Defenders of Wildlife v. Ventura

• Decision Date: 31 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. C3-01-329.,C3-01-329.
• Citation: 632 N.W.2d 707
• Parties: DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE; Sierra Club, North Star Chapter; Humane Society of the United States; Friends of Animals and Their Environment; Help Our Wolves Live; Minnesota Wolf Alliance; and the Animal Protection Institute, Appellants, v. Jesse VENTURA, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

632 N.W.2d 707

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE; Sierra Club, North Star Chapter; Humane Society of the United States; Friends of Animals and Their Environment; Help Our Wolves Live; Minnesota Wolf Alliance; and the Animal Protection Institute, Appellants, v. Jesse VENTURA, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. C3-01-329.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 31, 2001.

Review Denied October 24, 2001.

Brian B. O'Neill, Richard A. Duncan, Elizabeth H. Schmiesing, Chad M. Oldfather, Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for appellants.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, David P. Iverson, Assistant Attorney General, Joan M. Eichhorst, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.

Considered and decided by TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge, and RANDALL, Judge, and HARTEN, Judge.

OPINION

R.A. RANDALL, Judge.

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of 2000 Minn. Laws ch. 463, arguing that it violates the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17 and was the product of impermissible legislative logrolling. We find that chapter 463 does not violate the single-subject requirement of the constitution. Affirmed.

FACTS

The gray wolf (timber wolf), once listed as an endangered species by the federal government, was reclassified as a "threatened" species in 1978. As the wolf population continued to increase, the federal government began a process to remove the wolf from its list of protected species. The federal government will turn wolf management over to the state of Minnesota once Minnesota has designed an acceptable wolf-management plan. While not without controversy, a wolf-management plan was eventually enacted in 2000. The federal government has not yet formally passed on Minnesota's wolf management plan (WMP). At this time the federal government still classifies the wolf as "threatened."

The history of Minnesota's WMP is an integral part of appellants' legal argument. Appellants claim the legislative process is part of the proof that the WMP violates the "single subject" provision. In March 1999, a wolf-management plan was introduced into the Minnesota House of Representatives and assigned to its Agriculture Policy Committee, which then referred the bill to the Environment and Natural Resources Policy Committee. The house later passed a plan, which appellants characterize as "less protective" of the wolves, recommended by the latter committee. The bill then went to the Minnesota Senate where it passed through the Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Rules and Administration Committee, Agriculture and Rural Development Committee, and Crime Prevention Committee, the latter of which restored what appellants characterize as "more-protective" measures for the wolf. But the bill was amended on the senate floor to remove the "protective" measures and consequently tabled by the bill's sponsor. No standalone, wolf-management plan was passed.

In February 2000, a lottery bill was introduced in the house and assigned to its Environment and Natural Resources Policy Committee and in the senate by the Environment and Natural Resources Committee. It did not pass as a stand-alone bill. Meanwhile, a license bill was introduced in the house and referred to its Environment and Natural Resources Finance Committee and the Ways and Means Committee.

In March 2000, a "less-protective" wolf-management plan was introduced in the house and senate and referred to the house's Agricultural Policy Committee and the senate's Environment and Natural Resources Committee. After much activity, the senate passed a "more-protective" plan, but the house rejected it. The house, in turn, passed a "less-protective" bill. A committee was formed to reconcile the differences, but no compromise was attained and no stand-alone, wolf-management bill was passed. Around this time, an omnibus-supplemental-appropriations bill was making its way through the legislature. The senate's version contained provisions from the February 2000 lottery bill while the house's version did not.

In April 2000, the license bill was introduced in the senate after passing through the house. By special order, the senate amended the license bill to include a wolf-management plan, similar to the "less protective" one proposed by the house in earlier sessions, and lottery provisions the senate had placed in its March 2000 omnibus bill. Then, in May 2000, Governor Ventura signed 2000 Minn. Laws ch. 463, entitled:

An act relating to natural resources; requiring certain reports; modifying duties of citizen oversight committees; modifying certain license fees; providing for wolf management; modifying use of lighted fishing lures; modifying disposition of payments in lieu of sales tax for lottery tickets; appropriating money; amending Minnesota Statutes 1998, sections 3.737, subdivision 1; 97A.055, subdivisions 4 and 4a; 97A.331, by adding a subdivision; 97A.475, subdivisions 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, and 20; 97A.485, subdivision 12; 97B.645; 97B.671, subdivision 3, and by adding a subdivision; 97C.335, as amended; and 297A.44; subdivision 1; proposing coding for new law in Minnesota Statutes, Ch. 97B.

Thereafter, appellants filed a complaint in district court challenging the constitutionality of the portion of this act pertaining to wolf management in Minnesota, arguing that it violates the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. Appellants claim the WMP was a product of impermissible "logrolling" and that chapter 463 embraces more than a single subject. Appellants moved for summary judgment. Respondent moved to dismiss pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court considered matters outside the bare pleadings, thus converting the proceedings into cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted respondent's. This appeal followed.

ISSUE

Does 2000 Minn. Laws ch. 463 violate the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17?

ANALYSIS

What is man without the beasts?

If all the beasts were gone,

Men would die from a great loneliness of spirit,

For whatever happens to the beasts,

Soon happens to man.

All things are connected.

Maureen Greeley, Wolf 115 (1996) (quoting Chief Seattle).

Generally, in reviewing cases dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), the only question before this court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Elzie v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn.1980). But when the district court considers matters outside the pleadings, "the motion to dismiss shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02). Here, the district court considered matters outside the pleadings in making its decision and thus, the granting of the motion to dismiss shall be treated as a grant of summary judgment.

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of chapter 463 by arguing that it violates Minn. Const. Art. IV § 17, which requires that "no laws shall embrace more than one subject." "In evaluating challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, this court recognizes that the interpretation of statutes is a question of law." In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this court "is not bound by the [district] court's conclusions." Id. (quotation omitted). Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional and are declared unconstitutional only "with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989) (citation omitted). A necessary prerequisite for a finding of unconstitutionality is the challenging party's demonstration beyond a reasonable doubt of a violation of some provision of the Minnesota Constitution. Id.

A. Single Subject

Appellants argue that 2000 Minn. Laws ch. 463 impermissibly embraces more than one subject. The purpose of the single-subject provision is to ensure that the legislature separately reviews and considers each law, thereby diminishing the possibility that matters that are wholly unrelated with a law's subject are not included with the primary law. State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312, 322 (1875). Minnesota courts have traditionally construed the constitutional single-subject provision broadly to afford appropriate deference to the Minnesota legislature. "The common thread which runs through the various sections" need only be a "mere filament." Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg'l Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn.1989).

Historically, Minnesota courts have rarely invalidated laws for a violation of the single-subject requirement. Because of the requisite deference each branch of government affords the other in management of its internal affairs, there have been a limited number of challenges to legislation based on a claim of an article IV, § 17 violation. In the past few decades, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been called on to examine this issue only a handful of times. There is only one recent case, Associated Builders and Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn.2000), where the Minnesota Supreme Court threw out legislation based solely on the "single subject" provision. Although violations of the single-subject requirement are rarely found, the supreme court has recognized limitations on the interpretation of the single-subject provision. Id. at 303 (severing wage amendment provision holding that not severing "would push the mere filament to a mere figment").

The supreme court noted that recent cases prior to Associated took "a different approach" to analyzing challenges to statutes based on section 17. Id. at 301. In State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 778, 783 (Minn.1986), the bill was challenged as separation of powers and single-subject violations. The court invalidated the bill under the separation...