Deaton v. Town of Barrington

• Decision Date: 29 March 2023
• Docket Number: C. A. 20-15 WES
• Parties: JOHN DEATON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON, JAMES CUNHA, DAVID WYROSTEK, ANTHONY DECRISTOFORO, TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, and JOHN LaCROSS Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

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JOHN DEATON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON, JAMES CUNHA, DAVID WYROSTEK, ANTHONY DECRISTOFORO, TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, and JOHN LaCROSS Defendants.

C. A. No. 20-15 WES

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

March 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

William E. Smith District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Further, the remaining state law claim and associated supervisor liability and municipal liability claims are REMANDED to the Rhode Island Superior Court.

I. Background

The present case arises from an altercation between Plaintiff John Deaton, and his girlfriend's ex-husband, Ronald Warner, after which Plaintiff was arrested. See Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) ¶¶ 1, 4, 14 ECF No. 26; Pl.'s Statement of Disputed Facts (“PSDF”) ¶ 1, 14 ECF No. 30; Am. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 23. The outcome of this lawsuit, which challenges the constitutionality of the arrest as well as the ensuing prosecution, largely depends upon whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. While many of the facts surrounding the altercation and the investigation are hotly disputed, the probable cause determination hinges upon what the arresting officer knew about the altercation at the time of the arrest. The following facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are undisputed and establish what the arresting officer knew at the time he arrested Plaintiff.

On the afternoon of September 24, 2017, the Barrington Police Department (“BPD”) received a 911 call from Warner, who reported that Plaintiff had “put his hands on [Warner's] throat” and assaulted him^[1] outside of Barrington High School after a football game. DSUF ¶ 4; 911 Call Tr., Ex. 17, ECF No. 28-18; see PSDF ¶ 7. Two Officers, Defendants Wyrostek and DeCristoforo, were dispatched to the scene. DSUF ¶ 5; see PSDF ¶ 2.

Officer Wyrostek arrived first and met with Warner, who explained that during an argument his ex-wife's boyfriend had put his hands on Warner's throat. DSUF ¶¶ 6-7; PSDF ¶ 7. As Officer Wyrostek was speaking with Warner, Plaintiff drove by, and Warner pointed and identified Plaintiff as the person who had assaulted him. DSUF ¶¶ 10-11; PSDF ¶ 11. Officer Wyrostek conducted a stop of Plaintiff a short distance from school grounds. DSUF ¶¶ 1213; see PSDF ¶¶ 11, 14. Officer Wyrostek asked Plaintiff what happened, and Plaintiff said he did not attack Warner^[2] and that there might be an active warrant for Warner's arrest.^[3] Pl.'s Additional Undisputed Facts (“PAUF”) ¶ 38, ECF No. 29; Defs.' Resp. PAUF ¶ 38, ECF No. 33. At some point during the stop, Plaintiff exited his vehicle to speak with Officer Wyrostek, and, shortly thereafter, Officer Wyrostek placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. See Am. Compl. ¶ 22. After a few minutes of questioning, Officer Wyrostek informed Plaintiff that he was being arrested for simple assault and battery and disorderly conduct.^[4] See DSUF ¶ 14; Arrest Report 4, ECF No. 23-3.

Officer DeCristoforo arrived at the school shortly after Officer Wyrostek pulled Plaintiff over. PAUF ¶ 33; Defs.'s Resp. PAUF ¶ 33. Upon arrival, he spoke with Warner and Warner's girlfriend, Ashley Maryyanek,^[5] who confirmed Warner's story. Arrest Report 4; Maryyanek Statement, ECF No. 23-3. Officer DeCristoforo also examined Warner for injuries and observed that his “throat did not appear red, swollen, or show finger marks.” Arrest Report 4. At some point,^[6] Officer DeCristoforo spoke to Seth Fisher, who said that he witnessed Plaintiff “put his right hand on [Warner's] throat” before Fisher broke up the fight. Fisher Statement, Ex. 12, ECF No. 28-13. After Plaintiff had already been placed in handcuffs, Officer DeCristoforo told Officer Wyrostek that he had witness confirmation of Warner's story. See Wryostek Dep., 91:19-92:4, ECF No. 25-13; DeCristoforo Dep., 101:16-19, ECF No. 25-14; Kristiana Warner Statement, ECF No. 23-2. At some point that day, after Plaintiff's arrest, Officer DeCristoforo learned that there was an active arrest warrant for Warner, and Warner was subsequently arrested by the Providence Police Department pursuant to that warrant. Arrest Report 4.

After approximately two hours at the police station, Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance. DSUF ¶ 14; PSDF ¶ 14. Louis Pulner, the prosecutor for the Town of Barrington, prosecuted the charges against Plaintiff. Pulner Dep. 10:15-16, 11:4-11, ECF No. 25-16; 48A Dismissal, Ex. 33, ECF No. 28-34. The case was scheduled for trial but before trial occurred a 48A dismissal was entered and the charges were dismissed.^[7] 48A Dismissal; see DSUF ¶¶ 15-17; PSDF ¶¶ 15-17.

Thereafter, Plaintiff brought the present lawsuit. The case was initially brought in Rhode Island Superior Court and later was removed to this Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.^[8] Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges unlawful arrest in violation of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-3 (Count I); false imprisonment in violation of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-1 (Count II); malicious prosecution (Count III), invasion of privacy (Count V); assault and battery (Count VI); failure to supervise (Count VII); municipal liability (Count VIII); unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IX); conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights via § 1983 (Counts IV and X);^[9] and failure to intervene via § 1983 (Count XI). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts, arguing that it is warranted both on the merits and based on qualified immunity. Defs.' Mem. Supp. Summ. J. (“Defs.' Mem.”) 2, 38, ECF No. 25-1. II. Legal Standard

“The object of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.'” Tobin v. Federal Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 450 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992)).

Summary judgment is warranted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In ruling on the motion[,] the . . . [C]ourt must view ‘the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'” Bienkowski v. Ne. Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995)). “[A]n issue of fact is genuine if it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party For the same purpose, material facts are those which possess the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.” Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Finally, if the nonmoving party “fail[s] to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue, [that] warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” Vineberg V. Bissonnette, 529 F.Supp.2d 300, 302 (D.R.I. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 (Counts IV, IX, X, and XI)

The Court begins with Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, resolving these claims on the merits and concluding that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.^[10] To successfully establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” by one acting under the color of law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to violate and did violate his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him^[11] without probable cause to do so.^[12] Thus, in analyzing Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, the Court is tasked with answering whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for misdemeanor assault or disorderly conduct. The Court answers in the affirmative.

Assault is “a physical act of a threatening nature or an offer of corporal injury which puts an individual in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm.” Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 696 (R.I. 1997)). Battery is “an act that was intended to cause, and does decided that probable cause is a constitutional prerequisite to prosecution. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (leaving question open). cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of the assault.” Id. (quoting Fenwick v. Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 855 (R.I. 2004)). “A person commits disorderly conduct if he . . . intentionally knowingly, or recklessly . . . engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior.” R.I.G.L § 11-45-1(a)(1). There need only be probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed one of these three misdemeanors for the Court to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated. See Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (analyzing only one of two criminal charges).

“A warrantless arrest, like the one at issue here, must be based on probable cause.” United States v. Fiasconaro, 315 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2002). “Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and circumstances within [the police officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.” Id. at 34-35 (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir. 1987)).

Evaluated objectively, considering the totality of the circumstances probable cause “requires only a...