Dejesus v. Village of Pelham Manor

• Decision Date: 17 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02 CIV. 2381.,02 CIV. 2381.
• Citation: 282 F.Supp.2d 162
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Parties: Franklin DEJESUS, Eugenio Dejesus, Freddy Pirrental, Rafael Ortiz and Otilio Pena Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PELHAM MANOR, and John T. Pierpont, individually and as an employee of the Village of Pelham Manor, Defendants.

282 F.Supp.2d 162

Franklin DEJESUS, Eugenio Dejesus, Freddy Pirrental, Rafael Ortiz and Otilio Pena Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PELHAM MANOR, and John T. Pierpont, individually and as an employee of the Village of Pelham Manor, Defendants.

No. 02 CIV. 2381.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 17, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Zelman, Law Office of David Zelman, New York, NY, for Franklin Dejesus Eugenio Dejesus, Freddy Pirrental, Rafael Ortiz, Otilio Pena, plaintiffs.

John F. McKay, III, Suite 1E11, Lake Success, NY, for the Village of Pelham Manor, John T. Pierpont, Individually and as an employee of the Village of Pelham Manor, defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Franklin Dejesus, Eugenio Dejesus, Freddy Pirrental ("Pirrental"), Rafael Ortiz ("Ortiz") and Otilio Pena ("Pena") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a complaint, dated March 27, 2002 (the "Complaint" or "Compl."), alleging five causes of action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of their rights under the United States Constitution. Defendants Village of Pelham Manor ("Pelham Manor") and John Pierpont ("Pierpont") (collectively, "Defendants") now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, in whole or in part, dismissing the claims against them. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Pierpont has been the Village Manager of Pelham Manor since 1995. The Village Building Code of Pelham Manor, enacted on January 23, 1995 ("Building Code"), charges Pierpont with, among other duties and responsibilities, the issuance of building permits for Pelham Manor and the authority to investigate potential violations, and to enforce all regulations concerning building and housing construction and repair. (See Building Code, attached as Exh. D to Exhibits to Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Exhibit Binder")). In order to enable him to fulfill these duties, the Building Code empowers Pierpont with the "right of entry" to any building or structure at "any reasonable hour." Id. Pierpont testified that he was uncertain as to whether he had the power to arrest and nothing in the Building Code expressly grants him the authority to arrest or detain.

On February 21, 2002, the date of the incident out of which this action arises, Plaintiffs were engaged in construction work at the residential premises located at 50 Shore Road, Pelham Manor (the "Premises") on behalf of MSC Restoration Inc. The Premises are owned by Marie Cullen and her husband William Cullen, who also own and operate MSC Restoration Inc. It is not contested by Plaintiffs that on this date they were working at the Premises without a proper work permit.

After observing two construction vans parked outside, Pierpont entered the Premises. Pierpont asked Franklin Dejesus about the work being performed at the Premises and whether a work permit had been obtained. Pierpont identified himself as the Village Manager of Pelham Manor by flashing his official badge. Plaintiffs allege that when they did not produce the requested work permit, Pierpont started ordering them around and indicated that they were under arrest. According to Plaintiffs, Pierpont demanded that Franklin Dejesus order all the workers to congregate downstairs, refused to allow Franklin Dejesus to call his employer, ordered all the Plaintiffs to stay in the hallway while he searched the premises, and ordered that the car keys to both vans be given to him. Pierpont was also observed searching one of the Plaintiffs' vans internally and the other through the vehicle's window. Ultimately, Pierpont indicated that he would return within thirty minutes and that Plaintiffs should leave the Premises before he returned, otherwise he threatened that they would be arrested. Plaintiffs allege that although the keys to the vans were not returned to them by Pierpont, they had spare keys that they used to depart from the Premises soon after Pierpont left. Pierpont returned to the Premises shortly thereafter, at which point the Plaintiffs had already departed, and issued a stop work order, which was posted on the front door of the Premises.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure, both as to their persons and their property, as well as a deprivation of their property without cause in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process. Plaintiffs attest to psychological damage and limited economic damage from missed days of work as a result of these alleged violations. Defendants counter that no unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs took place, that Pierpont is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions, that Plaintiffs had no expectation of privacy in the allegedly searched property and that Pelham Manor is not liable for the actions of Pierpont under the legal parameters of § 1983.² Moreover, Defendants allege that, based on the current record, Plaintiffs are only entitled to nominal damages, and therefore should be precluded from any additional recovery as a matter of law.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To grant summary judgment, the court must determine that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate if the Court, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party, finds that the dispute about a material fact is "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).

The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying the matters that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party "must support with specific evidence his assertion that a genuine dispute as to material fact does exist," id., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998). The opposing party's showing of a genuine dispute must be grounded in concrete evidence sufficient to support a reasonable jury's rendering a verdict in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). All ambiguities and reasonable inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be resolved in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. One Tintoretto Painting Entitled "The Holy Family With Saint Catherine and Honored Donor", 691 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.1982) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)).

B. UNLAWFUL DETENTION OR ARREST

Plaintiffs argue that Pierpont arrested them without a warrant or probable cause that they had committed a crime, thereby violating their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. Moreover, Plaintiffs more broadly assert as part of the Complaint that Pierpont's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure of their persons, even if not rising to the level of an arrest. In response, Defendants contend that no arrest occurred and that, if any minimal detention did occur, Pierpont acted properly within the scope of his authority.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution proscribes "unreasonable seizures." A seizure of a person is said to have occurred "only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); see also Kaupp v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 1845-46, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) ("A seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments occurs when, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would `have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'") (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) and Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)).

An arrest is the "quintessential `seizure of the person.'" California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). However, the Fourth Amendment also protects against more limited detentions: "when an officer `even briefly detains an individual and restrains that person's right to walk away,' he has effected a seizure and the limitations of the Fourth Amendment become applicable." Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1990)); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (the protection against unreasonable search and seizures extends to "seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.")

The Supreme Court has delineated two categories of seizures of the person implicating the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See id. The first is an investigative detention or "Terry...