Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No. 412, IAFF v. City of Dearborn

• Decision Date: 17 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket Nos. 11306,11920,1
• Citation: 42 Mich.App. 51,201 N.W.2d 650
• Parties: , 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2826, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,879, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,926 DEARBORN FIRE FIGHTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 412, IAFF, a voluntary unincorporated association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, a Michigan municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant. POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF DEARBORN, a voluntary unincorporated association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, a Michigan municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Leave to Appeal Granted
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 650

201 N.W.2d 650

42 Mich.App. 51, 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2826,

69 Lab.Cas. P 52,879,

69 Lab.Cas. P 52,926

DEARBORN FIRE FIGHTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 412, IAFF, a voluntary unincorporated association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, a Michigan municipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF DEARBORN, a voluntary unincorporated association, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, a Michigan municipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 11306, 11920.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Leave to Appeal Granted Oct. 17, 1972.

July 24, 1972.

Released for Publication Oct. 27, 1972.

Joseph J. Burtell, City Atty., Eugene A. Forbes, Dearborn, for defendant-appellant.

Theodore Sachs, Ronald R. Helveston, Detroit, for Fire Fighters Union etc.

Winston L. Livingston, Detroit, for Police Officers Ass'n of Dearborn.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and V. J. BRENNAN and O'HARA ^*, JJ.

V. J. BRENNAN, Judge.

The issues raised in these two cases are identical; the facts in each case are almost identical ¹ and they may be summarized as follows:

Negotiations between the defendant City and the plaintiffs employee organizations failed and each dispute was submitted to mediation. After the failure of mediation to resolve the disputes, the employee organizations submitted each dispute to arbitration pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 423.231 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.455(31) et seq. The City, acting on its belief that the aforementioned compulsory arbitration statute was unconstitutional, did not appoint a representative to the arbitration panel as required by M.C.L.A. § 423.234; M.S.A. § 17.455(34). At this time the employee organizations requested the Michigan Employment Relations Commission to appoint a chairman of the arbitration panel. Such appointment was made in each case, and a two-man arbitration panel (consisting of a representative of the employees and the chairman appointed by MERC) proceeded to conduct hearings and subsequently rendered its decision. The City refused to comply with the decisions of these two-man panels of arbitrators, and the employee organizations subsequently filed suit to compel implementation of the panels' award. By final judgments in the Wayne County Circuit Court, the City was ordered in each case to implement the award of the arbitrators. The City appeals each decision and the appeals are joined here.

In both cases, the defendant City attacks the constitutionality of the compulsory arbitration statute, Supra, on three grounds. The first argument advanced by the defendant is that the statute divests the home-rule cities of powers granted to them pursuant to article 7, § 22 and § 34 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963. The defendant's argument is without merit. The Constitution specifically provides that 'The Legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service.' Const.1963, art. 4, § 48. The compulsory arbitration statute here under consideration falls within this grant of authority to the state Legislature. The powers of home rule cities are 'subject to the constitution and law.' Const.1963, art. 7, § 22.

The second argument advanced by the City is that the compulsory arbitration statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and administrative power to private persons. To determine whether a group is public or private for such purposes, we must look to 'its character, its relations, and its functions.' Penn School District No. 7 v. Lewis-Cass Intermediate School District Board of Education, 14 Mich.App. 109, 121, 165 N.W.2d 464, 471 (1968). The delegation to a body of a portion of the sovereign power of the state, here specifically the authority to arbitrate disputes between cities and plicemen and firemen, of itself renders it a public body. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Association, R.L., 256 A.2d 206 (1969).

Defendant also argues, in this context, that the standards set forth in the statute (M.C.L.A. § 423.239; M.S.A. § 17.455(39)) are insufficient to adequately circumscribe the arbitrator's exercise of authority. In City of Warwick, supra, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejected such an argument regarding a similar statute which contained almost identical standards. The Court there found that such standards not only properly directed and limited the authority of the arbitrators, but also formed an adequate basis for judicial review. On this basis, we reject defendant's argument.

The final constitutional argument advanced by the City is that the compulsory arbitration statute surrenders the power to impose taxes in violation of Const.1963, art. 9, § 2. Defendant's argument is that since the panel of arbitrators has the authority to increase the expenses necessary for the City to maintain its police and fire departments, it necessarily would command the City to increase its taxes in order to meet the additional burden. The logical extention of defendant's argument, as noted by Judge Kaufman below, would compel the conclusion that any increase in the price of any commodity which a city must purchase would also be violative of the constitution. While inflation may certainly be undesirable, we are not yet ready to hold it unconstitutional. Furthermore, the City is always free to reallocate resources to meet the increased demands placed upon it by an arbitration award without necessarily increasing taxes.

Having determined that the legislation in question is not constitutionally infirm, we turn to the second argument raised by defendant City: that the arbitration award was invalid for failure to comply with the procedural provisions of the statute. This argument is advanced by the defendant City in the case of Dearborn Fire Fighters only. The decision not to raise this issue in the Dearborn Police Officers case was made for 'tactical reasons'. The first procedural challenge made by the defendant is that a two-man panel has no jurisdiction whatsoever to conduct proceedings pursuant to the statute. Despite the fact that defendant's own noncompliance with the express statutory provisions created this situation, its argument is correct. The statute speaks in mandatory terms, and in these terms sets forth a step-by-step procedure which must be...