Deakyne v. Department of Army

• Decision Date: 29 January 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 78-344.
• Citation: 530 F. Supp. 1322
• Parties: David W. DEAKYNE, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

530 F. Supp. 1322

David W. DEAKYNE, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 78-344.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

January 29, 1982.

John H. Benge, Jr., Wilmington, Del., and Basil C. Clare, Ridley Park, Pa., Allmond, Eastburn & Benge, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., U. S. Atty. and John X. Denney, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

OPINION

MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

This action to quiet title was brought by plaintiff, David W. Deakyne, against the United States. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(f), 1402(d) and 2409a. Presently before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment.

The dispute concerns the ownership of 2.25 acres of marsh land located in the Town of Lewes, Sussex County, Delaware. In 1887 the State of Delaware by statute committed itself to acquiring and transferring title to certain lands in that area to the Federal Government for use in connection with a proposed inland waterway. 18 Del. Laws tit. 8 Chap. 139 at 210-213 (1887) ("18 Del.Laws"). Pursuant to that statute, along with amendments not relevant here, the commissioners of Lewes condemned the land in question in 1892 and awarded damages to the heirs of John Metcalf, which caused "the title to the lands to vest in the United States...." 18 Del.Laws at 211.

The original waterway project, which was authorized by the River and Harbor Act of August 5, 1886, 24 Stat. 310 (1886), was subsequently abandoned and the canal was rerouted. As a result part of the land condemned for the original project was returned to the State of Delaware by Act of Congress. Act of May 31, 1924, 43 Stat. 245 (1925). However, the land in question was not included in that reconveyance.

Plaintiff traces his claim through a series of conveyances to the same John Metcalf whose heirs received the condemnation award in 1892. Further, plaintiff alleges that the commissioners of the Town of Lewes recognized his predecessor in interest's claim by quit claim deed dated May 3, 1963. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to Quiet Title, ¶ 4. Plaintiff does not challenge the validity of the 1892 condemnation but argues that by that proceeding the Government received only an easement which it has since abandoned. The Government contends that it acquired a fee simple absolute which can never be abandoned. In the alternative the Government asserts that if in fact it obtained only an easement, it has never abandoned it. Further, the Government argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that even if it had jurisdiction, plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the twelve year limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f).

Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's first amended complaint requested compensation for the wrongful usurpation of his alleged fee title together with attorney's fees and costs. The Government quite properly argued that such a claim exceeded the $10,000 limit set by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).¹ At oral argument plaintiff requested and was granted leave to file a second amended complaint which expressly limits the damages claimed for the alleged wrongful usurpation to $10,000.

That amendment does not, however, end the matter. The Government contends that the fact that plaintiff seeks to quiet title to land which could well have a market value in excess of $10,000² deprives this Court of jurisdiction. The Government argues that the monetary value of the property at stake controls for purposes of section 1346(a)(2) and that because plaintiff seeks to deprive the Government of property with a value in excess of $10,000 his claim must be brought in the Court of Claims.

It is possible to read the statutory provisions as the Government suggests, but to do so the Court would have to do violence to the meaning of several of the provisions. Subsection (f) of section 1346 provides that:

The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States.

The Government would read the limitation of subsection (a)(2) back into this independent grant of jurisdiction so that subsection (f) would confer jurisdiction only in cases in which the estate or interest was in land valued at less than $10,000. Although it is possible to read section 1346(a) as requiring that result, to do so would render portions of section 2409a meaningless. Section 2409a(a) provides that:

The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action ... to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest....

Nowhere in the statute or the legislative history did Congress evince an intention to limit the Government's amenability to suit to cases involving land valued at less than $10,000. It was originally proposed that jurisdiction be vested in the district courts by adding a new section 1347a to title 28. The legislative history indicates that rather than create a new section, the House Judiciary Committee simply added the language of the proposed section to section 1346 as the new subsection (f). H.R.Rep. No. 1559, 92d Cong., 2d sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4547, 4550. There is no indication that by grafting the provision onto section 1346, as opposed to creating a separate section, Congress intended to limit its effect.

An examination of the legislative history of section 2409a(b) provides further support for this view. Section 2409a(b)³ provides that if it is determined that the United States is wrongfully occupying land the Government may nonetheless retain possession or control of the property by paying damages in an amount to be determined by the district court to the person entitled to compensation. Keeping in mind that the source of jurisdiction for the Court's award of just compensation under section 2409a(b) is the same section 1346(f) at issue here, it is significant that the House Report distinguishes the remedy provided by section 2409a(b) from that provided under the existing provisions of section 1346 by noting "that the district courts would have jurisdiction without regard to any jurisdictional amount such as that contained in section 1346a(2)." H.R.Rep. No. 1559, 92d Cong.,2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 4547, 4552. Accord, United States v. Drinkwater, 434 F.Supp. 457, 463 (E.D.Va.1977).

Based on the foregoing the Court concludes that section 1346(f) confers jurisdiction on the district courts to hear actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which the United States claims an interest without regard to the value of the land involved.

Statute of Limitations

It was not until October 25, 1972, with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2409a that the United States consented to be sued in actions to quiet title. Prior to that date, the Government was, with a few limited exceptions, immune to such suits. See Buchler v. United States, 384 F.Supp. 709, 710 (E.D.Cal.1974). As originally proposed, that statute would have been fully retroactive. The statute of limitations, section 2409a(f), would have allowed any action to have been brought within six years after the claim accrued or within two years of the effective date of the Act, whichever was later. The office of the Attorney General opposed the original version on the basis of the administrative burden which it would have placed on the Government. It suggested a different approach which was in fact adopted by Congress in subsection (f). 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 4552-4553.

As enacted section 2409a(f) provides:

Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States.

Given the clear legislative intent to limit the statute's retroactive effect, those courts which have addressed the issue have unanimously held that a plaintiff's action under section 2409a accrues when he or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the Government's claim, even if an action to quiet title could not have been brought at that time. Knapp v. United States, 636 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1980); Stubbs v. United States, 620 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980); Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1977); Hatter v. United States, 402 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D.Cal.1975); Buchler v. United States, 384 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.Cal. 1974).

There is no question that plaintiff's predecessors in interest knew that the Government claimed an interest in the land at issue. The plaintiff's remote predecessors in interest were, after all, the condemnees themselves. The instant dispute concerns the meaning of the phrase "claim of the United States." The government argues that inasmuch as plaintiff's predecessors knew that the government claimed some interest, if only an easement, as far back as 1892, his claim must now be barred. It asserts that the type of interest originally claimed is unimportant; a plaintiff who knows or should know that the Government claims an interest must bring an action to quiet title within twelve years. Thus, according to the Government, if the United States claims any interest in a tract of land, however limited or undisputed, the fee owner must bring an action within twelve years or be forever barred.

In support of this somewhat novel theory the Government cites Hatter v. United States, 402 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D.Cal.1975). In Hatter the plaintiffs brought an action under section 2409a. In response to the Government's assertion that their claim was time barred, plaintiffs argued that their predecessor in interest knew only that the Government claimed some type of equitable interest in the land. The...