty statute. State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 846 (1992).

The Superior Court certified ten questions of law to this Court in Cohen, pursuant to Article IV, Section 11(9) of the Delaware Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 41. Id. As a result of that proceeding, in which Dawson did not participate, this Court held that "the new law [is] valid in all respects and fully applicable to all the defendants." Id. at 848. This Court specifically rejected the contention that the application of the amended death penalty statute to defendants, such as Dawson, who committed their crimes prior to the enactment of that law violated the ex post facto clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. Id. at 852-55.

In his first argument on appeal, Dawson asks this Court to overrule the ex post facto holding of its decision in Cohen. This Court has rejected similar applications in two prior opinions. See Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 343 (1993); Red Dog v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 298, 305-06 (1992). Dawson has cited no legal precedent or intervening changes in the law that would undermine the ratio decidendi of this Court's holding in Cohen on the ex post facto issue. Accordingly, we decline to overrule Cohen. We adhere to our ex post facto analysis and holding in that decision. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d at 852-55. Accord Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 343; Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d at 305-06.

Striking Jurors For Cause

Death Penalty Reservations

Dawson's second contention on appeal relates to several jurors whom the Superior Court decided to strike for cause, after they had expressed personal reservations about the imposition of a sentence of death. Dawson argues that...