Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft

• Decision Date: 19 August 1983
• Citation: 464 A.2d 1313,318 Pa.Super. 225
• Parties: Norman D. DAY and Nancy V. Day, his wife, Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT and Volkswagen of America, Inc. and Volkswagen Atlantic, Inc. and Towne Volkswagen, Inc., and Frank Paparo.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1313

464 A.2d 1313

318 Pa.Super. 225

Norman D. DAY and Nancy V. Day, his wife, Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT and Volkswagen of America Inc. and Volkswagen Atlantic, Inc. and Towne Volkswagen, Inc. and Frank Paparo.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 9, 1983.

Filed Aug. 19, 1983.

[318 Pa.Super. 228] Carl N. Martin, II, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Stephen S. Phillips, Philadelphia, for Aktiengesellschaft, appellee.

Charles W. Craven, Philadelphia, for Volkswagen Atlantic, appellee.

Donald J. Sweeney, Philadelphia, for Towne, appellee.

Before BROSKY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.

WIEAND, Judge:

Does a state court action against a distributor and a retailer of an allegedly defective motor vehicle survive after an action in a federal court against the manufacturer and the importer has resulted in a final determination that the vehicle was not defective? The trial court held that the state court action was Mrs. Nancy V. Day was seriously injured when the Volkswagen van which she was driving through an intersection in the City of Philadelphia was struck by a vehicle whose driver had disregarded a red traffic signal. After settling claims against the driver of the offending vehicle, Norman and Nancy Day filed simultaneous actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County alleging that the Volkswagen van had been dangerously defective because not equipped with a harness type seat belt, a condition which was alleged to have contributed to Mrs. Day's injuries.

barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and entered summary judgment in favor of the distributor and retailer. We affirm. Further proceedings in the state court action are barred by principles of collateral estoppel.

The 1968 Volkswagen Type II Van driven by Mrs. Day at the time of the accident had been manufactured and equipped by Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG) in West Germany. It was imported in the United States by Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VWOA), a New Jersey corporation. At point of entry, title to the vehicle was transferred to Volkswagen Atlantic, Inc. (VW Atlantic), a Delaware corporation and the regional distributor servicing dealers in Southeastern Pennsylvania. The retailer from whom the Days purchased the van was Towne Volkswagen, Inc. (Towne), a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in Philadelphia.

In the complaint filed in the federal court the named defendants were VWAG, the The federal action was tried first and resulted in a verdict in favor of VWAG and VWOA. The jury which tried the case, in response to written interrogatories, found specifically that the van had not been defective and that neither VWAG nor VWOA had been negligent in failing to install shoulder restraints. Moreover, because the absence of shoulder restraints was obvious to a buyer, the court held as a matter of law that there had been no duty to warn. A motion for new trial by the Days was denied by the trial court, and its judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See: Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 451 F.Supp. 4 (E.D.Pa.1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1373 (3rd Cir.1978). In the Court of Appeals, appellants argued, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence that "the advertising campaign of Volkswagen over-sold it from the standpoint of safety and minimized its dangers to conservative-type purchasers such as the Days, who were interested in economical, safe transportation...." (Appellants' brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals, No. 77-2389, pg. 10).

manufacturer of the van, and VWOA, the importer. The claim was based upon negligence, breach of express and implied warranties and strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for an alleged defect in the design, manufacture and sale of the van without a shoulder restraint or harness ¹ [318 Pa.Super. 230] type seat belt. The complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia contained identical causes of action and named as defendants VW Atlantic, the regional distributor, and Towne, the retailer who had sold the vehicle to the Days, as well as VWAG and VWOA.

In the state court, all defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. On September 19, 1980, the motions of VWAG and VWOA were granted. Summary judgments were entered in their favor, and no appeals were taken from such judgments. The court declined to enter summary judgment in favor of VW Atlantic and Towne, however, but expressly provided that its action was without prejudice to a reconsideration "The law on summary judgment is well-settled. 'Summary judgment is made available by Pa.R.C.P. 1035 ... when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits considered together reveal no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. This severe disposition should only be granted in cases where the right is clear and free from doubt. To determine the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the court must take the view of the evidence most favorable to the non-moving party, and any doubts must be resolved against the entry of the judgment.' " Acker v. Palena, 260 Pa.Super. 214, 218-219, 393 A.2d 1230, 1232 (1978) quoting Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 234 Pa.Super. 452, 458, 341 A.2d 174, 177 (1975). Accord: Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 204, 412 A.2d 466, 469 (1979); Wilson v. Central Penn Industries, Inc., --- Pa.Super. ---, ---, 452 A.2d 257, 258 (1982); Boothman v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 304 Pa.Super. 137, ---, 450 A.2d 139, 140 (1982); McNair v. Weikers, 300 Pa.Super. 379, 388-389, 446 A.2d 905, 909-910 (1982); Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 290 Pa.Super. 581, 586, 435 A.2d 181, 183 (1981). The burden rests upon the moving party to demonstrate clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., supra, 488 Pa. at 204, 412 A.2d at 468-469; McNair v. Weikers, supra, 300 Pa.Super. at 399, 446 A.2d at 910; Aimco Imports, Ltd. v. Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Co., 291 Pa.Super. 233, 236, 435 A.2d 884, 885 (1981). Summary judgment is properly granted on grounds of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits disclose that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See: Brown v. Cooney, 296 Pa.Super. 117, 442 A.2d 324 (1982); Exner v. Exner, 268 Pa.Super. 253, 407 A.2d 1342 (1979); Haines Industries, Inc. v. City of Allentown, 237 Pa.Super. 188, 355 A.2d 588 (1975); Davis v. O'Brien, 230 Pa.Super. 449, 326 A.2d 511 (1974) allocatur denied December 30, 1974.

after discovery had been completed. After discovery had been completed, the motions of VW Atlantic and Towne were renewed, and the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor. It is this judgment from which the instant appeal has been taken and which now compels our attention and review.

The doctrine of res judicata has been judicially created. It reflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a multiplicity of litigation. It holds that "an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction." 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 394 at 558-559 (footnotes omitted). " 'The original cause is "barred" by a judgment for the defendant and "merged" in one for the plaintiff. [The doctrine] forbid[s] relitigation of matters actually decided, on the ground that there is no assurance the second decision will be more correct than the first. Moreover, a party is commonly forbidden to raise issues that could have been litigated in the first suit but were not, because of the desirability of settling the entire controversy in a single proceeding.' " In re Estate of R.L.L., 487 Pa. 223, 228 n. 7, 409 A.2d 321, 323 n. 7 (1979), quoting Cramton, Currie and Kay, Cases on Conflicts of Laws 2d Ed. ABC, p. 655 (1975). See also: Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, ---- n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 2375 n. 10, 76 L.Ed.2d 595, 606 n. 10 (1983). For the doctrine of res judicata to prevail there must be a concurrence of four conditions: (1) identity of issues, (2) identity of causes of action, (3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the To determine whether the state action against the distributor and retailer was barred by res judicata we must determine whether these parties were in privity with the manufacturer. If not, the state court action may proceed so long as it is based upon a cause of action different than that asserted against the manufacturer in the federal court action.

quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 574, 345 A.2d 664, [318 Pa.Super. 233] 668 (1975). Accord: Duquesne Slag Products Company v. Lench, 490 Pa. 102, 105, 415 A.2d 53, 55 (1980); In re Estate of R.L.L., supra, 487 Pa. at 228 n. 7, 409 A.2d at 323 n. 7; Keystone Building Corp. v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 468 Pa. 85, 91, 360 A.2d 191, 194 (1976); Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 366, 375, 336 A.2d 328, 332 (1975); Stevenson v. Silverman, 417 Pa. 187, 190, 208 A.2d 786, 787-788 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833, 86 S.Ct. 76, 15 L.Ed.2d 76 (1965); Dunham v. Temple University, 288 Pa.Super. 522, 534, 432 A.2d 993, 999 (1981); Notoro v. Hyer Estate, 239 Pa.Super. 10, 14, 361 A.2d 766, 768 (1976). "The doctrine of res judicata applies to and is binding, not only on actual parties to the litigation, but also to those who...