Decks N Such Marine, Inc. v. Daake
| Decision Date | 15 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D18-1396,1D18-1396 |
| Citation | 297 So.3d 653 |
| Parties | DECKS N SUCH MARINE, INC., Appellant, v. Thomas O. DAAKE Sr. and Adele Z. Daake, Husband and Wife, and Portfolio Recovery, LLC, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Emmanuel, Cecily M. Parker, and Michael S. Thomas of Emmanuel Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, for Appellant.
John R. Dowd Jr. of the Dowd Law Firm, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellees.
In this appeal, Decks N Such Marine, Inc. (DNS) challenges the trial court's award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2018), to Bank of America (BOA), a junior interest holder, in an action brought to enforce a construction lien. DNS argues that the trial court improperly broadened the scope of the statute in awarding attorney's fees to BOA, an entity not the property owner or contractor. We agree and reverse.
This is one of multiple legal actions resulting from a home renovation project gone awry. After making substantial improvements to the home of Thomas and Adele Daake, DNS did not receive full payment and in 2006 filed an action for enforcement and foreclosure of its construction lien on the Daake's property. DNS did not file a notice of lis pendens until March 2013, seven years after the Daakes executed and delivered a mortgage on the property to BOA, which was recorded in the official records. In 2013, DNS amended its lien enforcement claim to include BOA because of its interest in the property. However, BOA sought and was granted summary judgment under section 713.22, Florida Statutes (2018), because of DNS's failure to timely record the notice of lis pendens . BOA then moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29.1
At the attorney's fee hearing, DNS argued that section 713.29 could not serve as a basis for BOA's request because DNS did not attempt to "enforce a lien" against BOA, a junior interest holder, but only against the Daakes, the property owners. DNS further claimed that the statute does not contemplate attorney's fees for or against a junior interest holder but only as between the contractor and the property owner. In response, BOA argued that the statute provided attorney's fees to a "prevailing party" in a construction lien action, and it met the statutory qualifications. The trial court ultimately determined that the action was one to "foreclose against [BOA's] interest in the property" and that the verbiage of section 713.29 did not limit the available remedy to only those "actions against owners." The trial court awarded attorney's fees to BOA, finding it was a "prevailing party" as contemplated by section 713.29.2 DNS appeals the award.
Generally, this Court reviews an order on attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion, but where entitlement to attorney's fees, such as here, rests on an interpretation of statute, this Court's review is de novo. See Rawson v. Gulf Coast Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 261 So. 3d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ; Jennings v. Habana Health Care Ctr. , 183 So. 3d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ; Raza v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. , 100 So. 3d 121, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
This case presents an issue of first impression in Florida—whether a junior interest holder3 named in a construction lien enforcement and foreclosure action may recover attorney's fees under section 713.29. Section 713.29 provides as follows:
In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs, as allowed in equitable actions.
This section is directed exclusively to actions brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond brought under chapter 713, the Construction Lien Law.4
DNS argues that the term "prevailing party" as referenced in section 713.29 requires strict interpretation and should not be read as encompassing junior interest holders. Thus, the trial court's broad reading of section 713.29 is inconsistent with cases that have tightly limited which parties may seek fees under this statutory section. Attorney's fees under section 713.29 are strictly limited to the portion of the action in which the enforcement of construction lien is litigated and limited to the parties litigating the construction lien.
Furthermore, DNS emphasizes Florida's longstanding principle that statutes granting attorney's fees are to be narrowly construed. However, we are not persuaded by its argument that section 713.29 is ambiguous and that resort to canons of statutory interpretation is necessary to resolve this case.
Conversely, BOA argues that where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense. See State v. Hagan , 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980). Thus, as BOA acquired substantially the relief it sought in the action, it is a "prevailing party" under the statute.
The Legislature understands the meaning of words and where words in a statute have a well-defined meaning, there is no place for construction, and the popular or generally accepted meaning must be taken. Van Pelt v. Hilliard , 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 694–95 (1918). "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 555–56 (Fla. 2005) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931) ). We find the language of section 713.29 to be clear. Accordingly, we need not engage the rules of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Polite v. State , 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007). The statutory language—"[i]n any action brought to enforce a lien ... the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee"—unambiguously restricts a fee award to the prevailing party in the action to enforce the lien. See § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
BOA's argument that "prevailing parties" are entitled to attorney's fees under section 713.29 assumes the statute implicitly allows multiple attorney's fee awards and that the phrase "in any action to enforce a lien" means any and all litigated matters arising from the underlying lien enforcement action. We reject this argument as it fails to apply the statutory language as written. Initially, the argument improperly incorporates a consideration of "prevailing parties." This inflectional affix substitution by BOA results in an impermissible rework of the statute. The plain and unambiguous language of section 713.29 references "the prevailing party " as entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services provided. The language of the statute does not contemplate "prevailing parties" or "a prevailing party." The statute, through its basic terms, limits an award of attorney's fees to "the " party that prevails in the action to enforce the lien, if at the conclusion of the substantive litigation, there is a "prevailing party." The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that "a trial court has the discretion to make a determination that neither party has prevailed on the significant issues in litigation ..." and no attorney's fee is due under section 713.29. Trytek v. Gale Indus. , 3 So. 3d 1194, 1203 (Fla. 2009) (emphasis added).
Attorney's fees under section 713.29 have historically been awarded to the prevailing party in the underlying lien enforcement claim. See Snaidman v. Harrell , 432 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (); Allied Glass Corp. v. The Austin Co., 453 So. 2d 195, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (). Statutes granting attorney's fees must be strictly construed because there is no right to attorney's fees at common law. Trytek , 3 So. 3d at 1198–99. A statute must expressly provide for the authority to award attorney's fees. Knealing v. Puleo , 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996). Adhering to these strict construction principles, courts have been reluctant to expand section 713.29 to parties and disputes not specifically enumerated in the statute. See CDI Contractors, LLC v. Allbrite Elec. Contractors, Inc. , 836 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (); Metro-Centre Assocs. v. Envtl. Eng'rs, Inc. , 522 So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (); Allied , 453 So. 2d at 196 ().5
Junior lienholders are addressed in sections 713.22 () and 713.26 (establishing that a person whose interest is sold has the right of redemption under the statute and follows the same procedure as redemption of real property from sales under mortgages) of the Construction Lien Law. In these statutes, the Legislature expressed its intent that the same process and protections of junior interest holders used in other types of foreclosure actions be utilized in a construction lien action. Practically, junior interest holders are a narrow class of mortgagees...
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Chapter 19-6 Standards of Review
...455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Engle, 311 So. 3d 197, 200-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).[82] Decks N Such Marine, Inc. v. Daake, 297 So. 3d 653, 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).[83] Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 400 (Fla. 2006) ("in a de novo review, 'no deference is given to the judgment of......