Dean v. American Fed. of Gov. Employees, Civil Action No. 04-1466 (CKK).

• Decision Date: 20 September 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 04-1466 (CKK).
• Citation: 509 F.Supp.2d 39
• Parties: Robin DEAN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 476, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

509 F.Supp.2d 39

Robin DEAN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 476, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 04-1466 (CKK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 20, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Edward Carpenter, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Joseph Frank Henderson, Mark D. Roth, American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

Currently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE"), Local 476 (hereinafter "Defendant" or "the Local"). Plaintiff, Robin Dean, bring claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that her supervisor's unwelcome and pervasive sexual advances created a hostile work atmosphere during her tenure with Defendant, and that she was wrongfully terminated due to gender discrimination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-31. In addition, Plaintiff asserts a claim for defamation under District of Columbia law based on an e-mail sent by her supervisor, Edward Eitches, President of the Local, to all of the Local's members. See id. ¶¶ 32-34. Defendant moves for summary judgment on a number of grounds, including that (1) that the Local does not meet the, statutory definition of an "employer" subject to suit under Title VII because it had less than fifteen employees at all relevant times and is not a "single employer" with the AFGE National Union (hereinafter "the National"); and (2) that Plaintiff fails to proffer factual evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the Local should be liable for Mr. Eitches' alleged defamation. Upon searching consideration of the filings currently, before the Court, the attached exhibits, the relevant case law, and the entire record herein, the Court concludes that Defendant is correct with respect to each of these preliminary arguments. As a result, the Court grants-in-part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and does not reach the merits of either Plaintiffs Title VII claim or her defamation claim.¹

I. BACKGROUND

The Court begins its discussion of the facts by noting that this Court strictly adheres to the text of Local Civil Rule 56.1 (identical to Local Civil Rule 7(h)). The local rules for summary judgment "assist[] the district court to maintain docket control and to decide motions for summary judgment efficiently and effectively." Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C.Cir.1996). "Requiring strict compliance with the local rule is justified both by the nature of summary judgment and by the rule's purposes.... The procedure contemplated by the rule thus isolates the facts that the parties assert are material, distinguishes disputed from undisputed facts, and identifies the pertinent parts of the record." Id. (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 637 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C.Cir.1980)). "[A] district court should not be obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories in order to make [its] own analysis and determination of what may, or may not, be a genuine, issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 (D.C.Cir. 1988)).

The Court further notes that its October 13, 2005 Scheduling and Procedures Order advised the parties of the Court's strict adherence to the dictates of Local Civil Rules 7(h) and 56.1. Dean v. AFGE, Civil Action No. 04-1466, Order (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (citing Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 519 (D.C.Cir.2002)); see also Dean v. AFGE, Civil Action No. 04-1466, Minute Order (July 10, 2006). In addition, the Court's Scheduling and Procedures Order advised the parties that, pursuant to Local Civil Rules 7(h) and 56.1, each party submitting a motion for summary judgment is required to attach a statement of material facts as to which that party contends there is no genuine issue, with specific citations to those portions of the record upon which the party relies in fashioning the statement. Dean v. AFGE, Civil Action No. 04-1466, Order (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2005). The party opposing such a motion must, in turn, respond to each paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts "with a correspondingly numbered paragraph, indicating whether that paragraph is admitted or denied," and including any information relevant to its response. Id. Furthermore, "[i]f the responding party has additional facts that are not addressed in the corresponding paragraphs, the responding party should include these at the end of its responsive statement ... [a]t all points, parties must furnish precise citations to the portions of the record on which they rely." Id.

Plaintiff has met her obligation to respond to each paragraph of Defendant's Statement of Material Undisputed Facts (hereinafter "Def.'s Stmt.") with a correspondingly numbered paragraph in her Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (hereinafter "Pl.'s Stmt."), and has included, at the end of that Statement, a section entitled "Additional Facts That Are In Dispute Thereby Necessitating The Denial Of Defendant's Motion." See generally Pl.'s Stmt. However, as Defendant points out in its Reply and its accompanying Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (hereinafter "Def.'s Resp. Stmt."), Plaintiff altogether fails to provide record evidence to support a number of the purported factual assertions included in her "Additional Facts" section. See Def.'s Reply at 2-5; Def.'s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 1 (citing Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 11, 16, 18, 27-28, 31, 35, 38-40, 42-43, 45, 47-48, 50, 54, 56-58, 61-68, 70, 72-78, 80-81, 83-86, 94, 97-100, 103, 105, and 113-19). To the extent that Plaintiff does not support her factual assertions with record evidence, the Court can neither credit them, nor conclude that they controvert Defendant's factual assertions.

In addition, as Defendant also notes in its Reply and Response Statement, Plaintiff responds to a number of Defendant's factual assertions by stating that they are "neither disputed nor admitted, as Plaintiff does not have sufficient information to dispute or admit this allegation." See Def.'s Reply at 5, Def.'s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 2 (citing Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 5, 14, 44, 46, 51-53, 59, 60, 69, 71, 79, 72, 88-93, 95-96, 101-02, 104, 106, 108, and 111). However, this case has moved beyond the motion to dismiss stage — indeed, Plaintiff was afforded ample time for discovery in this matter, including an extension of sixty days at Plaintiffs request. See Dean v. AFGE, Civil Action No. 04-1466, Minute Order (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2006). At this stage, Plaintiff cannot controvert Defendant's factual assertions by simply refusing to admit them. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56. 1, in resolving the present summary judgment motion, this Court "assumes that facts identified by the moving party in the statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion." LCvR 56.1; 7(h). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff fails to adduce record evidence to controvert Defendant's factual assertions, the Court considers those assertions admitted.

The Court sets forth below the facts that it finds are undisputed, as well as those facts that are supported by record evidence and uncontroverted by the opposing party. Because the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiffs Title VII and defamation claims herein, the Court sets forth only such facts as are relevant to Defendant's preliminary arguments for summary judgment.

A. Background Facts

Plaintiff, Robin Dean, worked as a secretary for Defendant AFGE Local Union 476 from September 21, 2002 to June 23, 2003. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 1; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 1. The Local is an unincorporated association and a local labor organization, which represents only employees of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 2. Edward Eitches is a senior trial attorney in the General Counsel's Office at HUD, and has been the President of the Local since 1999. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 3; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 3. Mr. Eitches hired Plaintiff and acted as her supervisor during her tenure with the Local. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 4; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 4. Plaintiff was an at-will employee with no written contract or position description. Def.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 6-7; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff's duties at the Local included general secretarial and receptionist work. Def.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 8-9; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 8-9.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges' that during her employment with the Local, she "was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature from" Mr. Eitches. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. As Defendant points out, Plaintiff does not proffer record evidence in support of these allegations, see Def.'s Reply at 17-18; however, this failing is ultimately irrelevant to the instant motion because the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiffs Title VII claims. On June 23, 2005, an incident occurred between Plaintiff and Mr. Eitches, after which Plaintiff called the Federal Protective Services and had Mr. Eitches arrested and escorted out of the building. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 12. Plaintiff subsequently charged Mr. Eitches with assault, but the United States Attorney refused to press charges. Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 13; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 13. The Executive Board of the Local voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment on June 23, 2003, and Mr. Eitches informed Plaintiff of her termination by way of phone message on the evening of June 23, 2003. Def.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 14-15; Pl.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 14-15.

B. Facts Relating to Plaintiffs Defamation Claim

On September 14, 2005 — more than two years after Plaintiff's employment, with the Local was terminated — Mr. Eitches sent an e-mail to Jaminta Fleming, Secretary of the Local, which he copied to the...