Deeds v. State

• Decision Date: 03 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2008-KA-00146-SCT.,2008-KA-00146-SCT.
• Citation: 27 So.3d 1135
• Parties: John DEEDS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

27 So.3d 1135

John DEEDS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2008-KA-00146-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

December 3, 2009.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 2010.

T. Swayze Alford, Hollie M. Miller, Oxford, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Stephanie B. Wood, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

LAMAR, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. John Deeds was convicted in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County of driving under the influence with resulting injury. From that conviction, Deeds now appeals to this Court, asserting that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charges on the grounds of double jeopardy and by admitting the results of his blood alcohol test into evidence. Finding no merit in these assignments of error, we affirm.

¶ 2. On the morning of November 6, 2004, an automobile collision involving three vehicles occurred on Goodman Road in Olive Branch, Mississippi. Faye Bridges was traveling westbound, alone in her GMC van. Deeds was traveling eastbound in his Pontiac Grand Prix, with passenger Jason Raggett.¹ The collision occurred in the inside westbound lane of Goodman Road, a four-lane roadway. Bridges testified that Deeds's vehicle "came across and hit me nearly head on."

¶ 3. Officer Michael Gibbs of the Olive Branch Police Department was dispatched to the scene. Officer Gibbs testified that Deeds was pinned behind the steering wheel, semiconscious. Officer Gibbs further testified that he noticed "a real strong smell of intoxicating beverage" on Deeds's breath when he checked to see if Deeds was breathing. Officer Gibbs also observed a half-empty, half-gallon bottle of whiskey in the vehicle, which he testified had a "strong smell of alcohol or intoxicating beverage."

¶ 4. After they were removed from their respective vehicles, Deeds and Bridges were taken to the MED² in Memphis, Tennessee. Officer Gibbs was instructed by his supervisor to go to the hospital and retrieve a blood sample from Deeds. When Officer Gibbs arrived at the hospital, he was informed by a nurse that Deeds was still semiconscious and could not respond to verbal cues. Officer Gibbs observed as a nurse drew Deeds's blood in his presence. The nurse sealed the blood sample and handed it to Officer Gibbs. Officer Gibbs then transported the blood sample to the Olive Branch Police Department, where it was kept in a locked refrigerator. The blood was then transported by Sergeant Rod Stuard of the Olive Branch Police Department to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory for testing. J.C. Smiley, forensic toxicologist and associate director of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, testified at trial that the blood test revealed that Deeds's blood contained .13 percent ethyl alcohol.³

¶ 5. Deeds was issued citations for (1) driving under the influence (DUI) first offense, and (2) no proof of insurance. A trial date was set for June 23, 2005, in Olive Branch Municipal Court. Upon arrest, Deeds posted bond. On the date of trial, Deeds pleaded guilty to the charge of no proof of insurance. The court dismissed the charge of DUI first offense. The municipal judge, in his order dismissing the DUI charge and accepting Deeds's guilty plea to no proof of insurance, noted the following:

This cause came on to be heard on the charge of DUI-1st and no proof of insurance. The City was unable to proceed on the prosecution of the DUI-1st charge due to the factual circumstances of the case. The Defendant was in an accident and was air-lifted to the Med in Memphis, TN. The officers on the scene could not conduct any field sobriety tests due to the Defendant's injury and trapped in vehicle. Defendant was immediately air-lifted—unconscious. Blood was taken at Med. Defendant asserts and objects to admissibility under Section 63-11-7 MCA. City cannot prove anything by extrinsic facts. The Defendant plead guilty to no insurance, but obtained prior to court.

¶ 6. On August 19, 2005, Deeds was indicted by a DeSoto County grand jury, under Mississippi Code Section 63-11-30(5)—driving under the influence causing injury. Deeds was arrested and posted bond. After a bench trial before Judge Robert P. Chamberlin in DeSoto County Circuit Court, Deeds was found guilty and sentenced to serve a term of fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with seven years to serve followed by eight years post-release supervision.⁴

I. Double Jeopardy

¶ 7. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to claims of double jeopardy. Boyd v. State, 977 So.2d 329, 334 (Miss.2008) (citing Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1999)).

¶ 8. Deeds argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy. Deeds asserts that jeopardy "attached" on June 23, 2005—the original trial date—when the municipal court dismissed the charge of DUI first offense, barring the subsequent prosecution in circuit court. The State contends that the municipal court did not adjudicate the merits of the case, and thus jeopardy did not attach when the trial court dismissed the original charge.

¶ 9. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. Similarly, Section 22 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 provides that "[n]o person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution." Miss. Const. art. 3, § 22 (emphasis added).

¶ 10. The purposes underlying the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause have been clearly articulated by our courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the guarantee against double jeopardy protects against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). The first step of this analysis is to define the point at which jeopardy attaches for purposes of invoking the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the "protections afforded by the [Double Jeopardy] Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy. This state of jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled or sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to receive evidence." U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until "the defendant is put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge." U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). Citing Martin Linen Supply, this Court has likewise pronounced that jeopardy does not attach in the case of a bench trial until the first witness is sworn. King v. State, 527 So.2d 641, 643 (Miss. 1988).

¶ 11. With the teachings of Jorn, Martin, and King in mind, we find that jeopardy had not attached when the municipal court dismissed Deeds's DUI charge in the Olive Branch Municipal Court. It is undisputed that the municipal judge received no evidence and heard no witnesses before dismissing the DUI charge. Stated otherwise, Deeds was never "put to trial before the trier of facts" before the charge was dismissed. The judge's comments on the order relative to the DUI charge do not contain any findings of the court; rather, the court merely recorded the reasons that the prosecutor gave for not proceeding to trial on the DUI charge.⁵ We find that these notations in the order do not constitute either an acquittal or an adjudication, such that the subsequent indictment or trial of Deeds would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

¶ 12. The dissent argues that the municipal court's order was a final adjudication on the merits which would bar subsequent prosecution. However, the authorities cited by the dissent are clearly distinguishable from the case before us. In Sanabria v. U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), a mid-trial ruling erroneously excluded certain evidence and resulted in a subsequent entry of judgment of acquittal. Id. at 57-60, 98 S.Ct. 2170. Unlike the case sub judice, Sanabria had clearly been placed "in jeopardy" before the trial court entered its judgment, as the judgment of acquittal was issued at the close of the defense's case. Id. at 59, 98 S.Ct. 2170. In Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986), at the close of the prosecution's case, the trial court dismissed the charges on the grounds that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to support a conviction. Id. at 141, 106 S.Ct. 1745. In dismissing the charges, the trial court considered evidence that was presented during the prosecution's case-in-chief, clearly after the defendant had been placed "in jeopardy" before the trier of fact. Id. Conversely, in the case sub judice, there was no trial on the DUI charge and no evidence presented to the trier of fact.

¶ 13. In Serfass v. U.S., 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975), the Supreme Court considered a trial court's pretrial grant of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment. Id. at 379, 95 S.Ct. 1055. The Court considered and rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court's ruling was "the functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits and constructively jeopardy had attached." Id. at 390, 95 S.Ct. 1055. In its analysis, the Court discussed its reasons for finding that jeopardy had not attached when the trial court dismissed the indictment pretrial:

When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial. Although an accused...