Dawson v. State
| Decision Date | 14 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | WD 82441 |
| Citation | 611 S.W.3d 761 |
| Parties | Gabriel Knight DAWSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Rosemary E. Percival, Assistant State Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, Attorney for Appellant.
Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Shaun J. Mackelprang, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.
Before Division Two: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges
This post-conviction relief appeal involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a claim that the sentencing court imposed a sentence without consideration of mandatory juvenile sentencing guidelines. It also involves a procedural scenario in which the sentencing court and the post-conviction relief motion court are one and the same. Though this procedural circumstance is not dispositive of the appeal, where the motion court details an objectively reasonable basis why the sentencing court would not have been persuaded to sentence the defendant any differently after being apprised of new evidence and legal arguments at the Rule 24.035 hearing, the motion court's finding that there is no prejudice is not clearly erroneous.
Specifically, Mr. Gabriel Knight Dawson ("Dawson") appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri ("motion court"), denying his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Dawson contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim that the sentencing court "improperly sentenced" him without considering a sentence under the dual-jurisdiction statute, § 211.073,2 and in denying his claims that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence at his sentencing hearing. We affirm.
Dawson was born on September 21, 1999. On November 16, 2015, due to numerous acts of juvenile delinquency, Dawson was placed within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Juvenile Division ("juvenile court"), and was placed on probation (which he violated on numerous occasions) and supervision of the juvenile court. After Dawson participated in a crime that led to the death of his criminal accomplice, on June 1, 2016, the Juvenile Office filed a motion for certification seeking to certify Dawson to be prosecuted in a court of general jurisdiction for the commission of murder in the second degree, which would be a felony if committed by an adult. After a hearing, on July 13, 2016, the juvenile court entered an order that Dawson be transferred to a court of general jurisdiction for the purpose of such prosecution and that he be released from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. On the same day, Dawson was charged in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County with the class B felony of attempted robbery in the first degree in that on May 17, 2016, he attempted to carry out a robbery of another's property by threatening the use of a deadly weapon.
In exchange for the prosecutor's agreement that he would not be charged with felony murder, on October 6, 2016, Dawson filed a petition to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of felony robbery, and the sentencing court held a hearing on Dawson's petition. The sentencing court questioned Dawson regarding the factual basis for his plea, which established that Dawson and an accomplice engaged in a robbery that ultimately resulted in the death of his accomplice. After first questioning Dawson and confirming that he understood the range of punishment included a sentence of up to fifteen years with no probation, that neither plea counsel nor anyone else had promised or assured him that he would receive probation or a particular sentence, and that nobody had promised or assured him that he would be released on parole after serving a certain portion of the sentence imposed, the sentencing court found that Dawson's plea was made voluntarily and knowingly and that he was guilty as charged of the class B felony of attempted robbery in the first degree.
Before pronouncing sentence, the sentencing court ordered a sentencing assessment report ("SAR"). On December 12, 2016, the sentencing court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Dawson to fourteen years’ imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections. After imposing sentence, the sentencing court questioned Dawson and confirmed with him that he understood that the sentence he received was within the sentencing range for the crime to which he pleaded guilty, that he had not been made any promises by anyone about probation or parole, and that he was satisfied with the legal representation that he had received from his plea counsel.
Subsequently, Dawson timely filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion, and appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion. In Dawson's amended motion, he alleged that: (1) the sentencing court erred in sentencing him by failing to consider dual jurisdiction as a possible sentence as required by section 211.073, in violation of his right to due process of law; (2) plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present evidence of adolescent development at Dawson's sentencing hearing for mitigation purposes, and he was prejudiced thereby because had such evidence been presented, there is a reasonable probability the plea court would have sentenced him to a lesser term of incarceration or sentenced him pursuant to section 211.073, in the custody of the Division of Youth Services ("DYS"); and (3) plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence from Dawson's family members and weightlifting coach at his sentencing hearing, and had plea counsel called the witnesses to testify, there is a reasonable probability the plea court would have sentenced him to a lesser sentence.
The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on August 30, 2018. Dawson presented the testimony of the senior program administrator with the DYS, who testified regarding the dual-jurisdiction program. Plea counsel testified regarding her representation of Dawson. A neuropsychologist, Dr. Sandi Isaacson, testified regarding adolescent brain-behavior relationships and the results of her evaluation of Dawson while he was in custody when he was seventeen years old. Dawson's mother, grandmother, great-aunt, and weightlifting coach all testified as to Dawson's good character. Dawson testified on his own behalf by deposition.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the motion court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment denying the claims in Dawson's amended Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion.
Dawson timely appealed.
Our review of the motion court's decision on a Rule 24.035 motion is limited to determining whether its findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. The motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if a review of the entire record by the appellate court results in a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.
Pettis v. State , 212 S.W.3d 189, 192-93 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In Dawson's first point, he asserts that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim that the sentencing court committed reversible error when it "improperly sentenced [Dawson] without considering a sentence under the dual-jurisdiction statute, Section 211.073" and such sentencing error prejudiced Dawson since a "reasonable judge" would have sentenced Dawson to a dual-jurisdiction sentence had it been considered by such "reasonable judge."
The State argues that Dawson's claim is not cognizable in a Rule 24.035 motion. We disagree. In effect, Dawson's claim in this point on appeal is that the sentencing court failed to sentence him according to the law as mandated by section 211.073 and, hence, illegally sentenced him. "[A] claim that a defendant was illegally sentenced following a guilty plea ‘may be considered only in response to a Rule 24.035 motion.’ " Gray v. State , 498 S.W.3d 522, 528-29 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting State v. Onate , 398 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) ). Simply put, post-conviction relief motions have long been recognized by Missouri courts as an appropriate procedural vehicle to seek relief for a sentencing court's misapprehension or misapplication of the law in sentencing the defendant. See Wraggs v. State , 549 S.W.2d 881 (Mo banc 1977) ; Williams v. State , 800 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1990) ; Pettis , 212 S.W.3d 189.
That said, no Missouri court has presumed prejudice in such a post-conviction claim of sentencing error. See Pettis , 212 S.W.3d at 194-95 (); Williams , 800 S.W.2d at 740-41 (); Wraggs , 549 S.W.2d at 883 ().
"Post-conviction proceedings are not criminal proceedings, but are considered civil in nature." Wartenbe v. State , 583 S.W.3d 115, 120 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) ). "[P]ost-conviction proceedings pursuant to Rules 24.035 and 29.15 are civil proceedings ... [and] are ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Beck v. State
...at trial. "[S]pecial deference is given when the [Motion] judge and the [trial and sentencing] judge are the same." Dawson v. State , 611 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). And "[a] motion court's findings are presumptively correct. In this case, they carry special weight since the motio......
-
Hendricks v. State
... ... "[t]he fact that the motion court had presided over ... [m]ovant's sentencing placed it in a special position to ... evaluate the potential effect of additional character or ... mitigation evidence," (citing Dawson v. State , ... 611 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) and Cherco , ... 309 S.W.3d at 831)) ... Having ... reviewed the record of this case we are not left with the ... definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made, ... and we ... ...
-
Binion v. State
...counsel and prejudice, if a movant fails to establish one prong, a court need not address or consider the other." Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). Under the first prong, the movant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's con......
-
Stark v. State
...failure to establish either prong is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 770-71 (citing Dawson v. State , 611 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) ).The State's original information alleged in Count I that Stark committed felony murder in violation of section 565.0......
-
At the Edge of Objectivity: The Missouri Court of Appeals' Deference to a Seemingly Subjective Assessment of Prejudice Under Strickland.
...death. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114-15 (1982). (4.) Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. (5.) Id. at 700-01. (6.) Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. (7.) A motion court is the lower court that originally hears a motion for post-conviction relief. (8.) Id. at 763. (9.)......