Riverboat Corp. of Miss. v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 28 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–IA–01358–SCT.,2014–IA–01358–SCT.
• Citation: 198 So.3d 289
• Parties: RIVERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino v. HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Tal Flurry, Tax Assessor for Harrison County, Mississippi and City of Biloxi, Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

198 So.3d 289

RIVERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino

v.HARRISON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Tal Flurry, Tax Assessor for Harrison County, Mississippi and City of Biloxi, Mississippi.

No. 2014–IA–01358–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 28, 2016.

Robert Gregg Mayer, Fred L. Banks, Jr., Jerome C. Hafter, Jackson, James Grady Wyly, III, Gulfport, attorneys for appellant.

Tim C. Holleman, Gulfport, Patrick Taylor Guild, Ronald G. Peresich, Biloxi, William V. Westbrook, III, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

RANDOLPH, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Today, we are asked to abandon the common law of this state, pronouncements of this Court, and customs and practices of trial courts across this state, all dating back to the nineteenth century, under the guise that today's issue has not yet been squarely before this Court. We are asked to overrule a learned trial judge who, for some of the reasons just mentioned, determined a jury trial should be had in an appeal of a county's ad valorem tax assessment. We reject the appellant's invitation, finding no error, and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The property of Riverboat Corporation, an ad valorem taxpayer, was subject to assessment by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (“the Board”) because Riverboat owned certain personal and real property in Harrison County. In 2010, the county's tax assessor determined that the true value of the property was $145,041,552, and placed the property on the tax roll of the county at an assessed value of $21,756,233 (fifteen percent of the true value).¹ Riverboat objected to the assessment, arguing that the proper true value of the property was $33,166,433, which would result in an assessed value of $4,974,965. The Board denied Riverboat's objection. Aggrieved, Riverboat filed a timely notice of appeal in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Second Judicial District. Subsequently, the county filed a bill of exceptions embodying the relevant facts, judgment, and decision of the Board.

¶ 3. The county filed a request for a jury trial. Riverboat later appealed the county's tax assessments for 2011 and 2012.² The City of Biloxi subsequently moved the court to allow it to participate as an additional party defendant-appellee and to allow amendment of the county's bill of exceptions to add the city as a defendant-appellee.³ The trial court granted the city's motion and allowed the city to intervene in the case. The city then joined in the county's request for trial by jury.

¶ 4. Riverboat filed a motion to consolidate all three appeals. Riverboat then moved for a bench trial instead of a jury trial. Riverboat averred that there is no right to a jury trial in tax appeals, arguing that under Mississippi Constitution Article 3, Section 31, a right to a jury trial applies only to cases in which a jury trial was required by common law. According to Riverboat, tax appeals did not exist at common law at the time the 1817 Mississippi Constitution was adopted. Therefore, no right to a jury trial exists in a tax appeal. Riverboat additionally argued that a jury trial would prejudice Riverboat because it would put the issue of taxes to other taxpayers in the county. The city and county argued that this Court previously has acknowledged that jury trials are available under Sections 11–51–77 and 27–35–119, citing numerous tax-appeal cases and arguing that jury trials consistently have been held in tax appeals.

¶ 5. The trial court found (1) that the case should be tried by a jury and denied Riverboat's motion for a bench trial, (2) that the phrase “shall be tried anew” in Section 11–51–77 was indicative of the Legislature's intent to guarantee a jury trial, and (3) that tax appeals were tried by jury at common law. We granted Riverboat's petition for interlocutory review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. Article 3, Section 31 of Mississippi's 1890 Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate....” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 31.⁴ “The standard of review this Court employs for constitutional issues is de novo.” Deeds v. State, 27 So.3d 1135, 1141 (Miss.2009).

¶ 7. The narrow question as advanced by Riverboat—whether there is a right to a jury trial in an appeal of a county's ad valorem tax assessment—has not been presented precisely to this Court. However, the custom, practice, and usage of jury trials in tax-dispute cases has been recognized and reported by this Court for parts of three centuries. Our inquiry is not limited by Riverboat's artful drafting. The essential element of proof in dispute in this case is the value of property. Before us is a civil cause of action, the resolution of which requires the determination of a disputed fact. There can be no judgment in the absence of that factual determination. The statute authorizing this suit to be tried anew in circuit court is silent regarding the right to a jury trial. It is important to note that this case is not similar to an appeal from a decision by an administrative agency for which the Legislature has provided no more than the right of an appeal rather than, as under the statute before us today, a trial anew. Compare Miss.Code Ann. § 11–51–77 (Rev.2012) (“The controversy shall be tried anew in the circuit court ....”) with Miss.Code Ann. § 77–3–67 (Rev.2009) (specifically providing for an appeal from the Public Service Commission to the chancery court). It also is interesting to note that most statutes providing for appeals from administrative agencies direct litigants to the chancery court—which ordinarily hears cases without a jury—rather than, as here, directing that the case be tried anew in the circuit court—where trials without juries are the exception. See Miss.Code Ann. § 77–3–67(1) (“[A]ny party aggrieved by any final finding, order or judgment of the commission, except those final findings, orders or judgments specified in Section 77–3–72, shall have the right, regardless of the amount involved, of appeal to the chancery court of the judicial district in which the principal place of business of the utility in the state of Mississippi is located.”).

¶ 8. This Court, on prior occasion and well before the adoption of our 1890 Constitution, addressed the right to trial by jury when statutes giving rise to actions were silent as to that right. In a case involving one such silent statute, concerning recovery by sureties, our predecessors prophetically pronounced that

[i]ssues of fact in this class of cases, must be tried, as all other issues of fact are tried in the circuit courts, by a jury, which may be impanelled under the authority of the court, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the facts,⁵ upon which the judgment is to be pronounced.

Scott v. Nichols, 27 Miss. 94, 5 Cushm. 94, 95 (1854). In Scott, the plaintiff in the trial court sought to recover money paid as surety against the administrator of an estate. This Court emphatically declared the right to a jury trial “is unquestionably the parties' right, and the court will not be departing from its well established rules of practice in granting it, though the statute may be silent on the subject.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Woodward v. May, 5 Miss. 389, 4 Howard 389, 394–95 (1840) ; Smith's Adm'r v. Smith, 2 Miss. 102, 1 Howard 102 (1834).

¶ 9. Our predecessors sagely and emphatically held that “[i]n practice, the court should never refuse [a] party the privilege of a trial by jury, if desired.” Scott, 5 Cushm. at 95 (emphasis added). Almost a hundred years after the adoption of the 1890 Constitution, the Rebelwood Court described jury trials as a “right.” Rebelwood, Ltd. v. Hinds Cty., 544 So.2d 1356, 1368 (Miss.1989), superceded on other grounds by statute as stated in

Willow Bend Estates, LLC v. Humphreys Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 166 So.3d 494 (Miss.2013). This Court customarily has ruled in appeals involving disputes related to taxes involving jury verdicts for more than a hundred and fifty years. See id. (finding the taxpayer's right to trial by jury must “be respected the same as in any other civil case” and applying this view to “property tax appeals heard de novo in the circuit court the same as in any other civil case tried before a jury”); Lavecchia v. Vicksburg, 197 Miss. 860, 20 So.2d 831, 832–33 (1945) (reversing a trial court judgment for giving a peremptory jury instruction, for the jury's “province was to determine the taxable value of the property”); accord

Knox v. L.N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 148 Miss. 834, 114 So. 873, 879 (1927) ; Robertson v. U.S. Nursery Co., 121 Miss. 14, 83 So. 307, 311 (1919) ; Gloster Compress & Trading Co. v. Town of Gloster, 115 Miss. 578, 76 So. 550, 551 (1917) ; City of Clarksdale v. Stuart, 184 Miss. 179, 185 So. 588, 588–89 (1939) (“The property owner had a right to have the court instruct the jury on [the statute].”); accord

City of Clarksdale v. Fitzhugh, 184 Miss. 174, 185 So. 587, 587–88 (1939) ; Redmond v. City of Jackson, 143 Miss. 114, 108 So. 444, 446 (1926) (affirming a trial court's refusal to give a peremptory jury instruction); Bank of Oxford v. Bd. of Supervisors, 79 Miss. 152, 29 So. 825, 825 (1901) (remanding for new trial because jury verdict was in excess); Wm. Atkinson & Bacot Co. v. Pike Cty., 73 Miss. 348, 18 So. 924 (1895) (refusing to overturn a jury verdict).

¶ 10. The dissent relies upon dicta which cites a Kentucky case for the proposition that tax-related appeals were not tried before juries at common law. See Dis. Op. ¶ 23 (quoting Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424, 437–38 (Miss.Err. & App.1860) (citing Harris v. Wood, 22 Ky. 641 (1828) )). The Griffin opinion included that citation in a series of citations covering twelve pages of works attributable to Lord Coke, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall, Thomas Hobbes, and Daniel Webster, among many others. Following this discourse, Justice Harris, writing for the Court, stated, “with all becoming deference to the great minds, ... my reason will not...