Deborah Carol Dreher v. Charles Dean Dreher
| Decision Date | 29 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | 95-LW-3765,93 CA 537 |
| Parties | DEBORAH CAROL DREHER, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CHARLES DEAN DREHER, Defendant-Appellant Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jon C. Hapner, Hapner & Hapner, 127 North High Street, Hillsboro, Ohio 45133.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Ed Rhoads, 118 E. Second Street, Waverly, Ohio 45690.
DECISION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Pike County Common Pleas Court granting the parties a divorce.
The parties were married in 1981. Although they had no children together, appellee's one child by a previous marriage lived with the parties during the entire marriage. Appellee received no child support from the child's biological father.
The parties separated in February 1992. Sometime after the separation, appellee signed a deed conveying her interest in the marital residence to appellant. During the March 11, 1994 final hearing in this case, appellee testified that when she signed the deed she did not intend to create a de facto separation agreement relinquishing her rights to the marital property. Appellant, to the contrary, testified that appellee stated that she did not want the marital residence, but only wanted a tanning bed that the parties purchased new for $900. The parties testified that the house was appraised at $30,000. Appellant testified that the personal property remaining in the house after appellee left was worth $2,400.
The trial court expressly found that the parties had not entered into a separation agreement. The trial court awarded appellee the tanning bed and her clothing and other personal effects. The trial court awarded appellant all the remaining marital property, including the marital residence. The trial court however, ordered appellant to pay appellee $15,000 for appellee's equity in the marital assets.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by: (1) finding there was no separation agreement between the parties; (2) finding that appellant was not entitled to the entire interest in the marital residence; and (3) finding that the marital residence was marital property. When reviewing domestic relations cases, appellate courts should generally apply an "abuse of discretion" standard. In Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028, 1030, the court wrote:
* * *"
In Holcomb v. Holcomb (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 596, 599, the court wrote:
See, also, Stewart v. Stewart (June 12, 1991), Gallia App. No. 90 CA 10, unreported.
Thus, when reviewing a trial court's judgment in a domestic relations case, an appellate court's inquiry should focus on whether the trial court abused its discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion in the trial court's formulation of the division of marital property, a reviewing court may not disturb that decision. Worthington v. Worthington (1986), 21 Ohio St.2d 73, 488 N.E.2d 150; Martin v. Martin (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 292, 480 N.E.2d 1112; Briganti v. Briganti (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 220, 459 N.E.2d 896; Koegel v. Koegel (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 355, 432 N.E.2d 206; and Berish v. Berish (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. In re Jane Doe 1 (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 566 N.E.2d 1181; and Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. In re Jane Doe 1, citing Berk v. Matthews (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 559 N.E.2d 1301; and Buckles v. Buckles (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 102, 546 N.E.2d 950.
When reviewing evidence presented at trial, an appellate court must not re-weigh the evidence. In C.E. Morris v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
"Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence."
See, also, Vogel v. Wells (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 91, 566 N.E.2d 154; Ross v. Ross (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 18 O.O.3d 414, 414 N.E.2d 426. An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court when there exists competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case. In Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 410, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276, the court wrote:
"The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony."
In the case sub judice, appellant claims, in part, that the trial court erred by failing to find that when appellee executed a quitclaim deed to the marital residence, the marital residence became appellant's separate property. We note that in Pettry v. Pettry (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 30, 610 N.E.2d 443, the Tenth District held that the burden of challenging the effectiveness of a deed rests upon the challenger. The court wrote in pertinent part as follows:
Id., 81 Ohio App.3d at 34, 610 N.E.2d at 445. Thus, appellee had the burden of proving that when she signed the quitclaim deed placing the marital residence into appellant's name, she did not intend to make "an outright complete transfer" of all her interest in the marital residence.
After reviewing the record submitted on appeal and considering the totality of the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's judgment: (1) finding there was no separation agreement between the parties; (2) finding that appellant was not entitled to the entire interest in the marital residence; and (3) finding that marital residence was marital property. We find sufficient competent, credible evidence to support the judgment below.
We find no error with the trial court's determination that appellee met her burden by demonstrating that when she signed the quitclaim deed placing the marital residence into appellant's name, she did not intend to make "an outright complete transfer" of all her interest in the marital residence. The evidence reveals that parties acquired the marital residence during the course of the marriage. Appellee testified...
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