City of Amsterdam v. Helsby

• Citation: 37 N.Y.2d 19,371 N.Y.S.2d 404,332 N.E.2d 290
• Parties: , 332 N.E.2d 290, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2871, 78 Lab.Cas. P 53,807 CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Respondent, v. Robert D. HELSBY et al., constituting the Public Employment Relations Board of the State of New York, et al., Appellants. CITY OF BUFFALO, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 05 June 1975
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 404

371 N.Y.S.2d 404

37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 89

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2871,

78 Lab.Cas. P 53,807

CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Respondent, v. Robert D. HELSBY et al., constituting the Public Employment

Relations Board of the State of New York, et al.,

Appellants.

CITY OF BUFFALO, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 5, 1975.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (John Q. Driscoll and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for Robert D. Helsby and others, appellants in the first above-entitled action.

Dominick Tocci and William Pozefsky, Gloversville, for remaining appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Joseph Jacobs, Amsterdam, for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Benjamin Werne and Alan C. Marin, New York City, for the New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.

Arthur J. Harvey, Albany, for the Police Conference of New York, Inc., amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.

Richard P. Walsh, Jr., Schenectady, for the New York State Professional Fire Fighters Association, Inc., amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.

Leslie G. Foschio, Corporation Counsel, Buffalo (James J. McLoughlin, Buffalo, of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (John Q. Driscoll and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for the New York State Public Employment Relations Board, respondent in the second above-entitled action.

JASEN, Judge.

In 1974, the Legislature amended section 209 of the Civil Service Law, Consol.Laws, c. 7 so as to provide that disputes arising in the course of collective bargaining negotiations between a public employer and its firemen and policemen are to be submitted to an arbitration panel, established under the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter 'PERB'), for compulsory and binding arbitration. In the first case now before us, City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, the city and the collective bargaining representative for its policemen and firemen reached an impasse in their negotiations. The union then sought compulsory and binding arbitration as provided for in the amended section 209. The city, however, refused to participate and initially obtained a temporary restraining order, and thereafter a final judgment, preventing the union and PERB from proceeding to arbitration and declaring these amendments to section 209 to be unconstitutional. Similarly, in the second case, City of Buffalo v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd., the city and the unions representing its policemen and firemen also reached an impasse, and the unions petitioned PERB to refer these disputes to an arbitration panel. The city commenced this action in which it sought a judgment declaring section 209, as amended, to be unconstitutional. In this action, however, the trial court granted defendants a judgment Several grounds of alleged constitutional infirmity are alleged. The principal ground is that the amendments violate the Home Rule provisions of the State Constitution.

declaring the amendments to be constitutional and valid in all respects and dismissed the complaint. Both cases are before us on direct appeals taken as of right.

As relevant here, the Home Rule provisions of our Constitution provide in part as follows:

'In addition to powers granted in the statute of local governments or in any other law * * * (ii) every local government shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government:

'(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of work, protection, welfare and safety of its officers and employees'. (N.Y.Const., art. IX, § 2, subd. (c).)

This section makes it abundantly clear that the Home Rule powers will sustain an exercise of local authority with respect to the regulation of the hours of work, compensation, and so on, of employees of a local government only to the extent that such exercise is not inconsistent with any general law enacted by the Legislature. (Matter of Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 60, 4 N.E.2d 289, 290; see Temporary State Commission on the (1967) Constitutional Convention, Report No. 13, Local Government, pp. 81--82, 85, 89--91, 97.) Certainly, once an impasse is reached and arbitration is sought, an attempt by the local government to establish the hours of word, compensation, and so on, of its policemen and firemen would be entirely inconsistent with the compulsory and binding arbitration procedure established by the Legislature. In such a situation it should be apparent that the local government must yield to the dictates of the arbitration panel convened pursuant to these legislative enactments.

This discussion also necessarily involves a determination that each of these amendments to section 209 is a 'general law'. A 'general law' in this context is defined as '(a) law which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.' (N.Y. Const., art, IX, § 3, subd. (d), par, (1).) As the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Civil Service Law, §§ 290-214) is, by its own terms, applicable to all public employers, it is a 'general law'. Since neither The other points advanced by the cities do not merit extensive discussion. Both cities argue that the Legislature has unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority to the arbitration panel. However, there is no constitutional prohibition against the legislative delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or commission established to administer an enactment. (Martin v. State Liq. Auth., 43 Misc.2d 682, 685, 252 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Cooke, J.), affd. upon opn. rendered at Special Term, 15 N.Y.2d 707, 256 N.Y.S.2d 336, 204 N.E.2d 496, see Chiropractic Assn. of N.Y. v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 120--121, 237 N.Y.S.2d 289, 296--297, 187 N.E.2d 756, 761--762; and Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 164, 182 N.Y.S.2d 584, 156 N.E.2d 301). Here, the Legislature has delegated to PERB, and through PERB to Ad hoc arbitration panels, its constitutional authority to regulate the hours of work, compensation, and so on, for policemen and firemen in the limited situation where an impasse occurs. It has also established specific standards which must be followed by such a panel. (Civil Service Law, § 209, subd. 4, par. (c), cl. (v).) We conclude that the delegation here is both proper and reasonable.

on the challenged amendments to that law is any narrower in application, it follows that each amendment is itself a 'general law'.

The City of Amsterdam additionally argues that the Legislature has unconstitutionally granted the arbitration panel the power of taxation and that the amendments violate the one-man--one-vote principle and, therefore, deny the citizens of Amsterdam equal protection of the law. We have reviewed these arguments and have found them likewise to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment in City of Buffalo v. New York State Public Employment Relations Bd. should be affirmed. Since City of Amsterdam v. Helsby involves a procedural issue as well as the constitutional issue, a direct appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals does not lie. (CPLR 5601, subd. (b), par. 2.) That appeal should be transferred to the Appellate Division, Third Department. (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 5, subd. b.)

FUCHSBERG, Judge (concurring).

I concur in the result reached by the majority, but find its disposition of the issues in this case too summary. Binding arbitration statutes have been enacted by some 20 States and 10 cities (McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 Col.L.Rev. 1192, 1192--1193). Courts in other States have struggled with these statutes, presenting as they do such an unusual exercise of the delegative powers of a Legislature. The results of their struggles have been Where a statute raises constitutional questions, involves serious community interests, and inherits conflicting and confused views from courts in other States, the basis upon which this court upholds it ought to be set forth in some detail. My own analysis therefore follows.

mixed; a number of conflicting views as to the grounds on which compulsory arbitration statutes may be upheld have emerged (See Barr, Public Arbitration Panel as an Administrative Agency: Can Compulsory Interest Arbitration Be An Acceptable Dispute Resolution Method in the Public Sector?, 39 Albany L.Rev. 377).

I BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

Even more than most disputes in the public sector, those involving services performed by police and firefighters touch almost every part of the community. Growing unionism among the tremendously increasing number of employees in public service ¹ has led to strikes by public employees, in the one hand, and State legislation banning such strikes, on the other. (See Hildebrand, Public Sector (Dunlop & Chamberlain) Frontiers of Collective Bargaining 125, 125--126.)

In New York State that prohibition was originally accomplished through passage of the Condon-Wadlin Act. ² That law called for severe penalties for strikers, including automatic termination, re-employment only upon forfeiture of all pay increases for three years and reduction to probationary status for five years. But, in actual operation, it turned out to be counter-productive the...