DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, Inc., 27304

Decision Date07 September 1972
Docket NumberNo. 27304,27304
PartiesDeKALB COUNTY v. ALLSTATE BEER, INC., et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

George P. Dillard, Herbert O. Edwards, Robert E. Mozley, Decatur, for appellant.

Lefkoff & Hanes, Paul L. Hanes, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellees.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

UNDERCOFLER, Justice.

Allstate Beer, Inc., and others, filed a complaint seeking injunctive and other relief against DeKalb County. The complaint alleged that they carried on a wholesale business in that county selling malt beverages to licensed retailers therein; that their business premises are in Fulton County, Georgia, and each has been licensed either by the City of Atlanta or by Fulton County as a licensed wholesaler of malt beverages; and that on November 10, 1970, the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County passed an ordinance which required them to pay an 'audit fee' in addition to a $100 license fee for doing business in that county. A similar ordinance had been in effect previously but was rescinded on November 23, 1971. On December 28, 1971, the ordinance was again passed requiring the $550 'audit fee'. The complainants paid to the county the $100 annual license fee during the period when the 'audit fee' ordinance was not in existence but they have been notified that unless they now pay the $550 fee their 1972 licenses may be canceled or they may be subjected to criminal prosecution. The complaint further alleges that Georgia has a general statute dealing with the licensing of wholesale dealers who do business in counties other than where they are duly licensed and that the DeKalb County ordinance is in conflict with this general statute which limits the license fee to $100. The complainants contend that the general statute pre-empts any local ordinance attempting to impose any license fees or audit fees in excess of the statutory amount and that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The complaint sought an injunction and prayed that the ordinance of DeKalb County be declared unconstitutional and that DeKalb County be permanently enjoined from enforcing it.

DeKalb County filed certain defenses to the complaint.

On agreement of the parties that the matter be treated as if motions for summary judgment had been made by both parties, the trial court found that the 'audit fee' imposed by the ordinance was not a license fee but a revenue raising measure or tax and that the county was without authority to impose it in 1971 since the adoption of the ordinance was subsequent to the applications for licenses; that the audit fees paid into the registry of the court be remitted to the complainants; that the 1971 county ordinance is unconstitutional and void; and that the county be temporarily enjoined from collecting the 'audit fee.' The appeal is from this judgment. Held:

1. DeKalb County contends that the 1950 Act of the General Assembly (Ga.L.1950, p. 185) is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void because it violates Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII (Code Ann. § 2-1908) of the Georgia Constitution in that it contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof. The caption of the 1950 Act provides: 'An Act to further regulate the sales and delivery of malt beverages, to provide for penalties for violation of this Act, and for other purposes.' The county contends that because the caption does not refer to licensing of wholesale dealers or that wholesale dealers having a place of business in any other city or county shall be charged only $100 for the license fee, the body of the act contains matter not expressed in its title.

'We believe it not necessary to engage here in a discussion of the history and purpose of the constitutional clause invoked. It does not mean that the caption must be as detailed as the Act . . . It is sufficient if the provision of the Act is germane to the subject thereof stated in the caption.' Undercofler v Hospital Authority of Forsyth County, 221 Ga. 501, 504, 145 S.E.2d 487.

Licensing dealers is a part of 'regulating the sales and delivery of malt beverages' and the Act is not unconstitutional for this reason or because it contains licensing provisions of nonresident dealers. This contention of the county is without merit.

2. A 1958 local constitutional amendment granted the General Assembly the authority to empower the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County the right: 'To authorize the licensing and regulation of businesses and the levying of license taxes on all persons, firms and corporations doing business in the unincorporated area of said county.' Ga.L.1958, pp. 582, 583.

In 1959 the General Assembly passed an enabling Act authorizing DeKalb County to: 'Fix, levy and assess license fees, charges or taxes on all persons, firms and corporations engaging in or offering to engage in any trade, business, calling, avocation or profession in the area of DeKalb County, Georgia, outside the incorporated limits of municipalities situated therein.' Ga.L.1959, pp. 2658, 2659.

In 1971 DeKalb County passed the following ordinance pursuant to the 1959 enabling Act of the General Assembly: 'The revenue collector shall audit each wholesale dealer licensed to do business in the county, and such wholesaler shall, at the time of filing application for a license or a renewal of license, pay to the revenue collector the sum of five hundred fifty dollars to cover the cost of auditing the books and records of such wholesale dealer . . .' This audit fee is in addition to the license fee in the amount of $100 which the county also collects from the complainants.

A state statute was in existence at the time which provided: 'Where a wholesale dealer is licensed to do business in one city or...

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7 cases
  • Goldrush II v. City of Marietta
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1997
    ...effective until the legislation is passed. State v. Pendergrass, 63 Haw. 633, 633 P.2d 1113 (1981). See also DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, 229 Ga. 483(2), 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972). Consequently, while the wording of the constitutional amendment authorizes enactment of local legislation that ......
  • Bandoni v. State
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    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
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    ...267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1997) (citing State v. Pendergrass, 63 Haw. 633, 633 P.2d 1113 (1981) and DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, 229 Ga. 483, 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972)). Although the General Assembly may have failed to heed the framers' clarion call to enact specific enforcement prov......
  • Age Intern., Inc. v. Miller
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    ...Education, 231 Ga. 150, 200 S.E.2d 698 (1973); Robbins v. City of Rome, 230 Ga. 901, 199 S.E.2d 802 (1973); DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, Inc., 229 Ga. 483, 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972). Plaintiffs cite other cases which appear to require deferral to statutory administrative proceedings. George ......
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    ...the part of the 1951 Act which prohibits Fulton County from operating a police department. Compare DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, Inc., 229 Ga. 483(3), 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972). The trial judge correctly held that Fulton County under the 1972 constitutional amendment has the power to operate ......
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