Dees v. Dees, 46624

• Decision Date: 06 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 46624,46624
• Citation: 259 Ga. 177,377 S.E.2d 845
• Parties: , 57 USLW 2659 DEES v. DEES.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 845

377 S.E.2d 845

259 Ga. 177, 57 USLW 2659

DEES v. DEES.

No. 46624.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 6, 1989.

J. Russell Jackson, Cumming, for Dennis Dees, Jr.

Jane Plaginos, Cumming, for Jimmie Dees.

MARSHALL, Chief Justice.

We granted Mr. Dees' discretionary appeal of the final decree in his divorce action, which held that his unpaid California workers' compensation lump-sum settlement for an injury sustained during the marriage is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, and which awarded Mrs. Dees, inter alia, 20% of the settlement. We vacate and remand.

The parties were married in 1978. Mr. Dees worked as an engineer in the oil industry until 1982, when he sustained a job-related back injury in California. During the period from 1982 to 1987, at which time the parties separated, Mr. Dees' sole source of income was California workers' compensation benefits. Mrs. Dees helped support her husband and their one minor child by working as a hairdresser. At the time of the trial, Mr. Dees expected to receive a lump-sum settlement of his California workers' compensation claim imminently.

Although this appears to be a case of first impression in Georgia, many other states have considered this issue and decided that workers' compensation awards, like personal-injury awards, may properly be characterized as marital property. See, e.g., Weisfeld v. Weisfeld, 513 So.2d 1278 (1) (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1987) (citing, inter alia, Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 339 S.E.2d 591 (1986), and treating authority from community-property states as equally persuasive as that from equitable-distribution states, such as Georgia.) In considering this issue, the Florida court rejected the so-called "mechanistic approach"--under which "all property, including workers' compensation or personal[-]injury awards, acquired during marriage is deemed to be marital property unless it is specifically excepted by statute"--in favor of "the more enlightened view" of the "analytical approach"--under which, "whether the award is marital property does not depend on a formalistic view which looks only to the timing of the acquisition of the award. Instead, the inquiry focuses on the elements of damages the particular award was intended to remedy or, stated another way, the purpose of the award" ... States subscribing to this approach acknowledge that damage awards may be separated into three different components: (1) compensation for the injured spouse for pain and suffering, disability, and disfigurement, (2) compensation for the injured spouse for lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical and hospital expenses, and (3) compensation for the uninjured spouse for loss of consortium ... Compensation paid to a spouse for non-economic and strictly personal loss under (1) and (3) is considered that spouse's personal property, while the portion of damages paid to the injured spouse under (2) as compensation for economic loss during the marriage is marital property. Weisfeld, 513 So.2d 1278, supra at 1281, citing, inter alia, Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 339 S.E.2d 591, supra.

While we have not heretofore applied the "analytical approach" to workers' compensation awards, we have applied it to a personal-injury award. Campbell, supra. A workers' compensation award may compensate for some of the same...