DeBerry v. American Motorists Ins. Co.

Decision Date20 July 1977
Docket NumberNo. 7616DC902,7616DC902
PartiesAnuzel Medlin DeBERRY v. AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Mason, Williamson, Etheridge & Moser, P.A. by Daniel B. Dean, Laurinburg, for plaintiff-appellant-appellee.

Leath, Bynum, Kitchin & Neal by Henry L. Kitchin, Rockingham, for defendant-appellant-appellee.

CLARK, Judge.

The appeal presents three questions: (1) whether plaintiff was "struck by an automobile" as that term is used in the insurance policy; (2) if so, whether defendant's liability for medical expenses is limited to the amount on each insured car ($500.00) or to the total amount on all insured cars ($1,000.00); and (3) whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under G.S. 6-21.1.

(1) The term "struck by an automobile".

The term "struck by an automobile" is not defined in the policy. In the absence of a definition, nontechnical words are to be given a meaning consistent with the sense in which they are used in ordinary speech, unless the context clearly requires otherwise. Peirson v. Insurance Co., 249 N.C. 580, 107 S.E.2d 137 (1959). If there is no uncertainty or ambiguity in the language of a policy, there is no occasion for judicial construction. Squires v. Insurance Co., 250 N.C. 580, 108 S.E.2d 908 (1959). However, any ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of terms in a policy should be resolved against the insurer since it selected the language used. Williams v. Insurance Co., 269 N.C. 235, 152 S.E.2d 102 (1967).

Plaintiff contends that the term does not require physical contact between the automobile and the body of the insured and relies on Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970), wherein the pertinent provisions in the policy were identical to those in the present case. In Trust Co. the insured was driving a vehicle covered by his policy and was killed when this vehicle collided with another vehicle. There was no physical contact between the body of the insured and the automobile which collided with his vehicle. The insurer paid $5,000.00 under a medical payments provision covering accidental injury incurred while the insured was occupying his own vehicle, but refused to pay $5,000.00 under a medical payments provision covering accidental injury incurred if the insured was "struck by an automobile." The threshold question before the court was whether the occupant of a vehicle struck by an automobile had been "struck by an automobile" when there was no physical contact between the body of the insured and the automobile.

The court stated:

"The term 'struck by an automobile' is not defined in the policy. Consequently, it is to be given the meaning most favorable to the insured which is consistent with the use of the term in ordinary speech. In strict accuracy, the term is limited to a situation in which there is direct, physical contact between the body of the insured and an automobile. In normal speech the term has, however, a broader coverage and would include one who sustains bodily injury through the striking by an automobile of another vehicle or other object, in or upon which the injured person was. Thus, the term 'struck by an automobile,' as used in this policy, includes, nothing else appearing, one who is injured when the vehicle, occupied by him, is struck by another automobile and is not limited to collisions between automobiles and pedestrians, or to other situations involving physical contact between the body of the claimant and the automobile in question. (Citations omitted)" (Emphasis added.) 276 N.C. at 356, 172 S.E.2d at 523.

Defendant relies on Gant v. Insurance Co., 197 N.C. 122, 147 S.E. 740 (1929) and Roach v. Insurance Co., 248 N.C. 699, 104 S.E.2d 823 (1958). In Gant the insured was injured by a plank that was thrown from beneath the rear wheel of an automobile. At the time of the striking the insured was standing twelve to fifteen feet from the automobile. There was no physical contact between the automobile and the body of the insured. The policy under which plaintiff sought recovery insured against loss from injury sustained by "being struck, run down or run over by a moving automobile." In denying recovery, the court stated that the provision in the policy was "free from uncertainty or ambiguity", and that plaintiff had been struck by a plank, not an automobile.

In Roach, the other case relied upon by defendant, the insured was fatally injured as a result of being struck and burned by fuel from an exploding airplane. The policy insured against injury by being "struck, knocked down or run over by . . . airplane." In allowing recovery the court stated that the provision was to be construed most favorably to the insured and that the fuel was an essential part of the airplane.

Defendant contends that Gant was not overruled by implication by Trust Co., and the law in North Carolina is this: (1) physical contact between the body of the insured and the automobile is not required when the insured occupies a vehicle which collides with an automobile, and (2) physical contact between the body of the insured or some object touching the body of the insured and the automobile or essential part thereof is required when the insured is a pedestrian struck by a thrown object. In effect, defendant contends that a distinction exists between the "collision" and "thrown object" cases, such that Trust Co. can be reconciled with Gant.

The overwhelming majority rule in the United States is that physical contact between the body of the insured and the automobile is not necessary in order to recover under a provision compensating for accidental injury incurred by being "struck by an automobile". Recovery has been allowed in numerous cases in both the "collision" and "thrown object" situations without physical contact between the insured and the striking vehicle. Annot., 33 A.L.R.3rd 962 (1970). E. g., Bates v. United Security Ins. Co., 163 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1968); Wheeler v. Employer's Mutual Casualty Co., 211 Kan. 100, 505 P.2d 768 (1973); Black v. Hanover Ins. Co., 30 Misc.2d 1081, 220 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Mun.Ct.1961); McKay v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 27 Ohio App.2d 76, 193 N.E.2d 431 (1963); DiMartino v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 201 Pa.Super. 142, 192 A.2d 157 (1963); American Casualty Co. v. Cutshall, 205 Tenn. 234, 326 S.W.2d 443 (1959). Majority rule jurisdictions have nonetheless denied recovery in certain fact situations involving an automobile where it could not be said that the insured had been "struck by an automobile" according to the common and ordinary meaning of that phrase. See e. g., Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kahn, 359 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.1962). A very small minority of jurisdictions have denied recovery on the ground that physical contact between the automobile and the body of the insured is required. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 962 § 3(c). But only South Carolina has done so since 1945.

Defendant has cited no jurisdiction which has allowed recovery in the "collision" situation but denied it in the "thrown object" situation. Our research reveals that the Supreme Court of South Carolina appears to have done so on the ground that the situations are "factually distinguishable". Elrod v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 246 S.C. 129, 142 S.E.2d 857 (1965) (collision); Quinn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 301, 120 S.E.2d 15 (1961) (piece of timber thrown). With all due respect to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, we fail to see any reason why the factual distinction between a collision and a thrown object should have any legal significance. One insured may be injured when the vehicle in...

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