Hendricks v. State
| Decision Date | 21 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | ED110418 |
| Parties | MEGAN L. HENDRICKS, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County 1911-CC00771 Honorable Jon A. Cunningham
Megan L. Hendricks (Movant) appeals from the motion court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment denying her amended Rule 24.035 1[] post-conviction motion after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Movant contends the motion court erred in denying her motion because she proved she received ineffective assistance of counsel before her plea and at sentencing, which rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary and resulted in a longer sentence. Finding no clear error, we affirm.
Movant seeks relief from her conviction and sentence for child abuse/neglect resulting in death, based on the 2016 death of Movant's six-week-old child (Victim). This conviction was based on Movant knowingly keeping Victim in the care custody, and control of her boyfriend / Victim's father (Father), despite having witnessed Father physically abuse Victim on multiple occasions.
In 2018, Movant entered an open guilty plea[2] to one count of child abuse/neglect resulting in death. At the plea hearing Movant stated that she observed: Father violently shake Victim more than two or three times; Father "slamming" Victim two or three times (i.e. throwing Victim on the bed); and Father shoving his fingers down Victim's throat. Movant confirmed that Victim suffered 38 fractures and a deprivation of oxygen as a result of Father's actions. Movant admitted that, by allowing Victim to be in the care, custody, and control of Father, and by Movant being present while the abuse occurred, Movant allowed Victim to suffer serious injury that resulted in his death. Before accepting Movant's guilty plea, the court found that Movant's plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, and that there was a factual basis for the plea. The court ordered a Sentencing Assessment Report and a sentencing hearing took place in early 2019, at which the lead detective and Movant testified. The court ultimately sentenced Movant to twenty-one years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. Movant was represented by Counsel throughout the investigation of the case and plea and sentencing proceedings.
Movant timely filed a pro se post-conviction motion under Rule 24.035 to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment and sentence. Appointed counsel timely filed an amended motion alleging that Counsel was ineffective for: failing to investigate an alternative cause of Victim's death and accordingly, interview an expert witness; failing to call Movant's former roommate to provide mitigation testimony at sentencing; failing to obtain Movant's high school counseling records and present this mitigating evidence at sentencing; and failing to object to the lead detective's hearsay testimony at sentencing. The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on these claims at which Movant, Counsel, a forensic pathologist, and Movant's former roommate testified. After taking the motion under advisement, the motion court[3] denied all the claims in Movant's amended motion. This appeal follows.
Additional facts relevant to each of Movant's points on appeal will be included, as needed, in our discussion below.
Standard of Review[4]
We review the denial of a Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion for whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are "clearly erroneous." Rule 24.035(k); see also Routt v. State (Routt II), 535 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (). Clear error occurs when a review of the entire record leaves this Court "with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Routt II, 535 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Brooks v. State, 242 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Mo. banc 2008)). We presume the motion court's findings are correct. Lusk v. State, 655 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citing James v. State, 462 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)).
In her four points on appeal, Movant challenges the motion court's denial of her postconviction claims, all of which alleged that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Movant's first point complains of Counsel's failure to adequately investigate an alternative cause of Victim's death, which Movant argues rendered her guilty plea unknowing and unintelligent. In her remaining three points, Movant challenges Counsel's conduct regarding her sentencing hearing, namely: Counsel's failure to present mitigating testimony from Movant's former roommate; Counsel's failure to obtain and present mitigating evidence in the form of Movant's high school counseling records; and Counsel's failure to object to hearsay testimony from the lead detective. We conclude that none of Movant's points on appeal are meritorious and we therefore affirm the motion court's denial of her post-conviction claims.[5]
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Surrounding Guilty Plea (Point I)
In her first point on appeal, Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying her claim that she was prejudiced by Counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to investigate and present testimony supporting an alternative cause of Victim's death. According to Movant, Counsel's failure to investigate an expert opinion regarding an alternative cause of Victim's death rendered Movant's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must meet the two-prong test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See id. at 234 (citing Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905-06 (Mo. banc 2016)). Under Strickland, a movant must show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that counsel failed to exercise the level of skill, care, and diligence that reasonably competent counsel would exercise in a similar situation; and (2) that failure prejudiced movant. Id. (citing Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 905-06). To satisfy the performance prong, a movant must overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective. Id. (citing Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 906). To satisfy the prejudice prong, a movant must demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the movant would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead proceeded to trial. Id. (citing Rice v. State, 550 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). "If the movant fails to satisfy either the performance prong or the prejudice prong, we need not consider the other." Id. (quoting Farr v. State, 408 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)).
In a claim arising from a guilty plea, an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent that the complained-of conduct affected the voluntariness of and knowledge with which the plea was made. Id. (citing Rice, 550 S.W.3d at 569). A movant must prove any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 233 (citing Rule 24.035(i)).
The motion court did not clearly err in denying the claim that Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an alternative cause of Victim's death
The motion court did not clearly err in denying Movant's claim because, under the circumstances here, Counsel's conduct was reasonable and therefore did not constitute deficient performance necessary to prove ineffective assistance of counsel.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel grounded in an allegedly inadequate investigation, a movant must specifically describe the information counsel failed to discover, allege that a reasonable investigation would have resulted in the information's discovery, and prove that the information would have aided or improved the movant's position. Washington v. State, 598 S.W.3d 656, 671 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (quoting Hendrix v. State, 473 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)).
We focus our discussion on whether Counsel's level of investigation was reasonable. "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 291 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). We assess reasonableness under "all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Gray v. State, 108 S.W.3d 86, 88-89 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003) (quoting Ervin v. State, 80 S.W.3d 817, 824 (Mo. banc 2002)). We are mindful that the duty to investigate does not require counsel "to scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste." Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636, 652 (Mo. banc 2008) (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005)). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. .. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Gray, 108 S.W.3d at 88 (citing Moore v. State, 39 S.W.3d 888, 892-93 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001)).
Movant contends that Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the existence of an alternative cause of Victim's death that was unrelated to Father's actions. Movant argues this was unreasonable given that Movant's guilt was dependent...
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