Decker v. Bishop of Charleston

• Decision Date: 08 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 18472,18472
• Citation: 147 S.E.2d 264,247 S.C. 317
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: M. Marlon DECKER, as Executrix of the Estate of Carolyn Gohl Schmidt, Appellant, v. The BISHOP OF CHARLESTON, Respondent.

Page 264

147 S.E.2d 264

247 S.C. 317

M. Marlon DECKER, as Executrix of the Estate of Carolyn Gohl Schmidt, Appellant, v. The BISHOP OF CHARLESTON, Respondent.

No. 18472.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 8, 1966.

Moore, Mouzon & McGee, Charleston, for appellant.

Grimball & Cabaniss, Charleston, for respondent.

MOSS, Acting Chief Justice.

The Bishop of Charleston, a corporation sole, the respondent herein, was created by an Act of the General Assembly of South Carolina, approved December 13, 1880, 17 Stat. 321, and was authorized 'to purchase, hold, possess, and enjoy in fee simple or in any lesser estate, any property, either real or personal, to be held, enjoyed, possessed, or used, for the purpose of a church, hospital, parsonage, burial ground, schoolhouse, or any or all of said purposes, or for the erection, repair, maintenance, support or keeping up of them, or any or all of them, * * *.' It is alleged in the complaint herein that the respondent is the owner of a church building located in the City of Charleston, and known as The Cathedral of St. John The Baptist, and said Cathedral is operated 'for church purposes for the benefit of its members and other persons, including especially adherents of the Catholic faith.'

It is alleged in the complaint that on April 8, 1963, Carolyn Gohl Schmidt entered The Cathedral of St. John The Baptist and proceeded up the center aisle to the altar rail in order to say her prayers. When she had finished, she turned from the altar rail and walked back toward the center aisle and at a point near the front-most pew she fell off the platform onto the main church floor, a distance of approximately six inches, seriously injuring herself. She alleges that her injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the respondent.

It is further alleged in the complaint that the respondent owned among its nontrust and non-charitable assets a policy of insurance which insured it against bodily injury liability to third persons. The Ad damnum prayer is for actual damages in the sum of Seventy-five Thousand ($75,000.00) Dollars, or such lesser amount as does not exceed limitations of the respondent's liability insurance.

The respondent demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the action is one against an eleemosynary corporation, a charitable institution, for an alleged tort; and under the settled rule of this State such a corporation is immune from liability for torts.

The demurrer came on to be heard before the Honorable J. A. Spruill, Presiding Judge, and he issued his order on February 19, 1965, sustaining the said demurrer. This appeal followed.

The record shows that after this action was commenced that Carolyn Gohl Schmidt died and M. Marion Decker, the executrix of her last will and testament, was substituted as plaintiff. In this capacity he is the appellant before this Court.

The appellant concedes that the respondent is a charitable institution or organization and that under the previous decisions of this Court it is immune from tort liability. However, he argues that the doctrine of charitable immunity should be overruled and the charity held liable for its torts.

The doctrine of charitable immunity was first announced by our Court in the case of Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512. The case involved alleged injuries suffered by a paying patient in a hospital supported, in part, by charity. The appeal was heard by an En banc court. A majority of the court held that the hospital was charitable in nature and immune from tort liability, saying that '(t)he true ground upon which to rest the exemption from liability is that it would be against public policy to hold a charitable institution responsible for the negligence of its servants, selected with due care.'

The doctrine of charitable immunity was next considered and reaffirmed in the case of Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649. In the cited case it was said:

'* * * the exemption of public charities from liability in actions for damages for tort rests not upon the relation of the injured person to the charity, but upon grounds of public policy, which forbid the crippling or destruction of charities which are established for the benefit of the whole public to compensate one or more individual members of the public for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the corporation itself, or of its superior officers or agents, or of its servants or employe s. * * *'

In the Vermillion case the appeal was from an order of nonsuit. This Court reversed the order of nonsuit and remanded the case to the lower Court for the purpose of determining the relation of the defendant to the public, determining whether or not it was a charitable institution, for the reason that the defendant had offered no evidence to prove its relation to the public, and in order to allow the plaintiff to show 'that defendant is not, in fact, within the reason of the rule established in Lindler v. Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512, upon the authority of which the nonsuit was granted.' The Vermillion case was again tried in the lower Court and from an order directing a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff again prosecuted an appeal to this Court. The judgment below was affirmed, this Court holding that under the evidence the defendant was within the reason of the rule established in the Lindler case. 111 S.C. 156, 97 S.E. 619.

In the case of Peden v. Furman University, 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907, this Court held that a charity, though exempt from liability for negligence, was nevertheless liable for property damages resulting from a nuisance.

The doctrine was again applied in Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788, and it was held that the said association, as an employer, was protected by the charitable immunity rule so as to shield it from a workmen's compensation claim. In holding that a charitable organization or institution was not liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, this Court said:

'In determining whether the Legislature intended that the Act should apply to charitable institutions, it is also necessary to consider the status of such institutions with reference to tort liability prior to the enactment of this legislation. The question of the liability of a charitable institution to respond in damages for the negligence of its managers, agents and servants has been before the courts on numerous occasions. It is one upon which there has been, and is, a conflict of decisions not only upon the question of liability but under what circumstances it exists; and among those courts adhering to the rule of non-liability, there has also been a remarkable diversity of opinion as to the correct reason or ground for so deciding. Some courts hold that there is no liability to those who avail themselves of the benefits of the charity, but impose liability where the injured person is a stranger to the institution or to its charity, or is an employee or servant, or is on the premises by express or implied invitation. An exhaustive review of the decisions of all the states and a learned discussion of the subject will be found in Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Association, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, and President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810. The writer is strongly impressed with the View adopted in a number of jurisdictions that such institutions should unqualifiedly be held responsible for their negligence. However, the question has been settled in this jurisdiction by adoption of the rule of full immunity of such institutions from the torts of their agents and servants. * * *'

The case of Bush v. Aiken Electric Coop. Inc., 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716, was one for damages for personal injury. The defendant interposed a demurrer on the ground that it was a non-profit rural electric co-operative and not subject to liability for tort. Upon appeal by the defendant from an order overruling the demurrer, this Court held that even though a rural electric co-operative was a non-profit organization, where it had been formed by voluntary association of its members for their own benefit and not for advancement of common good, it was not a charitable corporation immune from tort liability. In this case it was stated that under our decisions charitable institutions or corporations, on grounds of public policy, enjoy full immunity from tort liability. Cited in support of this are the Lindler, Vermillion and Caughman cases.

In Eiserhardt v. State A. & M. Society of South Carolina, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568, we held the charitable immunity doctrine inapplicable to a commercial venture conducted by a charitable corporation, saying:

'And we do not think immunity should be extended to a situation where the activity out of which the alleged liability arose is primarily commercial in character and wholly unconnected with the charitable purpose for which the corporation was organized. This view is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority. Annotation 25 A.L.R.2d at page 130.'

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