DC Production Service v. Dept. of Employment
Decision Date | 24 September 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01-23.,01-23. |
Citation | 2002 WY 142,54 P.3d 768 |
Parties | DC PRODUCTION SERVICE, Appellant (Petitioner), v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, Employment Tax Division; and the Wyoming Unemployment Insurance Commission, Appellee (Respondent). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Timothy C. Kingston of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.
Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; William L. Weaver, Special Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee. Argument by Mr. Weaver.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN1, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] Following a hearing, the hearing examiner decided that, for purposes of paying unemployment insurance premiums under Wyoming's employment security law, DC Production Services, Inc., (DC) was the employer of sixteen flow testers who provided services to DC's oil company clients. The sole issue in this case is whether the Wyoming Unemployment Insurance Commission correctly determined that flow testers were employees rather than independent contractors. We affirm.
[¶ 2] DC presents the following issue for our review:
Were persons who provided services to the Appellant's customers independent contractors or employees?
The Commission presents the following issue:
The Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission) held that services provided by 16 flow testers to DC Production Service in 1999 are covered employment under the Wyoming Employment Security Law (Act), making payments to flow testers reportable and taxable under the Act. Was the decision of the Commission in accordance with law pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-104(b) (Lexis 1999) and supported by substantial evidence as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (E) (Lexis 1999)?
[¶ 3] DC is an oil field service company that rents flow testing equipment to oil companies and contracts with oil companies to provide oil well flow testing services. The persons providing the flow testing services to the oil companies are known as "flow testers." DC considers flow testers as independent contractors and has each sign a "Master Work Agreement" that contains a number of provisions referring to the flow testers as independent contractors and not DC employees and establishing a contractor relationship. DC also requires that the flow testers sign a "Notice to Independent Contractors," which provides:
DC Productions is in the business of renting flow testing equipment to oil companies, and upon request by oil companies may send personnel to monitor it. These personnel are independent contractors known as flow testers/pumpers. DC Productions does not have supervisory control over the independent contractors; they report directly to the oil company or companies in which they are testing for. As a flow tester/pumper, among other things, you will be expected to provide your own transportation, telephone, tools, liability insurance naming DC Production as an additional insured, licenses, and any other expenses occurred [sic] in the production of this income. You will also be expected to pay all of your own taxes including self-employment taxes and file all returns required.
[¶ 4] In 1999, DC provided sixteen flow testers to its oil field clients. Upon request by an oil company, DC contacted flow testers and contracted with them based upon availability and negotiated prices for each assignment. If DC and a contacted flow tester could not agree on a price, then both were free to decline offers. A flow tester who appeared on site received directions from the oil company regarding the specific site's requirements and provided his own replacements, transportation and insurance. DC had no further control over the flow testers activities. After completing a job, the flow tester submitted an invoice to DC for a previously agreed amount. DC billed that amount to the particular oil company along with a surcharge. At the end of the year, DC provided each of the flow testers with a Form 1099 for the amount of payments received.
[¶ 5] On March 20, 2000, the Wyoming Department of Employment issued a notice of audit to DC. On May 17, 2000, the Department issued a joint audit and procedure report that found that some sixteen "flow testers" who provided services to customers of DC were employees for the purposes of assessing unemployment insurance premiums against DC, and DC objected. A contested case hearing was held, and the hearing examiner issued a decision that upheld the joint audit and procedure report. That decision stated:
3. DC argues that the Hearing Examiner must follow the Internal Revenue Service's definition of independent contractor instead of the definition enacted as part of the Wyoming Employment Security Law. The Examiner rejects DC's argument. In Laramie Cabs, the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals that to rely on the definition of the Internal Revenue Service was an error by the trial court. The Wyoming Supreme Court expressly stated that the only definition the Examiner can apply is that which appears in the Wyoming Employment Security Law.
The hearing examiner concluded that the flow testers were employees to whom wages had been paid and were not independent contractors. DC appealed that decision to the Unemployment Insurance Commission, which revised one factual finding and affirmed the decision. DC's petition for review to the district court was certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.
[¶ 6] The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act governs this Court's review of decisions by the Commission. Hat Six Homes, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Employment, Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 6 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wyo.2000).
We recently held that the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act contested case proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties submit evidence. Newman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 22 (Wyo.2002). We further held, that when only the party with the burden of proof submits evidence in the contested case proceeding and that party does not ultimately prevail, the arbitrary or capricious standard governs the judicial review of that agency decision. Id. Even if the factual findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons. Id. at ¶ 23. We do not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the board's decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and order upon all of the evidence before it. Id. at ¶ 24, ¶ 25. Because both parties presented cases-in-chief, we apply the substantial evidence standard.
Kuntz-Dexter v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 101, ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 190, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002).
[¶ 7] DC does not dispute the hearing examiner's findings of fact, but contends that the legal conclusions based on the factual findings are not in accordance with law. An agency's conclusion of law is entitled to no deference from this Court. We will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law. Haynes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 962 P.2d 876, 878 (Wyo.1998).
[¶ 8] DC first objects to the hearing examiner's conclusion that because the oil companies could control the flow testers' on-site work, the statutory requirement of independence was not met. DC contends that the oil companies' control is that of a third party paying for the services and the statute does not apply to third party control. DC next objects to the conclusion that the flow testers did not hold themselves out to the public as independent contractors, contending that its client...
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