Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center

• Decision Date: 08 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. A095702.,A095702.
• Citation: 98 Cal.App.4th 243,119 Cal.Rptr.2d 606
• Parties: Montie S. DAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALTA BATES MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

119 Cal.Rptr.2d 606

98 Cal.App.4th 243

Montie S. DAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALTA BATES MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A095702.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.

May 8, 2002.

Montie S. Day, for Appellant.

John L. Fleer, Walnut Creek, Rise A. Donlon, Fleer, Daugherty & Raub, for Respondent.

HAERLE, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of a hospital (Alta Bates) in a quantum meruit action filed against it by appellant Day, an attorney (Day). Alta Bates had filed a hospital lien (see Civ.Code § 3045.1 et seq. (section 3045.1)) in a previous, but unsuccessful, medical malpractice action Day had filed on behalf of a woman who had been treated at that hospital. Day contended below, and contends here, that the filing of the lien required him to perform, and he did perform, legal services on the hospital's behalf for which he is entitled to be compensated by it.

Like the trial court, we disagree with that contention and hence affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1995 or 1996, Day filed a medical malpractice action in Alameda County Superior Court on behalf of one Demitrianna Jackson; the action was entitled Jackson v. Streitfeld, No. 762468-7 in that court (Jackson action). On May 17, 1996, a Newport Beach-based collection agency, Hoffman, Hoffman & Associates (Hoffman), filed a notice of lien with Day on behalf of its client, Alta Bates. Day's client, Jackson, had been treated at Alta Bates from, apparently, February 10, 1995, until her discharge on March 24 of that year. On account of those services, Alta Bates asserted, pursuant to section 3045.1 and via the Hoffman agency, a lien for services in the amount of $45,165.43.

Simultaneous with filing the lien, Hoffman wrote Day requesting the name, address, etc., of his client's insurance carrier and stating, among other things, that Day personally "may have liability if you have disbursed settlement funds without satisfying [Alta Bates'] bill for hospital services."

Day apparently did not respond in writing to the May 1996 notice of lien or accompanying letter until June 9, 2000. On that day, he sent a fax letter to Hoffman in which he acknowledged the lien being asserted, but then stated that "it is my belief that the lien is invalid, but in that you are asserting such a lien, I am trying such case." He went on to advise that a bifurcated trial (with the issue of liability being tried first) was starting that day, and requested that John Hoffman, Jr., an attorney with Hoffman, "appear on behalf of Alta Bate [sic] Medical Center, the lien claimant" that day. He also stated: "While I am being required to present the case which would include your lien claim, it is absolutely essential that you produce a witness from Alta Bates Medical Center to establish the charges for which you make a lien claim. Also, I would have to meet with the witness before such witness testifies." Day concluded by again stating that, although he did not "acknowledge the validity of such lien claim, ... it is absolutely essential that the amount of the lien claim for the reasonable charges be submitted to the jury.... I will expect Mr. Hoffman, on behalf of Alta Bates Medical Center, to cooperate with me in the prosecution of this case as I am being required to prosecute the case on behalf of Alta Bates' lien claim."

As far as the record discloses, Hoffman responded to this letter via a two-line email dated June 13, 2000, stating the name of the potential witness "who will testify re the hospital's bill," asking Day to let him know when that witness would be needed, and confirming that it was the hospital that was asserting the lien via Hoffman as "their collection agent." There then followed a series of four e-mail messages from Day to Hoffman. In sum, these various messages (1) acknowledged Hoffman's June 13 e-mail, (2) advised him generally regarding the progress of the liability phase of the trial, (3) suggested that, if his client won on the liability phase (which was going to the jury shortly), a witness from Alta Bates would probably be necessary the following day, (4) strongly urging that any such witness, or an attorney for Alta Bates, be prepared to "argue the validity of the lien" and (5) concluded by requesting case authority supporting the validity of the lien. As best as can be determined from the record before us, none of these emails elicited any response from either Hoffman or Alta Bates.

In any event, shortly after the last of these e-mails was sent, the jury in the Jackson action returned a defense verdict in the liability phase of that case. On behalf of Jackson, Day negotiated a waiver of her right to appeal for a waiver of costs.

On August 30, 2000, Day wrote a letter to both Alta Bates and Hoffman demanding to be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for the value of the services he had performed for Alta Bates in connection with the Jackson action. Among other things, the letter asserted: "In making your claim and demands, you required that I proceed to attempt to make a recovery which, if made, would benefits [sic] Alta Bates Medical Center/Herrick Hospital, and accordingly, while my contractual client, Ms. Jackson, may benefit, so may Alta Bates Medical Center/Herrick Hospital. Accordingly, Alta Bates Medical Center/Herrick Hospital required that I render services which were to its benefit.... [¶] ... These services were demanded as a result of the notice of lien and the demand that the claim be represented.... [¶] Accordingly, at this time, there is only one remaining issue which is outstanding, and that is my claim for the reasonable value of attorney fees and costs which I expended for the benefit of Alta Bates Medical Center/Herrick Hospital."

The letter demanded, as compensation for his services, 50% of Day's fees "at my normal rate," together with 50% of his costs, which equaled slightly over $49,000. Day concluded by suggesting a willingness to compromise for the prompt payment of $40,000.

On behalf of both that firm and Alta Bates, Hoffman flatly rejected this demand and offer, calling the allegations of Day's August letter "ludicrous" and a purported lawsuit "frivolous."

On October 2, 2000, Day filed suit against both Hoffman and Alta Bates on, as noted, a quantum meruit theory. Alta Bates answered in February 2001.

In April 2001, Day and Alta Bates' counsel stipulated that Hoffman was acting strictly as an agent for Alta Bates in its dealings with Day in the Jackson action. In the same month, Alta Bates moved for summary judgment land Day moved for summary adjudication of seven affirmative defenses asserted by Alta Bates in its answer. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Alta Bates submitted a declaration from Hoffman asserting that: "At no time, and in no manner did I, or any employee or agent of Hoffman ... communicate to plaintiff a request or demand for plaintiff to render legal services of any kind on behalf of [Alta Bates]."

Both of the motions were, of course, opposed and, after much briefing back and forth, were argued to the superior court on May 21, 2001. The court granted Alta Bates' motion, commenting that "I can't even find an implied request [for services] here." In its formal order, it granted Alta Bates' motion on the basis that "plaintiff has no evidence to show that defendant either requested that plaintiff work on its behalf or that defendant directly benefited from plaintiffs work." Judgment in favor of Alta Bates was entered on June 1, 2001 and Day timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

For two separate and distinct reasons, the summary judgment in favor of Alta Bates must be affirmed. The two reasons are: (1) as noted by the superior court in its order, Day made no showing that his services were either performed "at the request" of Alta Bates or were of "direct benefit" to it and (2) under recent California Supreme Court precedent applicable here, Day was representing only Jackson in her litigation and cannot recover fees against a lien claimant who might arguably have received an "incidental benefit" from his actions. We will deal with these points in that order.

A.

First of all, in order to recover under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for such services from the defendant and that the services rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant. One court summarized the rule as follows: "The theory of quasi-contractual recovery is that one party has accepted and retained a benefit with full appreciation of the facts, under circumstances making it inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of its reasonable value." (Truestone, Inc. v. Simi West Industrial Park II (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 715, 724, 209 Cal.Rptr. 757; see also 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.1987) §§ 112-114, pp. 137-139.)

The importance of the "benefit" part of the rule was stressed in a recent decision by one of our sister courts, Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 (Maglica): "The classic formulation concerning the measure of recovery in quantum meruit is found in Palmer v. Gregg [1967] 65 Cal.2d 657 [661, 56 Cal.Rptr. 97, 422 P.2d 985], Justice Mosk, writing for the court, said: `The measure of recovery in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the services rendered provided they were of direct benefit to the defendant.' [Citations.] ... [¶] The idea that one must be benefited by the goods and services bestowed is thus integral to recovery in quantum meruit; hence courts have always required that the plaintiff have bestowed some benefit on the defendant as a prerequisite to recovery. [Citation.]" (Maglica, supra, 66 Cal. App.4th at pp. 449-450, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 101.)

The second prong is that there must be either an explicit or implicit request for the services. As one court framed this requirement: "[A]...