Dearborn Hills Civic Ass'n v. Scripps Media Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 359221 |
| Parties | DEARBORN HILLS CIVIC ASSOCIATION INC., and MARGOT CLEVELAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCRIPPS MEDIA INC., DAVE LEWALLEN, SIMON SHAYKHET, and OATH INC., Defendants-Appellees, and VERIZON MEDIA INC., and VERIZON CMP HOLDINGS LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 21-007277-NZ
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAVANAGH and CAMERON, JJ.
Plaintiffs Dearborn Hills Civic Association ("DHCA") and Margot Cleveland (collectively, "plaintiffs") appeal as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendants Scripps Media Inc., Dave LewAllen, Simon Shaykhet, and Oath Inc. (collectively "defendants").[1] On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial court's determination the communications at issue were not defamatory. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This case arises from a July 15, 2020 news story that aired on WXYZ-Detroit ("WXYZ")[2]entitled: "Claims of Unfair Treatment Made by Homeowners Disputed by [DHCA]." DHCA is an organization of volunteers tasked with monitoring and enforcing deed restrictions in the Dearborn Hills neighborhood of Dearborn, Michigan. Plaintiff Cleveland is a DHCA board member, and is also its legal counsel. Defendant Scripps is the parent company of WXYZ, defendant LewAllen is a WXYZ anchor, and defendant Shaykhet is a WXYZ reporter
The news story included interviews with three homeowners who live in the Dearborn Hills neighborhood-Mariam Sleiman, Lindsey Mahanna, and Nasser Beydoun (collectively, the "homeowners"). Defendants' story represented that these homeowners believed DHCA had unfairly targeted Arab-American homeowners. The homeowners' complaints arose from earlier legal actions by DHCA against them. Each of the homeowners had sought DHCA's approval to make certain renovations to their homes, but DHCA denied their requests on the basis of certain deed restrictions. When the homeowners refused to comply with DHCA's denials, DHCA filed suit. DHCA prevailed after a court in the respective actions found DHCA was within its authority to enforce the deed restrictions.
LewAllen introduced the news story stating: The story cut to Shaykhet who reported:
Three Dearborn homeowners we talked to today say they are being unfairly targeted because they are Arab-American when it comes to fixing up their homes. They say the civic association in Dearborn Hills is preventing them from doing so. But an attorney for the civic association says that couldn't be further from the truth.
The homeowners each recounted how DHCA had denied their respective requests for renovations. The story also included an interview with Cleveland who wholly denied the allegations of discrimination, claiming DHCA's denials of any home renovation projects were solely based on an objective set of criteria.
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case, alleging defamation defamation by implication, defamation per se, and false light against defendants. In response, defendants filed two motions for summary disposition, each under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The trial court granted summary disposition, finding the communications at issue were not defamatory. This appeal followed.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition. Thomas v Bd of Law Examiners, 210 Mich.App. 279, 280; 533 N.W.2d 3 (1995). Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). In granting defendants' motions for summary disposition, the trial court did not specify the subsection under which it granted summary disposition. However, the trial court's reasoning clearly relied on matters outside the pleadings. Therefore, we consider whether summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Edwards v Detroit News, Inc, 322 Mich.App. 1, 11; 910 N.W.2d 394 (2017) ().
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019) (emphasis, quotation marks, citations omitted).]
With respect to defamation claims, this Court "must make an 'independent examination' of the facts to make sure that the speaker's First Amendment right of free expression is preserved." Edwards, 322 Mich.App. at 12 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by dismissing their defamation claims because the claims were sufficiently viable at the summary disposition stage. We agree in part and disagree in part.
"[T]he media enjoy a special position in our society . . . .", citing U.S. Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 5. This position "is most evident on consideration of our constitutions, which provide for the freedom of the press." Id. As such, courts are reticent to issue rulings limiting a media defendant's speech because such a ruling risks a "chilling effect" on the constitutional protections afforded to these defendants. Id. However, the media's protections on speech are not unfettered, and the law of defamation creates a small window in which a plaintiff may successfully challenge a media defendant's communications. "A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower an individual's reputation in the community or deters third persons from associating or dealing with that individual." Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich.App. 607, 614; 584 N.W.2d 632 (1998). In these circumstances, "[t]he quandary lies in determining at what point the law of defamation abridges freedom of speech or of the press." Reighard v ESPN, Inc, ___ Mich.App. ___, ___; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 355053); slip op at 5.
A successful defamation case requires:
(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Edwards, 322 Mich.App. at 12 (citation omitted).]
The law surrounding defamation traditionally concerns statements that are defamatory in nature. See, e.g., Kevorkian v American Med Ass'n, 237 Mich.App. 1, 8; 602 N.W.2d 233 (1999). However, Michigan courts also recognize two subsets of defamation-defamation by implication and defamation per se. See Hope-Jackson v Washington, 311 Mich.App. 602, 620-621; 877 N.W.2d 736 (2015); Hawkins v Mercy Health Servs, Inc, 230 Mich.App. 315, 329-331; 583 N.W.2d 725 (1998). If a communication is capable of a defamatory meaning, then a court must make a number of other secondary determinations, such as which party holds the burden of proof, and the appropriate standard of proof. Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Mich, 440 Mich. 238, 252; 487 N.W.2d 205 (1992); Mino v Clio Sch Dist, 255 Mich.App. 60, 73; 661 N.W.2d 586 (2003).
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged defamation by defendants against DHCA and Cleveland, in her individual capacity. The trial court erred in granting summary disposition as to DHCA because the record is unclear whether the news story was an accurate representation of the homeowners' beliefs. However, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition as to Cleveland because there were no communications against her which could be construed as defamatory.
A cause of action for defamation is extremely limited and it is not necessary that a news outlet be "literally and absolutely accurate in every minute detail." Rouch, 440 Mich. at 258. Rather, Michigan courts look to whether the news story was substantially true. Id. at 259. "[S]light inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance." Id. at 258-259, quoting 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 581, comment f, p 237. This Court "looks to the sting of the article to determine its effect on the reader; if the literal truth produce[s] the same effect, minor differences [are] deemed immaterial." Id. at 259, citing McAllister v Detroit Free Press Co, 85 Mich. 453, 460-461; 48 N.W. 612 (1891).
Again, Shaykhet introduced the news story, stating:
Three Dearborn homeowners we talked to today say they're being unfairly targeted because they're Arab-American when it comes to fixing up their homes. They say the civic association in Dearborn Hills is preventing them from doing so. But, an attorney for the civic association says that couldn't be further from the truth.
The news story then cut to a segment featuring statements by Shaykhet and the three homeowners, which provided:
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