Dean v. Goddard

• Decision Date: 17 November 1893
• Citation: 56 N.W. 1060,55 Minn. 290
• Parties: DEAN v. GODDARD.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

55 Minn. 290

56 N.W. 1060

DEAN

v.GODDARD.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 17, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. In an action to determine the question of title by adverse possession, the period relied upon need not be the statutory one next before the time when the action is commenced. If such title becomes complete it is not lost or forfeited by any subsequent interruption of the possession, unless by some other adverse possessor holding for such a length of time as would create title in himself.

2. A title acquired by adverse possession is one in fee simple, and is as perfect a title as one by deed. The legal effect of such title not only bars the remedy of the owner of the paper title, but divests his estate, and vests it in the party holding adversely for the required period of time, and is conclusive evidence of such title. The title so acquired is predicated upon the presumption or proven fact that the prior owner has abandoned the premises.

3. If there is any cloud resting upon the title acquired by adverse possession, the owner of the premises has a legal right to apply to the court, and have his rights adjudicated, and have the cloud removed, and his title perfected by judgment record, if the evidence sustains his claim.

4. Where the plaintiff inserts in his reply repugnant allegations, and the defendant does not move to have the pleading made certain and definite, nor move to compel the plaintiff to elect upon which of such allegations he will rely, but allows the plaintiff, without objection, to introduce parol evidence which shows one of the allegations to be indisputably true, the defendant will be estopped from claiming that the written pleadings should control the parol evidence so given.

5. If permissive possession of land, with parol executory conditions attached, do not constitute adverse possession, as between the parties, yet it might be so as against third persons or strangers.

6. The continuity of adverse possession is not broken by the party in possession taking written conveyances of the premises from other parties claiming an interest therein, as this may give him color of title, and perhaps define the boundaries of the premises claimed.

7. Where the trial court finds that the possession has been adverse for a period of 20 years, it is a substantial and sufficient finding that such possession has been hostile during that period of time, especially if all of the other ingredients necessary to constitute adverse possession are found by the court to exist.

8. The intent to claim by adverse possession may be inferred from the nature of the occupancy, and the possessory acts necessary to constitute adverse possession depend upon the character of the property, its location, and the purposes for which it is ordinarily fit or adapted. Actual residence upon the premises is not necessary, nor is it incumbent upon the adverse possessor to make oral declarations of his adverse claim. The mere fact that time may intervene between successive acts of occupancy, while the party is temporarily absent, engaged in business,-as in cutting logs to be sawed into lumber to be piled and stored on the premises by such party,-will not destroy his continuity of possession.

9. The highest considerations of public policy demand that our real property should be occupied and made productive, and the taxes promptly paid, to the end that all the governmental functions be maintained, the people protected in their just rights, and the country thereby made prosperous.

10. The statutes upon the subject of adverse possession are properly called “statutes of repose,” and are intended to prevent litigation, and to quiet the titles to land which has remained unoccupied by the actual owner for a long period of time. The statute, which the actual owner is presumed to know, is a continual warning to him; and if, through his negligence or selfishness, he allows others to occupy, use, and improve his land for a long period of time, he must be deemed to have acquiesced in the possession of his premises by his adversary.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Canty, Judge.

Action by Alfred J. Dean against Fred E. Goddard to quiet title to realty. Plaintiff had judgment, and, from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. J. Cahaley and Little & Nunn, for appellant.

Woods & Kingman, for respondent.

BUCK, J.

The question raised in this case is whether the plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession to the premises described in the complaint, viz. the front half of lots 1 and 2 in block 67, in the city of Minneapolis. The action was commenced in August, 1891. In his complaint the plaintiff alleges that he is in possession, and is the owner in fee simple, of the premises above described, and that the defendants claim some estate or interest in the premises adverse to the plaintiff, and prays that the claims of the respective parties be adjudged and determined, and that title to said premises be decreed to be in the plaintiff. The defendant Goddard answered, and alleged the title in fee to be in himself. The plaintiff replied, and such reply will be referred to hereafter. Plaintiff's contention is that he acquired title by possession held adversely for such a length of time as to create a title in himself.

Under Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 4, the time limited for commencing actions for the recovery of real property was fixed at 20 years; but on April 24, 1889, the law was changed to 15 years,-not to take effect, however, until January 1, 1891. The law, as amended, would be applicable to actions commenced after January 1, 1891, and prior to the time of the commencement of this action, in August, 1891; but this would not render the law existing prior to the amendment inapplicable to causes of action, when there was 20 years' adverse possession before the time when the change took effect. The period, however, relied upon, need not be the 20 years immediately preceding the 1st day of January, 1891. It would be sufficient if the possession relied upon was continuous for 20 years up to any certain or definite time. Of course, the 20 years would have to be complete before the bringing of the action; but such 20 years need not, necessarily, be those next before the time when the action is commenced. In this case, if the inception of the plaintiff's adverse possession was in the months of June or August, 1866, and became perfect by continued adverse possession until the month of June or August, 1886, then the title thereby created would not be lost or forfeited by any subsequent interruption of the possession, unless by some other adverse possession for such a length of time as would create title in the possessor.

The court below found the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint to be true, and that he was, at the time of the commencement of this action, the sole owner, in fee, and in the lawful possession, of the premises described in the complaint, and that he and his grantors and predecessors in interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession of the premises, with color of title, and paying taxes thereon, for a period of 20 years, and that he was entitled to the decree and judgment of the court declaring him to be the absolute owner of the premises. We think a title acquired by adverse possession is a title in fee simple, and is as perfect as a title by deed. The legal effect not only bars the remedy of the owner of the paper title, but divests his estate, and vests it in the party holding adversely for the required period of time, and is conclusive evidence of such title. To say that the statutes upon this subject only bar the remedy, as some authorities do, is only to leave the fee in the owner of the paper title; thus leaving the owner with a title, but without a remedy. We think the better and more logical rule is to hold that the occupier of the premises by adverse possession acquires title by that possession, predicated upon the presumption or proven fact that the prior owner has abandoned the premises. Adverse possession ripens into a perfect title. This title the adverse possessor can transfer by conveyance, and when he does so he is conveying his own title, and not a piece of land where the title is in some other person,...